Intellectual Operations of the Soul

Yes. Science is in the intellect because through the intellect the soul knows bodies by a knowledge which is immaterial, universal, and necessary.

Scientia est in intellectu quia anima per intellectum cognoscit corpora cognitione immateriali, universali et necessaria.

If, therefore, the intellect does not know bodies, it follows that there is no science of bodies; and thus perishes natural science, which treats of mobile bodies.

Si ergo intellectus non cognoscit corpora, sequitur quod nulla scientia sit de corporibus. Et sic peribit scientia naturalis, quae est de corpore mobili.

Every movement presupposes something immovable: for when a change of quality occurs, the substance remains unmoved; and when there is a change of substantial form, matter remains unmoved. Moreover the various conditions of mutable things are themselves immovable; for instance, though Socrates be not always sitting, yet it is an immovable truth that whenever he does sit he remains in one place. For this reason there is nothing to hinder our having an immovable science of movable things.

Omnis motus supponit aliquid immobile, cum enim transmutatio fit secundum qualitatem, remanet substantia immobilis; et cum transmutatur forma substantialis, remanet materia immobilis. Rerum etiam mutabilium sunt immobiles habitudines, sicut Socrates etsi non semper sedeat, tamen immobiliter est verum quod, quandocumque sedet, in uno loco manet. Et propter hoc nihil prohibet de rebus mobilibus immobilem scientiam habere.

Even in sensible things it is to be observed that the form is otherwise in one sensible than in another: for instance, whiteness may be of great intensity in one, and of a less intensity in another: in one we find whiteness with sweetness, in another without sweetness.

Quia etiam in ipsis sensibilibus videmus quod forma alio modo est in uno sensibilium quam in altero, puta cum in uno est albedo intensior, in alio remissior, et in uno est albedo cum dulcedine, in alio sine dulcedine.

In the same way the sensible form is conditioned differently in the thing which is external to the soul, and in the senses which receive the forms of sensible things without receiving matter, such as the color of gold without receiving gold.

Et per hunc etiam modum forma sensibilis alio modo est in re quae est extra animam, et alio modo in sensu, qui suscipit formas sensibilium absque materia, sicut colorem auri sine auro.

So also the intellect, according to its own mode, receives under conditions of immateriality and immobility, the species of material and mobile bodies: for the received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver.

Et similiter intellectus species, corporum, quae sunt materiales et mobiles, recipit immaterialiter et immobiliter, secundum modum suum, nam receptum est in recipiente per modum recipientis.

No. The soul does not know corporeal things through itself because the soul itself cannot be known through the bodily senses.

Anima non cognoscit corporea per suam substantiam quia ipsa anima non est cognoscibilis per corporis sensus.

If there be an intellect which knows all things by its essence, then its essence must needs have all things in itself immaterially; thus the early philosophers held that the essence of the soul, that it may know all things, must be actually composed of the principles of all material things. Now this is proper to God, that His Essence comprise all things immaterially as effects pre-exist virtually in their cause. God alone, therefore, understands all things through His Essence; but neither the human soul nor the angels can do so.

Si aliquis intellectus est qui per essentiam suam cognoscit omnia, oportet quod essentia eius habeat in se immaterialiter omnia; sicut antiqui posuerunt essentiam animae actu componi ex principiis omnium materialium, ut cognosceret omnia. Hoc autem est proprium Dei, ut sua essentia sit immaterialiter comprehensiva omnium, prout effectus virtute praeexistunt in causa. Solus igitur Deus per essentiam suam omnia intelligit; non autem anima humana, neque etiam Angelus.

Material things known must needs exist in the knower, not materially, but immaterially. The reason of this is, because the act of knowledge extends to things outside the knower: for we know things even that are external to us. Now by matter the form of a thing is determined to some one thing. Wherefore it is clear that knowledge is in inverse ratio of materiality. And consequently things that are not receptive of forms save materially, have no power of knowledge whatever: such as plants, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 12).

