Ratio: Formal Aspect

No. The intellect knows itself not by its essence, but by its act, because it understands itself according as it is made actual by the species abstracted from sensible things, through the light of the active intellect, which not only actuates the intelligible things themselves, but also, by their instrumentality, actuates the passive intellect.

Non per essentiam suam, sed per actum suum se cognoscit intellectus noster quia seipsum intelligat intellectus noster, secundum quod fit actu per species a sensibilibus abstractas per lumen intellectus agentis, quod est actus ipsorum intelligibilium, et eis mediantibus intellectus possibilis.

An angel apprehends his own essence through itself: not so the human mind, which is either altogether in potentiality to intelligible things (as is the passive intellect) or is the act of intelligible things abstracted from the phantasms (as is the active intellect).

Angelus suam essentiam per seipsum apprehendit. Non autem intellectus humanus, qui vel est omnino in potentia respectu intelligibilium (sicut intellectus possibilis) vel est actus intelligibilium quae abstrahuntur a phantasmatibus (sicut intellectus agens).

It is said (De Anima iii, 4) that "the intellect understands itself in the same way as it understands other things." But it understands other things, not by their essence, but by their similitudes. Therefore it does not understand itself by its own essence.

Dicitur in III de anima, quod "intellectus intelligit seipsum sicut et alia". Sed alia non intelligit per essentias eorum, sed per eorum similitudines. Ergo neque se intelligit per essentiam suam.

No. Habits, like the powers, are known by their acts, because nothing is known but as it is actual.

Habitus per actus cognoscuntur, sicut et potentiae, quia nihil cognoscitur nisi secundum quod est actu.

A habit is a kind of medium between mere power and mere act.

Habitus quodammodo est medium inter potentiam puram et purum actum.

Habits are present in our intellect, not as its object since, in the present state of life, our intellect's object is the nature of a material thing as stated above (Q84, A7), but as that by which it understands.

Habitus sunt praesentes in intellectu nostro, non sicut obiecta intellectus (quia obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est natura rei materialis, ut supra dictum est); sed sunt praesentes in intellectu ut quibus intellectus intelligit.

Although faith is not known by external movement of the body, it is perceived by the subject wherein it resides, by the interior act of the heart. For no one knows that he has faith unless he knows that he believes.

Etsi fides non cognoscatur per exteriores corporis motus, percipitur tamen etiam ab eo in quo est, per interiorem actum cordis. Nullus enim fidem se habere scit, nisi per hoc quod se credere percipit.

Yes. The intellect can understand its own act because the first thing understood of the intellect is its own act of understanding.

Intellectus potest suum actum intelligere quia primum quod de intellectu intelligitur, scilicet ipsum eius intelligere.

The object of the intellect is something universal, namely, "being" and "the true," in which the act also of understanding is comprised.

Obiectum intellectus est commune quoddam, scilicet ens et verum, sub quo comprehenditur etiam ipse actus intelligendi. Unde intellectus potest suum actum intelligere.

But not primarily, since the first object of our intellect, in this state of life, is not every being and everything true, but "being" and "true," as considered in material things, as we have said above (Q84, A7), from which it acquires knowledge of all other things.

Sed non primo, quia nec primum obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum praesentem statum, est quodlibet ens et verum, sed ens et verum consideratum in rebus materialibus, ut dictum est, ex quibus in cognitionem omnium aliorum devenit.

The human intellect neither is its own act of understanding, nor is its own essence the first object of its act of understanding, for this object is the nature of a material thing. And therefore that which is first known by the human intellect is an object of this kind, and that which is known secondarily is the act by which that object is known; and through the act the intellect itself is known, the perfection of which is this act of understanding. For this reason did the Philosopher assert that objects are known before acts, and acts before powers (De Anima ii, 4).

Intellectus humanus nec est suum intelligere, nec sui intelligere est obiectum primum ipsa eius essentia, sed aliquid extrinsecum, scilicet natura materialis rei. Et ideo id quod primo cognoscitur ab intellectu humano, est huiusmodi obiectum; et secundario cognoscitur ipse actus quo cognoscitur obiectum; et per actum cognoscitur ipse intellectus, cuius est perfectio ipsum intelligere. Et ideo philosophus dicit quod obiecta praecognoscuntur actibus, et actus potentiis.

Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I understand."

Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., "intelligo me intelligere."

Yes. The act of the will is understood by the intellect because whatever is intelligibly in an intelligent subject, is understood by that subject: both inasmuch as one knows that one wills; and inasmuch as one knows the nature of this act, and consequently, the nature of its principle which is the habit or power.

Actus voluntatis intelligitur ab intellectu quia quod intelligibiliter est in aliquo intelligente, consequens est ut ab eo intelligatur: et inquantum aliquis percipit se velle; et inquantum aliquis cognoscit naturam huius actus, et per consequens naturam eius principii, quod est habitus vel potentia.

Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I will."

Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., "intelligo me velle."

No. Immaterial substances which do not fall under sense and imagination, cannot first and "per se" be known by us, according to the mode of knowledge which experience proves us to have, because our intellect in its present state of life has a natural relationship to the natures of material things; and therefore it can only understand by turning to the phantasms.

Substantias immateriales, quae sub sensu et imaginatione non cadunt, primo et per se, secundum modum cognitionis nobis expertum, intelligere non possumus, quia intellectus noster, secundum statum praesentis vitae, naturalem respectum habet ad naturas rerum materialium; unde nihil intelligit nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata.

In the opinion of Plato, immaterial substances are not only understood by us, but are the objects we understand first of all. For Plato taught that immaterial subsisting forms, which he called "Ideas," are the proper objects of our intellect, and thus first and "per se" understood by us; and, further, that material objects are known by the soul inasmuch as phantasy and sense are mixed up with the mind. Hence the purer the intellect is, so much the more clearly does it perceive the intelligible truth of immaterial things.

Secundum opinionem Platonis, substantiae immateriales non solum a nobis intelliguntur, sed etiam sunt prima a nobis intellecta. Posuit enim Plato formas immateriales subsistentes, quas ideas vocabat, esse propria obiecta nostri intellectus, et ita primo et per se intelliguntur a nobis. Applicatur tamen animae cognitio rebus materialibus, secundum quod intellectui permiscetur phantasia et sensus. Unde quanto magis intellectus fuerit depuratus, tanto magis percipit immaterialium intelligibilem veritatem.

The active intellect is not a separate substance, but a faculty of the soul, extending itself actively to the same objects to which the passive intellect extends receptively; because, as is stated (De Anima iii, 5), the passive intellect is "all things potentially," and the active intellect is "all things in act." Therefore both intellects, according to the present state of life, extend to material things only, which are made actually intelligible by the active intellect, and are received in the passive intellect. Hence in the present state of life we cannot understand separate immaterial substances in themselves, either by the passive or by the active intellect.

Intellectus agens non est substantia separata, sed virtus quaedam animae, ad eadem active se extendens, ad quae se extendit intellectus possibilis receptive, quia, ut dicitur in III de anima, intellectus possibilis est quo est omnia fieri, intellectus agens quo est omnia facere. Uterque ergo intellectus se extendit, secundum statum praesentis vitae, ad materialia sola; quae intellectus agens facit intelligibilia actu, et recipiuntur in intellectu possibili. Unde secundum statum praesentis vitae, neque per intellectum possibilem, neque per intellectum agentem, possumus intelligere substantias immateriales secundum seipsas.

There must needs be some proportion between the object and the faculty of knowledge; such as of the active to the passive, and of perfection to the perfectible. Hence that sensible objects of great power are not grasped by the senses, is due not merely to the fact that they corrupt the organ, but also to their being improportionate to the sensitive power. And thus it is that immaterial substances are improportionate to our intellect, in our present state of life, so that it cannot understand them.

Requiritur aliqua proportio obiecti ad potentiam cognoscitivam, ut activi ad passivum, et perfectionis ad perfectibile. Unde quod excellentia sensibilia non capiantur a sensu, non sola ratio est quia corrumpunt organa sensibilia; sed etiam quia sunt improportionata potentiis sensitivis. Et hoc modo substantiae immateriales sunt improportionatae intellectui nostro, secundum praesentem statum, ut non possint ab eo intelligi.

