No. The essence of the soul is not its power. For nothing is in potentiality by reason of an act, as act.

Essentia animae non est eius potentia. Nihil enim est in potentia secundum actum, inquantum est actus.

The act to which primary matter is in potentiality is the substantial form. Therefore the potentiality of matter is nothing else but its essence.

Actus ad quem est in potentia materia prima, est substantialis forma. Et ideo potentia materiae non est aliud quam eius essentia.

Action belongs to the composite, as does existence; for to act belongs to what exists. Now the composite has substantial existence through the substantial form; and it operates by the power which results from the substantial form. Hence an active accidental form is to the substantial form of the agent ... as the power of the soul is to the soul.

Actio est compositi, sicut et esse; existentis enim est agere. Compositum autem per formam substantialem habet esse substantialiter; per virtutem autem quae consequitur formam substantialem, operatur. Unde sic se habet forma accidentalis activa ad formam substantialem agentis ... sicut se habet potentia animae ad animam.

Although the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has an admixture of potentiality, as we have said above (Q75, A5, RO4); and for this reason it can be the subject of an accident.

Anima, licet non sit composita ex materia et forma, habet tamen aliquid de potentialitate admixtum ut supra dictum est. Et ideo potest esse subiectum accidentis.

That the accidental form is a principle of action is due to the substantial form. Therefore the substantial form is the first principle of action; but not the proximate principle.

Forma accidentalis est actionis principium, habet a forma substantiali. Et ideo forma substantialis est primum actionis principium, sed non proximum.

Now we observe that what has a soul is not always actual with respect to its vital operations; whence also it is said in the definition of the soul, that it is "the act of a body having life potentially"; which potentiality, however, "does not exclude the soul."

Invenitur autem habens animam non semper esse in actu operum vitae. Unde etiam in definitione animae dicitur quod est "actus corporis potentia vitam habentis," quae tamen potentia "non abiicit animam."

For the soul by its very essence is an act. Therefore if the very essence of the soul were the immediate principle of operation, whatever has a soul would always have actual vital actions, as that which has a soul is always an actually living thing. For as a form the soul is not an act ordained to a further act, but the ultimate term of generation.

Nam anima secundum suam essentiam est actus. Si ergo ipsa essentia animae esset immediatum operationis principium, semper habens animam actu haberet opera vitae; sicut semper habens animam actu est vivum. Non enim, inquantum est forma, est actus ordinatus ad ulteriorem actum, sed est ultimus terminus generationis.

Wherefore, for it to be in potentiality to another act, does not belong to it according to its essence, as a form, but according to its power. So the soul itself, as the subject of its power, is called the first act, with a further relation to the second act.

Unde quod sit in potentia adhuc ad alium actum, hoc non competit ei secundum suam essentiam, inquantum est forma, sed secundum suam potentiam. Et sic ipsa anima, secundum quod subest suae potentiae, dicitur actus primus, ordinatus ad actum secundum.

The operation of the soul is not in the genus of substance; for this belongs to God alone, whose operation is His own substance.

Operatio autem animae non est in genere substantiae; sed in solo Deo, cuius operatio est eius substantia.

Wherefore the Divine power which is the principle of His operation is the Divine Essence itself.

Unde Dei potentia, quae est operationis principium, est ipsa Dei essentia.

This cannot be true either of the soul, or of any creature, as we have said above when speaking of the angels (Q54, A3).

Quod non potest esse verum neque in anima, neque in aliqua creatura; ut supra etiam de Angelo dictum est.

Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi) says that "heavenly spirits are divided into essence, power, and operation."

Dionysius dicit, XI cap. Caelest. Hier., quod "caelestes spiritus dividuntur in essentiam, virtutem et operationem."

But the potential whole is in each part according to its whole essence, not, however, according to its whole power. Therefore in a way it can be predicated of each part, but not so properly as the universal whole. In this sense, Augustine says that the memory, understanding, and the will are the one essence of the soul.

Totum vero potentiale adest singulis partibus secundum totam suam essentiam, sed non secundum totam virtutem. Et ideo quodammodo potest praedicari de qualibet parte; sed non ita proprie sicut totum universale. Et per hunc modum Augustinus dicit quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una animae essentia.

For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4), that "mind, knowledge, and love are in the soul substantially, or, which is the same thing, essentially": and (De Trin. x, 11), that "memory, understanding, and will are one life, one mind, one essence."