Oportet materialia cognita in cognoscente existere non materialiter, sed magis immaterialiter. Et huius ratio est, quia actus cognitionis se extendit ad ea quae sunt extra cognoscentem: cognoscimus enim etiam ea quae extra nos sunt. Per materiam autem determinatur forma rei ad aliquid unum. Unde manifestum est quod ratio cognitionis ex opposito se habet ad rationem materialitatis. Et ideo quae non recipiunt formas nisi materialiter, nullo modo sunt cognoscitiva: sicut plantae, ut dicitur in II libro de anima.

But the more immaterially a thing receives the form of the thing known, the more perfect is its knowledge. Therefore the intellect which abstracts the species not only from matter, but also from the individuating conditions of matter, has more perfect knowledge than the senses, which receive the form of the thing known, without matter indeed, but subject to material conditions.

Quanto autem aliquid immaterialius habet formam rei cognitae, tanto perfectius cognoscit. Unde et intellectus, qui abstrahit speciem non solum a materia, sed etiam a materialibus conditionibus individuantibus, perfectius cognoscit quam sensus, qui accipit formam rei cognitae sine materia quidem, sed cum materialibus conditionibus.

Aristotle did not hold that the soul is actually composed of all things, as did the earlier philosophers; he said that the soul is all things, "after a fashion," inasmuch as it is in potentiality to all: through the senses, to all things sensible; through the intellect, to all things intelligible.

Aristoteles non posuit animam esse actu compositam ex omnibus, sicut antiqui naturales; sed dixit "quodammodo" animam esse omnia, inquantum est in potentia ad omnia: per sensum quidem ad sensibilia; per intellectum vero ad intelligibilia.

Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3) that "the mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the bodily senses."

Augustinus dicit, IX de Trin., quod "mens corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit".

No. The soul does not know corporeal things through innate species because the angelic intellect is perfected by intelligible species, in accordance with its nature; whereas the human intellect is in potentiality to such species.

Anima non cognoscit corporalia per species naturaliter inditas quia intellectus Angeli est perfectus per species intelligibiles secundum suam naturam, intellectus autem humanus est in potentia ad huiusmodi species.

If questions be put in an orderly fashion they proceed from universal self-evident principles to what is particular. Now by such a process knowledge is produced in the mind of the learner. Wherefore when he answers the truth to a subsequent question, this is not because he had knowledge previously, but because he thus learns for the first time. For it matters not whether the teacher proceed from universal principles to conclusions by questioning or by asserting; for in either case the mind of the listener is assured of what follows by that which preceded.

Ordinata interrogatio procedit ex principiis communibus per se notis, ad propria. Per talem autem processum scientia causatur in anima addiscentis. Unde cum verum respondet de his de quibus secundo interrogatur, hoc non est quia prius ea noverit; sed quia tunc ea de novo addiscit. Nihil enim refert utrum ille qui docet, proponendo vel interrogando procedat de principiis communibus ad conclusiones, utrobique enim animus audientis certificatur de posterioribus per priora.

Now we observe that man sometimes is only a potential knower, both as to sense and as to intellect. And he is reduced from such potentiality to act: through the action of sensible objects on his senses, to the act of sensation; by instruction or discovery, to the act of understanding. Wherefore we must say that the cognitive soul is in potentiality both to the [physical] icons which are the principles of sensing, and to those [mental] icons which are the principles of understanding. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 4) held that the intellect by which the soul understands has no innate species, but is at first in potentiality to all such species.

Videmus autem quod homo est quandoque cognoscens in potentia tantum, tam secundum sensum quam secundum intellectum. Et de tali potentia in actum reducitur: ut sentiat quidem, per actiones sensibilium in sensum; ut intelligat autem, per disciplinam aut inventionem. Unde oportet dicere quod anima cognoscitiva sit in potentia tam ad similitudines quae sunt principia sentiendi, quam ad similitudines quae sunt principia intelligendi. Et propter hoc Aristoteles posuit quod intellectus, quo anima intelligit, non habet aliquas species naturaliter inditas, sed est in principio in potentia ad huiusmodi species omnes.