No. We are not able perfectly to understand immaterial substances through material substances because immaterial substances differ altogether in formal aspect from the definable structures of material things.

Per substantias materiales non possumus perfecte substantias immateriales intelligere quia substantiae immateriales sunt omnino alterius rationis a quidditatibus materialium rerum.

However much our intellect abstracts the definable structure of material things from matter, it could never arrive at anything similar to immaterial substance.

Quantumcumque intellectus noster abstrahat quidditatem rei materialis a materia, nunquam perveniet ad aliquid simile substantiae immateriali.

From material things we can rise to some kind of knowledge of immaterial things, but not to the perfect knowledge thereof, for there is no proper and adequate proportion between material and immaterial things; and the likenesses drawn from material things for the understanding of immaterial things are very dissimilar therefrom, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii).

Ex rebus materialibus ascendere possumus in aliqualem cognitionem immaterialium rerum, non tamen in perfectam, quia non est sufficiens comparatio rerum materialium ad immateriales; sed similitudines si quae a materialibus accipiuntur ad immaterialia intelligenda, sunt multum dissimiles, ut Dionysius dicit, II cap. Cael. Hier.

But we may have a scientific knowledge of them by way of negation and by their relation to material things.

Sed de eis nobis in scientiis documenta traduntur per viam remotionis et alicuius habitudinis ad res materiales.

Created immaterial substances are not in the same natural genus as material substances, for their formal aspect does not agree in power or in matter; but they belong to the same logical genus, because even immaterial substances are in the predicament of substance, since their definable structure is not their existence.

Substantiae immateriales creatae in genere quidem naturali non conveniunt cum substantiis materialibus, quia non est in eis eadem ratio potentiae et materiae; conveniunt tamen cum eis in genere logico, quia etiam substantiae immateriales sunt in praedicamento substantiae, cum earum quidditas non sit earum esse.

But God has no connection with material things, as regards either natural genus or logical genus; because God is in no genus, as stated above (Q3, A5). Hence through the likeness derived from material things we can know something positive concerning the angels, according to some common formal aspect, though not according to the specific formal aspect; whereas we cannot acquire any such knowledge at all about God.

Sed Deus non convenit cum rebus materialibus neque secundum genus naturale, neque secundum genus logicum, quia Deus nullo modo est in genere, ut supra dictum est. Unde per similitudines rerum materialium aliquid affirmative potest cognosci de Angelis secundum rationem communem, licet non secundum rationem speciei; de Deo autem nullo modo.

No. God is not the first object of our knowledge because the first object of our knowledge in this life is the definable structure of a material thing, which is the proper object of our intellect.

Deus non est primum quod a nobis cognoscitur quia primum quod intelligitur a nobis secundum statum praesentis vitae, est quidditas rei materialis, quae est nostri intellectus obiectum.

The human intellect in the present state of life cannot understand even immaterial created substances; much less can it understand the essence of the uncreated substance.

Intellectus humanus, secundum statum praesentis vitae, non possit intelligere substantias immateriales creatas; multo minus potest intelligere essentiam substantiae increatae.

Rather do we know God through creatures, according to the Apostle (Romans 1:20), "the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made".

Sed magis per creaturas in Dei cognitionem pervenimus, secundum illud apostoli ad Rom. I, "invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur."

Other things than God are known because of God; not as if He were the first known object, but because He is the first cause of our faculty of knowledge.

Propter Deum autem alia cognoscuntur, non sicut propter primum cognitum, sed sicut propter primam cognoscitivae virtutis causam.

We see and judge of all things in the light of the first truth, inasmuch as the light itself of our mind, whether natural or gratuitous, is nothing else than the impression of the first truth upon it, as stated above (Q12, A2).

In luce primae veritatis omnia intelligimus et iudicamus, inquantum ipsum lumen intellectus nostri, sive naturale sive gratuitum, nihil aliud est quam quaedam impressio veritatis primae, ut supra dictum est.

Yes. The soul can understand when it is apart from the body because it has a proper operation and above all that which consists in intelligence.

