www.WarAndDecision.com
www.WarAndDecision.com The origins and course of the war in Iraq: review by Fred C. Iklé
Stockpiles of WMD?: "the salient issue was not whether Saddam had stockpiles of WMD but whether he could produce them and place them in the hands of terrorists. The administration’s appalling inability to explain that this is what it was thinking and doing allowed the unearthing of stockpiles to become the test of whether it had correctly assessed the risk that Saddam might provide WMD to terrorists. When none were found, the administration appeared to have failed the test even though considerable evidence of Saddam’s capability to produce WMD was found in postwar inspections by the Iraq Survey Group chaired by Charles Duelfer."
'[M]ost of the received wisdom about the dynamics of the first Bush term --
pitting "warmongering neocons" and democracy fantasists such as Mr.
Feith
against more sober-minded realists such as then-Secretary of State Colin Powell
and his deputy, Richard Armitage --
is bunk, and demonstrably so.' -- Bret Stephens, Wall
Street Journal
The war on terrorism finally explained in detail by Douglas Feith
• It was the Pentagon "neocons" who continually urged the
President to tone down his democracy rhetoric.
• The most powerful analysis of the downsides of going to war in Iraq
came not from the State Department or the CIA, but from Donald Rumsfeld.
• The Pentagon-CIA dispute over the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship began with
objections by Defense officials about the CIA's politicization of intelligence,
not the other way around.
• The work of the State Department's Future of Iraq project on post-Saddam
political transition was opposed not by Defense officials, but by Colin Powell
and Richard Armitage.
• It was CIA officials who predicted that Iraqis would launch pro-U.S.
uprisings after the start of the war.
• It was State Department officials who advocated a multiyear U.S. occupation
of Iraq.
Feith debunks the misconceptions about the Iraq war
"For anyone seriously interested in the decisions prior to and during
the Iraq War, War and Decision is a must-read book. It is the first from within
the Department of Defense, and Feith provides careful documentation rather than
just freewheeling opinions. He explodes many of the journalistic and political
myths that have become widely accepted." — James Schlesinger
Excerpt from Chapter 3:
"In the past several years, countless media stories have suggested that
Rumsfeld and the 'neocons' mysteriously or conspiratorially achieved sway over
the president. Defense officials did have influence, but this owed much to a
mode of operation that was the opposite of conspiracy: We created a transparent
record of the facts and reasoning we used to support our proposals. Bush often
complimented Rumsfeld’s memos, which addressed him at the level on which
he liked to operate—that of strategy, not tactics. They were analytical
and mercilessly edited, giving the results of much thought in few words. And
they showed confidence that the ideas they contained, when reduced to print
on a page, could retain potency and withstand scrutiny over time, unlike arguments
that derive their force from the personality of the advocate."
Watch the documentary: IraqAndBeyond.com
Hugh Hewitt interviews Doug Feith - Part 1
Hugh Hewitt interviews Doug Feith - Part 2
Hugh Hewitt interviews Doug Feith - Part 3
Interview with KLo: Feith on war, media, and history.
VDH on the "neocon" slur
The
scarlet word: "neocon"
Review by Bing
West
Review by Christopher Hitchens
Review by Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. [Gaffney debunks the crazy conspiracy theories about Douglas Feith.]
Review by Michael Barone [Barone on “Bush lied; people died.”]
Review by Larry Di Rita
Review by Jonah Goldberg
Review by Rich Lowry [Part 2]
A Model War Correspondent: Feith reviews The Forever War, by Dexter Filkins
War
Policy with Douglas Feith: Chapter 1 of 5
Critics argue that U.S. officials manipulated intelligence in order to boost
public support for the war. There mantra is “Bush lied, people died.”
Not true, says Douglas Feith. Bush believed the same intelligence information
that Clinton believed. Saddam, meanwhile, was corrupting that intelligence,
leading the world to believe the WMD stockpiles were there.
War
Policy with Douglas Feith: Chapter 2 of 5
Feith discusses the war blunders. First, the failure to provide adequate security
forces after the fall of Saddam. Feith describes how this grew out of a sense
that a build-up of U.S. forces would play to enemy propaganda. Second, the decision
to maintain an occupation government in Iraq for over a year. Feith says this
came counter to the idea of “liberation, not occupation.”
War
Policy with Douglas Feith: Chapter 3 of 5
Why was the CIA’s pre-war intelligence about Iraq so faulty?
Simple, says Feith. According to a congressional report, “the CIA did
not have . . . a single agent dedicated to the WMD issue in Iraq before the
war. Not one.” Making matters worse, the CIA neither offered the president
alternatives to his Iraq policy, nor did it wholeheartedly support that policy
once it was implemented.
War
Policy with Douglas Feith: Chapter 4 of 5
Feith describes how WMD in Iraq — or the lack thereof — changed
everything. Despite the fact that the WMD threat was but one of several dangers
posed by Saddam’s regime, the failure to discover the WMD stockpiles prompted
the Bush administration to shift its rhetoric away from past threats and toward
Iraq’s future. In doing so the administration only empowered its critics.
War
Policy with Douglas Feith: Chapter 5 of 5
Is the U.S. equipped to deal with national-security problems around the world?
Feith says no, pointing out the antiquated organization of our entire security
community as well as the ineffective mess that is the CIA. Of course, our national
security ultimately depends on the people in charge. Feith rates a few of the
bigger names.
Besides, what if Iraq works? There could be a promising future there.