Since form is the principle of action, a thing must be related to the form which is the principle of an action, as it is to that action: for instance, if upward motion is from lightness, then that which only potentially moves upwards must needs be only potentially light, but that which actually moves upwards must needs be actually light.

Cum forma sit principium actionis, oportet ut eo modo se habeat aliquid ad formam quae est actionis principium, quo se habet ad actionem illam: sicut si moveri sursum est ex levitate, oportet quod in potentia tantum sursum fertur, esse leve solum in potentia, quod autem actu sursum fertur, esse leve in actu.

But since that which has a form actually, is sometimes unable to act according to that form on account of some hindrance, as a light thing may be hindered from moving upwards; for this reason did Plato hold that naturally man's intellect is filled with all intelligible species, but that, by being united to the body, it is hindered from the realization of its act. But this seems to be unreasonable.

Sed quia id quod habet actu formam, interdum non potest agere secundum formam propter aliquod impedimentum, sicut leve si impediatur sursum ferri; propter hoc Plato posuit quod intellectus hominis naturaliter est plenus omnibus speciebus intelligibilibus, sed per unionem corporis impeditur ne possit in actum exire. Sed hoc non videtur convenienter dictum.

First, because, if the soul has a natural knowledge of all things, it seems impossible for the soul so far to forget the existence of such knowledge as not to know itself to be possessed thereof: for no man forgets what he knows naturally; that, for instance, the whole is larger than the part, and such like. And especially unreasonable does this seem if we suppose that it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, as we have established above (Q76, A1): for it is unreasonable that the natural operation of a thing be totally hindered by that which belongs to it naturally.

Primo quidem quia, si habet anima naturalem notitiam omnium, non videtur esse possibile quod huius naturalis notitiae tantam oblivionem capiat, quod nesciat se huiusmodi scientiam habere, nullus enim homo obliviscitur ea quae naturaliter cognoscit, sicut quod omne totum sit maius sua parte, et alia huiusmodi. Praecipue autem hoc videtur inconveniens, si ponatur esse animae naturale corpori uniri, ut supra habitum est, inconveniens enim est quod naturalis operatio alicuius rei totaliter impediatur per id quod est sibi secundum naturam.

Secondly, the falseness of this opinion is clearly proved from the fact that if a sense be wanting, the knowledge of what is apprehended through that sense is wanting also: for instance, a man who is born blind can have no knowledge of colors. This would not be the case if the soul had innate images of all intelligible things.

Secundo, manifeste apparet huius positionis falsitas ex hoc quod, deficiente aliquo sensu, deficit scientia eorum, quae apprehenduntur secundum illum sensum; sicut caecus natus nullam potest habere notitiam de coloribus. Quod non esset, si animae essent naturaliter inditae omnium intelligibilium rationes.

The Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says (De Anima iii, 4) that it is like "a tablet on which nothing is written."

Philosophus dicit, in III de anima, de intellectu loquens, quod est sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum.

No. The intelligible species, by which our soul understands, are not derived from separate forms because if this were true we should not need the senses in order to understand.

Species intelligibiles quibus anima nostra intelligit, non effluunt a formis separatis quia secundum hoc sensibus non indigeremus ad intelligendum.

And this is proved to be false especially from the fact that if a man be wanting in a sense, he cannot have any knowledge of the sensibles corresponding to that sense.

Quod patet esse falsum ex hoc praecipue quod qui caret uno sensu, nullo modo potest habere scientiam de sensibilibus illius sensus.

Material things, as to the being which they have outside the soul, may be actually sensible, but not actually intelligible.