Anima intelligit sine corpore existens quia habet aliquam operationem propriam et maxime eam quae est intelligere.

The separated soul does not understand by way of innate species, nor by species abstracted then, nor only by species retained ... but the soul in that state understands by means of participated species arising from the influence of the Divine light, shared by the soul as by other separate substances, though in a lesser degree.

Anima separata non intelligit per species innatas, nec per species quas tunc abstrahit, nec solum per species conservatas ... sed per species ex influentia divini luminis participatas, quarum anima fit particeps sicut et aliae substantiae separatae, quamvis inferiori modo.

Hence as soon as it ceases to act by turning to corporeal [phantasms], the soul turns at once to the superior things; nor is this way of knowledge unnatural, for God is the author of the influx of both of the light of grace and of the light of nature.

Unde tam cito cessante conversione ad corpus, ad superiora convertitur. Nec tamen propter hoc cognitio non est naturalis, quia Deus est auctor non solum influentiae gratuiti luminis, sed etiam naturalis.

As nothing acts except so far as it is actual, the mode of action in every agent follows from its mode of existence. Now the soul has one mode of being when in the body, and another when apart from it, its nature remaining always the same; but this does not mean that its union with the body is an accidental thing, for, on the contrary, such union belongs to the formal aspect of its nature.

Cum nihil operetur nisi inquantum est actu, modus operandi uniuscuiusque rei sequitur modum essendi ipsius. Habet autem anima alium modum essendi cum unitur corpori, et cum fuerit a corpore separata, manente tamen eadem animae natura; non ita quod uniri corpori sit ei accidentale, sed per rationem suae naturae corpori unitur.

The soul, therefore, when united to the body, consistently with that mode of existence, has a mode of understanding, by turning to corporeal phantasms, which are in corporeal organs; but when it is separated from the body, it has a mode of understanding, by turning to simply intelligible objects, as is proper to other separate substances.

Animae igitur secundum illum modum essendi quo corpori est unita, competit modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata corporum, quae in corporeis organis sunt; cum autem fuerit a corpore separata, competit ei modus intelligendi per conversionem ad ea quae sunt intelligibilia simpliciter, sicut et aliis substantiis separatis.

Hence it is as natural for the soul to understand by turning to the phantasms as it is for it to be joined to the body; but to be separated from the body is beyond the formal aspect of its nature, and likewise to understand without turning to the phantasms is beyond its nature; and hence it is united to the body in order that it may have an existence and an operation suitable to its nature.

Unde modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata est animae naturalis, sicut et corpori uniri, sed esse separatum a corpore est praeter rationem suae naturae, et similiter intelligere sine conversione ad phantasmata est ei praeter naturam. Et ideo ad hoc unitur corpori, ut sit et operetur secundum naturam suam.

Now it is clear that in the natural order human souls hold the lowest place among intellectual substances. But the perfection of the universe required various grades of being. If, therefore, God had willed souls to understand in the same way as separate substances, it would follow that human knowledge, so far from being perfect, would in general be confused.

Manifestum est autem inter substantias intellectuales, secundum naturae ordinem, infimas esse animas humanas. Hoc autem perfectio universi exigebat, ut diversi gradus in rebus essent. Si igitur animae humanae sic essent institutae a Deo ut intelligerent per modum qui competit substantiis separatis, non haberent cognitionem perfectam, sed confusam in communi.

Therefore to make it possible for human souls to possess perfect and proper knowledge, they were so made that their nature required them to be joined to bodies, and thus to receive the proper and adequate knowledge of sensible things from the sensible things themselves; thus we see in the case of uneducated men that they have to be taught by sensible examples.

Ad hoc ergo quod perfectam et propriam cognitionem de rebus habere possent, sic naturaliter sunt institutae ut corporibus uniantur, et sic ab ipsis rebus sensibilibus propriam de eis cognitionem accipiant; sicut homines rudes ad scientiam induci non possunt nisi per sensibilia exempla.

The Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1), "If the soul had no proper operation, it could not be separated from the body."

Philosophus dicit, in I de anima, quod "si non est aliqua operationum animae propria, non contingit ipsam separari."