Res materiales, secundum esse quod habent extra animam, possunt esse sensibiles actu, non autem actu intelligibiles.

Our passive intellect is reduced from potentiality to act by some being in act, that is, by the active intellect, which is a power of the soul, as we have said (Q79, A4), and not by a separate intelligence, as proximate cause; although perchance as remote cause.

Intellectus noster possibilis reducitur de potentia ad actum per aliquod ens actu, idest per intellectum agentem, qui est virtus quaedam animae nostrae, ut dictum est, non autem per aliquem intellectum separatum, sicut per causam proximam; sed forte sicut per causam remotam.

The intelligible species which are participated by our intellect are reduced, as to their first cause, to a first principle which is by its essence intelligible: namely, God. But they proceed from that principle by means of the sensible forms and material things, from which we gather knowledge, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii).

Species intelligibiles quas participat noster intellectus, reducuntur sicut in primam causam in aliquod principium per suam essentiam intelligibile: scilicet in Deum. Sed ab illo principio procedunt mediantibus formis rerum sensibilium et materialium, a quibus scientiam colligimus, ut Dionysius dicit.

Yes. The intellectual soul knows all true things in the eternal types because the unchangeable truth is contained in the eternal types.

Anima intellectiva omnia vera cognoscit in rationibus aeterni quia veritas incommutabilis in aeternis rationibus continetur.

Augustine says (Confess. xii, 25): "If we both see that what you say is true, and if we both see that what I say is true, where do we see this, I pray? Neither do I see it in you, nor do you see it in me: but we both see it in the unchangeable truth which is above our minds."

Dicit Augustinus, XII Confess., "si ambo videmus verum esse quod dicis, et ambo videmus verum esse quod dico, ubi quaeso id videmus? Nec ego utique in te, nec tu in me sed ambo in ipsa, quae supra mentes nostras est, incommutabili veritate."

The human soul knows all things in the eternal types, since by participation of these types we know all things. For the intellectual light itself which is in us, is nothing else than a participated likeness of the uncreated light, in which are contained the eternal types. Whence it is written (Psalm 4:6-7), "Many say: Who showeth us good things?" which question the Psalmist answers, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us," as though he were to say: "By the seal of the Divine light in us, all things are made known to us."

Anima humana omnia cognoscat in rationibus aeternis, per quarum participationem omnia cognoscimus. Ipsum enim lumen intellectuale quod est in nobis, nihil est aliud quam quaedam participata similitudo luminis increati, in quo continentur rationes aeternae. Unde in Psalmo IV, dicitur, "multi dicunt, quis ostendit nobis bona?" Cui quaestioni Psalmista respondet, dicens, "signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine." Quasi dicat, "per ipsam sigillationem divini luminis in nobis, omnia nobis demonstrantur."

But since besides the intellectual light which is in us, intelligible species, which are derived from things, are required in order for us to have knowledge of material things; therefore this same knowledge is not due merely to a participation of the eternal types, as the Platonists held, maintaining that the mere participation of ideas sufficed for knowledge.

Quia tamen praeter lumen intellectuale in nobis, exiguntur species intelligibiles, a rebus acceptae, ad scientiam de rebus materialibus habendam; ideo non per solam participationem rationum aeternarum de rebus materialibus notitiam habemus, sicut Platonici posuerunt quod sola idearum participatio sufficit ad scientiam habendam.

As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 11): "If those who are called philosophers said by chance anything that was true and consistent with our faith, we must claim it from them as from unjust possessors. For some of the doctrines of the heathens are spurious imitations or superstitious inventions, which we must be careful to avoid when we renounce the society of the heathens." Consequently whenever Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines of the Platonists, found in their teaching anything consistent with faith, he adopted it; and those things which he found contrary to faith he amended.

Augustinus dicit in II de Doctr. Christ., "philosophi qui vocantur, si qua forte vera et fidei nostrae accommoda dixerunt, ab eis tanquam ab iniustis possessoribus in usum nostrum vindicanda sunt. Habent enim doctrinae gentilium quaedam simulata et superstitiosa figmenta, quae unusquisque nostrum de societate gentilium exiens, debet evitare." Et ideo Augustinus, qui doctrinis Platonicorum imbutus fuerat, si qua invenit fidei accommoda in eorum dictis, assumpsit; quae vero invenit fidei nostrae adversa, in melius commutavit.

Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 16): "Although the philosophers prove by convincing arguments that all things occur in time according to the eternal types, were they able to see in the eternal types, or to find out from them how many kinds of animals there are and the origin of each? Did they not seek for this information from the story of times and places?"

Unde Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin., "numquid quia philosophi documentis certissimis persuadent aeternis rationibus omnia temporalia fieri, propterea potuerunt in ipsis rationibus perspicere, vel ex ipsis colligere quot sint animalium genera, quae semina singulorum? Nonne ista omnia per locorum ac temporum historiam quaesierunt?"

That Augustine did not understand all things to be known in their "eternal types" or in the "unchangeable truth," as though the eternal types themselves were seen, is clear from what he says (QQ. 83, qu. 46): viz., that "not each and every rational soul can be said to be worthy of that vision," namely, of the eternal types, "but only those that are holy and pure": such as the souls of the blessed.

Quod autem Augustinus non sic intellexerit omnia cognosci in rationibus aeternis, vel in incommutabili veritate, quasi ipsae rationes aeternae videantur, patet per hoc quod ipse dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod "rationalis anima non omnis et quaelibet, sed quae sancta et pura fuerit, asseritur illi visioni," scilicet rationum aeternarum, esse idonea: sicut sunt animae beatorum.

In this way the soul, in the present state of life, cannot see all things in the eternal types; but the blessed who see God, and all things in Him, thus know all things in the eternal types.

Et hoc modo anima, in statu praesentis vitae, non potest videre omnia in rationibus aeternis; sed sic in rationibus aeternis cognoscunt omnia beati, qui Deum vident et omnia in ipso.

Yes. The principle of knowledge is in the senses because on the part of the phantasms, intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses.

Principium nostrae cognitionis est a sensu quia ex parte phantasmatum intellectualis operatio a sensu causatur.

But since the phantasms cannot of themselves affect the passive intellect, and require to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect, it cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather that it is in a way the material cause.

Sed quia phantasmata non sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem, sed oportet quod fiant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem, non potest dici quod sensibilis cognitio sit totalis et perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis quodammodo est materia causae.

We must not expect the entire truth from the senses. For the light of the active intellect is needed, through which we achieve the unchangeable truth of changeable things, and discern things themselves from their likeness.

Veritas non sit totaliter a sensibus expectanda. Requiritur enim lumen intellectus agentis, per quod immutabiliter veritatem in rebus mutabilibus cognoscamus, et discernamus ipsas res a similitudinibus rerum.

Aristotle, with Plato, he agreed that intellect and sense are different. But he held that the sense has not its proper operation without the cooperation of the body; so that to feel is not an act of the soul alone, but of the "composite." And he held the same in regard to all the operations of the sensitive part.

Aristoteles autem media via processit. Posuit enim cum Platone intellectum differre a sensu. Sed sensum posuit propriam operationem non habere sine communicatione corporis; ita quod sentire non sit actus animae tantum, sed coniuncti. Et similiter posuit de omnibus operationibus sensitivae partis.

Since, therefore, it is not unreasonable that the sensible objects which are outside the soul should produce some effect in the "composite," Aristotle agreed with Democritus in this, that the operations of the sensitive part are caused by the impression of the sensible on the sense: not by a discharge, as Democritus said, but by some kind of operation. For Democritus maintained that every action comes into being by way of a discharge of atoms, as we gather from De Gener. i, 8.