Yes. The soul apart from the body has perfect knowledge of other separated souls, but it has an imperfect and defective knowledge of the angels, so far as its natural knowledge is concerned, because, as Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), "our mind acquires the knowledge of incorporeal things by itself"--i.e., by knowing itself (Q88, A1, ad 1).

De aliis animabus separatis perfectam cognitionem habet, de Angelis autem imperfectam et deficientem, loquendo de cognitione naturali animae separatae, quia sicut Augustinus dicit in IX de Trin., "mens nostra cognitionem rerum incorporearum per seipsam accipit", idest cognoscendo seipsam.

Therefore from the knowledge which the separated soul has of itself, we can judge how it knows other separate things. Now it was said above (Q89, A1), that as long as it is united to the body the soul understands by turning to phantasms, and therefore it does not understand itself save through becoming actually intelligent by means of ideas abstracted from phantasms; for thus it understands itself through its own act, as shown above (Q87, A1).

Per hoc ergo quod anima separata cognoscit seipsam, accipere possumus qualiter cognoscit alias substantias separatas. Dictum est autem quod quandiu anima corpori est unita, intelligit convertendo se ad phantasmata. Et ideo nec seipsam potest intelligere nisi inquantum fit actu intelligens per speciem a phantasmatibus abstractam, sic enim per actum suum intelligit seipsam, ut supra dictum est.

When, however, it is separated from the body, it understands no longer by turning to phantasms, but by turning to simply intelligible objects; hence in that state it understands itself through itself. Now, every separate substance "understands what is above itself and what is below itself, according to the mode of its substance" (De Causis viii): for a thing is understood according as it is in the one who understands; while one thing is in another according to the nature of that in which it is. And the mode of existence of a separated soul is inferior to that of an angel, but is the same as that of other separated souls.

Sed cum fuerit a corpore separata, intelliget non convertendo se ad phantasmata, sed ad ea quae sunt secundum se intelligibilia, unde seipsam per seipsam intelliget. Est autem commune omni substantiae separatae quod intelligat id quod est supra se, et id quod est infra se, per modum suae substantiae, sic enim intelligitur aliquid secundum quod est in intelligente; est autem aliquid in altero per modum eius in quo est. Modus autem substantiae animae separatae est infra modum substantiae angelicae, sed est conformis modo aliarum animarum separatarum.

The separated soul understands the angels by means of divinely impressed ideas; which, however, fail to give perfect knowledge of them, inasmuch as the nature of the soul is inferior to that of an angel.

Anima separata intelligit Angelos per similitudines divinitus impressas. Quae tamen deficiunt a perfecta repraesentatione eorum, propter hoc quod animae natura est inferior quam Angeli.

Man's ultimate happiness consists not in the knowledge of any separate substances; but in the knowledge of God, Who is seen only by grace. The knowledge of other separate substances, if perfectly understood, gives great happiness, yet not final and ultimate happiness. But the separated soul does not understand them perfectly.

In cognitione substantiarum separatarum non quarumcumque, consistit ultima hominis felicitas, sed solius Dei, qui non potest videri nisi per gratiam. In cognitione vero aliarum substantiarum separatarum est magna felicitas, etsi non ultima, si tamen perfecte intelligantur. Sed anima separata naturali cognitione non perfecte eas intelligit.

No. Separated souls know all natural things not with a certain and proper knowledge but in a general and confused manner because the separated soul, like the angels, understands by means of species, received from the influence of the Divine light; nevertheless, as the soul by nature is inferior to an angel, to whom this kind of knowledge is natural, the soul apart from the body through such species does not receive perfect knowledge.

Animae separatae de omnibus naturalibus cognitionem habent, non certam et propriam, sed communem et confusam quia anima separata intelligit per species quas recipit ex influentia divini luminis, sicut et Angeli, sed tamen, quia natura animae est infra naturam Angeli, cui iste modus cognoscendi est connaturalis, anima separata per huiusmodi species non accipit perfectam rerum cognitionem.

Separated souls, therefore, have the same relation through such species to imperfect and confused knowledge of natural things as the angels have to the perfect knowledge thereof. Now angels through such species know all natural things perfectly; because all that God has produced in the respective natures of natural things has been produced by Him in the angelic intelligence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8).