Quia igitur non est inconveniens quod sensibilia quae sunt extra animam, causent aliquid in coniunctum, in hoc Aristoteles cum Democrito concordavit, quod operationes sensitivae partis causentur per impressionem sensibilium in sensum: non per modum defluxionis, ut Democritus posuit, sed per quandam operationem. Nam et Democritus omnem actionem fieri posuit per influxionem atomorum, ut patet in I de Generat.

But Aristotle held that the intellect has an operation which is independent of the body's cooperation. Now nothing corporeal can make an impression on the incorporeal. And therefore in order to cause the intellectual operation according to Aristotle, the impression caused by the sensible does not suffice, but something more noble is required, for "the agent is more noble than the patient," as he says (De Gener. i, 5).

Intellectum vero posuit Aristoteles habere operationem absque communicatione corporis. Nihil autem corporeum imprimere potest in rem incorpoream. Et ideo ad causandam intellectualem operationem, secundum Aristotelem, non sufficit sola impressio sensibilium corporum, sed requiritur aliquid nobilius, quia "agens est honorabilius patiente", ut ipse dicit.

Not, indeed, in the sense that the intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere impression of some superior beings, as Plato held; but that the higher and more noble agent which he calls the active intellect, of which we have spoken above (Q79, A3; Q79, A4) causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelligible, by a process of abstraction.

Non tamen ita quod intellectualis operatio causetur in nobis ex sola impressione aliquarum rerum superiorum, ut Plato posuit; sed illud superius et nobilius agens quod vocat intellectum agentem, de quo iam supra diximus, facit phantasmata a sensibus accepta intelligibilia in actu, per modum abstractionis cuiusdam.

No. In the present state of life in which the soul is united to a passible body, it is impossible for our intellect to understand anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms, because the proper object of the human intellect, which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter; and through such natures of visible things it rises to a certain knowledge of things invisible.

Impossibile est intellectum nostrum, secundum praesentis vitae statum, quo passibili corpori coniungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, quia intellectus humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens; et per huiusmodi naturas visibilium rerum etiam in invisibilium rerum aliqualem cognitionem ascendit.

Now it belongs to such a nature to exist in an individual, and this cannot be apart from corporeal matter: for instance, it belongs to the nature of a stone to be in an individual stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in an individual horse, and so forth. Wherefore the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and truly, except in as much as it is known as existing in the individual. Now we apprehend the individual through the senses and the imagination. And, therefore, for the intellect to understand actually its proper object, it must of necessity turn itself to the phantasms, in order to perceive the universal nature existing in the individual.

De ratione autem huius naturae est, quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non est absque materia corporali: sicut de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit in hoc lapide, et de ratione naturae equi quod sit in hoc equo, et sic de aliis. Unde natura lapidis, vel cuiuscumque materialis rei, cognosci non potest complete et vere, nisi secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens. Particulare autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem. Et ideo necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum obiectum proprium, quod convertat se ad phantasmata, ut speculetur naturam universalem in particulari existentem.

For the intellect to understand actually, not only when it acquires fresh knowledge, but also when it applies knowledge already acquired, there is need for the act of the imagination and of the other powers.

Intellectus actu intelligat, non solum accipiendo scientiam de novo, sed etiam utendo scientia iam acquisita, requiritur actus imaginationis et ceterarum virtutum.

Anyone can experience this of himself, that when he tries to understand something, he forms certain phantasms to serve him by way of examples, in which as it were he examines what he is desirous of understanding. For this reason it is that when we wish to help someone to understand something, we lay examples before him, from which he forms phantasms for the purpose of understanding.

Hoc quilibet in seipso experiri potest, quod quando aliquis conatur aliquid intelligere, format aliqua phantasmata sibi per modum exemplorum, in quibus quasi inspiciat quod intelligere studet. Et inde est etiam quod quando alium volumus facere aliquid intelligere, proponimus ei exempla, ex quibus sibi phantasmata formare possit ad intelligendum.

Now the reason of this is that the power of knowledge is proportioned to the thing known.

Huius autem ratio est, quia potentia cognoscitiva proportionatur cognoscibili.

Incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms, are known to us by comparison with sensible bodies of which there are phantasms. Thus we understand truth by considering a thing of which we possess the truth; and God, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), we know as cause, by way of excess and by way of remotion. Other incorporeal substances we know, in the present state of life, only by way of remotion or by some comparison to corporeal things. And, therefore, when we understand something about these things, we need to turn to phantasms of bodies, although there are no phantasms of the things themselves.

Incorporea, quorum non sunt phantasmata, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad corpora sensibilia, quorum sunt phantasmata. Sicut veritatem intelligimus ex consideratione rei circa quam veritatem speculamur; Deum autem, ut Dionysius dicit, cognoscimus ut causam, et per excessum, et per remotionem; alias etiam incorporeas substantias, in statu praesentis vitae, cognoscere non possumus nisi per remotionem, vel aliquam comparationem ad corporalia. Et ideo cum de huiusmodi aliquid intelligimus, necesse habemus converti ad phantasmata corporum, licet ipsorum non sint phantasmata.

The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that "the soul understands nothing without a phantasm."

Philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod "nihil sine phantasmate intelligit anima."

Yes. Suspension of the senses necessarily involves a hindrance to the judgment of the intellect because although the intellect is superior to the senses, nevertheless in a manner it receives from the senses, and its first and principal objects are founded in sensible things.

Necesse est quod impediatur iudicium intellectus ex ligamento sensus quia quamvis intellectus sit superior sensu, accipit tamen aliquo modo a sensu, et eius obiecta prima et principalia in sensibilibus fundantur.

As we have said above (Q84, A7), our intellect's proper and proportionate object is the nature of a sensible thing. Now a perfect judgment concerning anything cannot be formed, unless all that pertains to that thing's nature be known, especially if that be ignored which is the term and end of judgment.

Sicut dictum est, proprium obiectum intellectui nostro proportionatum est natura rei sensibilis. Iudicium autem perfectum de re aliqua dari non potest, nisi ea omnia quae ad rem pertinent cognoscantur, et praecipue si ignoretur id quod est terminus et finis iudicii.

Now the Philosopher says (De Coel. iii), that "as the end of a practical science is action, so the end of natural science is that which is perceived principally through the senses"; for the smith does not seek knowledge of a knife except for the purpose of action, in order that he may produce a certain individual knife; and in like manner the natural philosopher does not seek to know the nature of a stone and of a horse, save for the purpose of knowing the essential formal structures of those things which he perceives with his senses.

Dicit autem philosophus, in III de caelo, quod "sicut finis factivae scientiae est opus, ita naturalis scientiae finis est quod videtur principaliter secundum sensum"; faber enim non quaerit cognitionem cultelli nisi propter opus, ut operetur hunc particularem cultellum; et similiter naturalis non quaerit cognoscere naturam lapidis et equi, nisi ut sciat rationes eorum quae videntur secundum sensum.

Now it is clear that a smith cannot judge perfectly of a knife unless he knows the action of the knife; and in like manner the natural philosopher cannot judge perfectly of natural things, unless he knows sensible things.

Manifestum est autem quod non posset esse perfectum iudicium fabri de cultello, si opus ignoraret; et similiter non potest esse perfectum iudicium scientiae naturalis de rebus naturalibus, si sensibilia ignorentur.

But in the present state of life whatever we understand, we know by comparison to natural sensible things. Consequently it is not possible for our intellect to form a perfect judgment, while the senses are suspended, through which sensible things are known to us.

Omnia autem quae in praesenti statu intelligimus, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad res sensibiles naturales. Unde impossibile est quod sit in nobis iudicium intellectus perfectum, cum ligamento sensus, per quem res sensibiles cognoscimus.