Sicut igitur se habent Angeli ad perfectam cognitionem rerum naturalium per huiusmodi species, ita animae separatae ad imperfectam et confusam. Angeli autem per huiusmodi species cognoscunt cognitione perfecta omnia naturalia, quia omnia quae Deus fecit in propriis naturis, fecit in intelligentia angelica, ut dicit Augustinus, super Gen. ad Litt.

As the soul separated from the body does not perfectly understand separate substances, so neither does it know all natural things perfectly.

Anima separata non perfecte intelligit substantias separatas ita nec omnia naturalia perfecte cognoscit, sed sub quadam confusione.

Yes. The intellect does not know the singular by way of abstraction; neither does the separated soul know it thus, because the knowledge of the separated soul is confined to those species or individuals to which the soul has some kind of determinate relation.

Intellectus per viam abstractionis non est cognoscitivus singularium; sic autem anima separata non intelligit, quia ad illarum rerum species vel individua cognitio animae separatae determinatur, ad quae anima separata habet aliquam determinatam habitudinem.

The separated soul has not the same relation to all singulars, but one relation to some, and another to others.

Anima separata non se habet aequaliter ad omnia singularia, sed ad quaedam habet aliquam habitudinem quam non habet ad alia.

Separated souls know some singulars, but not all, not even all present singulars. To understand this, we must consider that there is a twofold way of knowing things, one by means of abstraction from phantasms, and in this way singulars cannot be directly known by the intellect, but only indirectly, as stated above (Q86, A1).

Animae separatae aliqua singularia cognoscunt, sed non omnia, etiam quae sunt praesentia. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod duplex est modus intelligendi. Unus per abstractionem a phantasmatibus, et secundum istum modum singularia per intellectum cognosci non possunt directe, sed indirecte, sicut supra dictum est.

The other way of understanding is by the infusion of species by God, and in that way it is possible for the intellect to know singulars. For as God knows all things, universal and singular, by His Essence, as the cause of universal and individual principles (Q14, A2), so likewise separate substances can know singulars by species which are a kind of participated similitude of the Divine Essence.

Alius modus intelligendi est per influentiam specierum a Deo, et per istum modum intellectus potest singularia cognoscere. Sicut enim ipse Deus per suam essentiam, inquantum est causa universalium et individualium principiorum, cognoscit omnia et universalia et singularia, ut supra dictum est; ita substantiae separatae per species, quae sunt quaedam participatae similitudines illius divinae essentiae, possunt singularia cognoscere.

There is a difference, however, between angels and separated souls in the fact that through these species the angels have a perfect and proper knowledge of things; whereas separated have only a confused knowledge.

In hoc tamen est differentia inter Angelos et animas separatas, quia Angeli per huiusmodi species habent perfectam et propriam cognitionem de rebus, animae vero separatae confusam.

Hence the angels, by reason of their perfect intellect, through these species, know not only the specific natures of things, but also the singulars contained in those species; whereas separated souls by these species know only those singulars to which they are determined by former knowledge in this life, or by some affection, or by natural aptitude, or by the disposition of the Divine order; because whatever is received into anything is conditioned according to the mode of the recipient.

Unde Angeli, propter efficaciam sui intellectus, per huiusmodi species, non solum naturas rerum in speciali cognoscere possunt, sed etiam singularia sub speciebus contenta. Animae vero separatae non possunt cognoscere per huiusmodi species nisi solum singularia illa ad quae quodammodo determinantur, vel per praecedentem cognitionem, vel per aliquam affectionem, vel per naturalem habitudinem, vel per divinam ordinationem, quia omne quod recipitur in aliquo, determinatur in eo secundum modum recipientis.

Yes. Knowledge acquired in the present life does not remain in the separated soul, as regards what belongs to the sensitive powers; but as regards what belongs to the intellect itself, it must remain; because it is evident that human knowledge is not corrupted through corruption of the subject, for the intellect is an incorruptible faculty; and neither can the intelligible species in the passive intellect be corrupted by their contrary, for there is no contrary to intelligible "intentions," above all as regards simple intelligence of "what a thing is."

Quantum ergo ad id quod aliquis praesentis scientiae habet in inferioribus viribus, non remanebit in anima separata, sed quantum ad id quod habet in ipso intellectu, necesse est ut remaneat; quia manifestum est quod per corruptionem subiecti, scientia quae est in intellectu humano, corrumpi non potest, cum intellectus sit incorruptibilis; similiter etiam nec per contrarium corrumpi possunt species intelligibiles quae sunt in intellectu possibili, quia intentioni intelligibili nihil est contrarium; et praecipue quantum ad simplicem intelligentiam, qua intelligitur quod quid est.

Since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is "the abode of species," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4), the habit of knowledge here acquired must be partly in the aforesaid sensitive powers and partly in the intellect. This can be seen by considering the very actions from which knowledge arises. For "habits are like the actions whereby they are acquired" (Ethic. ii, 1).

Sed quia scientia est in intellectu, qui est locus specierum, ut dicitur in III de anima; oportet quod habitus scientiae hic acquisitae partim sit in praedictis viribus sensitivis, et partim in ipso intellectu. Et hoc potest considerari ex ipsis actibus ex quibus habitus scientiae acquiritur, nam "habitus sunt similes actibus ex quibus acquiruntur", ut dicitur in II Ethic.

Now the actions of the intellect, by which knowledge is here acquired, are performed by the mind turning to the phantasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers. Hence through such acts the passive intellect acquires a certain facility in considering the species received: and the aforesaid sensitive powers acquire a certain aptitude in seconding the action of the intellect when it turns to them to consider the intelligible object.

Actus autem intellectus ex quibus in praesenti vita scientia acquiritur, sunt per conversionem intellectus ad phantasmata, quae sunt in praedictis viribus sensitivis. Unde per tales actus et ipsi intellectui possibili acquiritur facultas quaedam ad considerandum per species susceptas; et in praedictis inferioribus viribus acquiritur quaedam habilitas ut facilius per conversionem ad ipsas intellectus possit intelligibilia speculari.

But as the intellectual act resides chiefly and formally in the intellect itself, whilst it resides materially and dispositively in the inferior powers, the same distinction is to be applied to habit.

Sed sicut actus intellectus principaliter quidem et formaliter est in ipso intellectu, materialiter autem et dispositive in inferioribus viribus, idem etiam dicendum est de habitu.

Yes. The act of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul, but in a different way, because through the intelligible species acquired in this life, the soul apart from the body can understand what it understood formerly, but in a different way; not by turning to phantasms, but by a mode suited to a soul existing apart from the body.

Manet in anima separata actus scientiae hic acquisitae, sed non secundum eundem modum, quia secundum species intelligibiles hic acquisitas, anima separata intelligere possit quae prius intellexit; non tamen eodem modo, scilicet per conversionem ad phantasmata, sed per modum convenientem animae separatae.

Action offers two things for our consideration--its species and its mode. Its species comes from the object, whereto the faculty of knowledge is directed by the (intelligible) species, which is the object's similitude; whereas the mode is gathered from the power of the agent.

In actu est duo considerare, scilicet speciem actus, et modum ipsius. Et species quidem actus consideratur ex obiecto in quod actus cognoscitivae virtutis dirigitur per speciem, quae est obiecti similitudo, sed modus actus pensatur ex virtute agentis.

Thus that a person see a stone is due to the species of the stone in his eye; but that he see it clearly, is due to the eye's visual power.

Sicut quod aliquis videat lapidem, contingit ex specie lapidis quae est in oculo, sed quod acute videat, contingit ex virtute visiva oculi.

The acts which produce a habit are like the acts caused by that habit, in species, but not in mode. For example, to do just things, but not justly, that is, pleasurably, causes the habit of political justice, whereby we act pleasurably. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethic. v, 8: Magn. Moral. i, 34).

Actus per quos acquiritur habitus, sunt similes actibus quos habitus causant, quantum ad speciem actus, non autem quantum ad modum agendi. Nam operari iusta, sed non iuste, idest delectabiliter, causat habitum iustitiae politicae, per quem delectabiliter operamur.