Dicit enim Augustinus, in IX de Trin., quod "mens, notitia et amor sunt substantialiter in anima, vel, ut idem dicam, essentialiter." Et in X dicit quod "memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una vita, una mens, una essentia."

Therefore the powers of the soul are accidents; and the power of the soul is not its own essence.

Ergo potentiae animae sunt accidentia. Et ita videtur quod potentia animae non sit eius essentia.

Yes. The human soul abounds in a variety of powers because it is on the confines of spiritual and corporeal creatures and therefore the powers of both meet together in the soul.

Anima humana abundat diversitate potentiarum, videlicet quia est in confinio spiritualium et corporalium creaturarum, et ideo concurrunt in ipsa virtutes utrarumque creaturarum.

The intellectual soul approaches to the Divine likeness, more than inferior creatures, in being able to acquire perfect goodness; although by many and various means; and in this it falls short of more perfect creatures.

In hoc ipso magis ad similitudinem Dei accedit anima intellectiva quam creaturae inferiores, quod perfectam bonitatem consequi potest; licet per multa et diversa; in quo deficit a superioribus.

We conclude, therefore, that things which are below man acquire a certain limited goodness; and so they have a few determinate operations and powers. But man can acquire universal and perfect goodness, because he can acquire beatitude. Yet he is in the last degree, according to his nature, of those to whom beatitude is possible; therefore the human soul requires many and various operations and powers.

Dicendum est ergo quod res quae sunt infra hominem, quaedam particularia bona consequuntur, et ideo quasdam paucas et determinatas operationes habent et virtutes. Homo autem potest consequi universalem et perfectam bonitatem, quia potest adipisci beatitudinem. Est tamen in ultimo gradu, secundum naturam, eorum quibus competit beatitudo, et ideo multis et diversis operationibus et virtutibus indiget anima humana.

But to angels a smaller variety of powers is sufficient. In God there is no power or action beyond His own Essence.

Angelis vero minor diversitas potentiarum competit. In Deo vero non est aliqua potentia vel actio, praeter eius essentiam.

As the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, 12), the lowest order of things cannot acquire perfect goodness, but they acquire a certain imperfect goodness, by few movements; and those which belong to a higher order acquire perfect goodness by many movements; and those yet higher acquire perfect goodness by few movements; and the highest perfection is found in those things which acquire perfect goodness without any movement whatever.

Sicut philosophus dicit in II de caelo, quae sunt in rebus infima, non possunt consequi perfectam bonitatem, sed aliquam imperfectam consequuntur paucis motibus; superiora vero his adipiscuntur perfectam bonitatem motibus multis; his autem superiora sunt quae adipiscuntur perfectam bonitatem motibus paucis; summa vero perfectio invenitur in his quae absque motu perfectam possident bonitatem.

Thus he is least of all disposed of health, who can only acquire imperfect health by means of a few remedies; better disposed is he who can acquire perfect health by means of many remedies; and better still, he who can by few remedies; best of all is he who has perfect health without any remedies.

Sicut infime est ad sanitatem dispositus qui non potest perfectam consequi sanitatem, sed aliquam modicam consequitur paucis remediis; melius autem dispositus est qui potest perfectam consequi sanitatem, sed remediis multis; et adhuc melius, qui remediis paucis; optime autem, qui absque remedio perfectam sanitatem habet.

A unified power is superior if it extends to equal things: but a multiform power is superior to it, if it is over many things.

Virtus unita est superior, si ad aequalia se extendat. Sed virtus multiplicata est superior, si plura ei subiiciantur.

One thing has one substantial existence, but may have several operations. So there is one essence of the soul, with several powers.

Unius rei est unum esse substantiale, sed possunt esse operationes plures. Et ideo est una essentia animae, sed potentiae plures.

Yes. The powers are distinguished according to the difference of their objects because a power as such is directed to an act.

Potentiae distinguuntur secundum differentiam obiectorum quia potentia, secundum illud quod est potentia, ordinatur ad actum.

Act, though subsequent in existence to power, is, nevertheless, prior to it in intention and logically; as the end is with regard to the agent.

Actus, licet sit posterior potentia in esse, est tamen prior in intentione et secundum rationem, sicut finis agente.

And the object, although extrinsic, is, nevertheless, the principle or end of the action; and those conditions which are intrinsic to a thing, are proportionate to its principle and end.

Obiectum autem, licet sit extrinsecum, est tamen principium vel finis actionis. Principio autem et fini proportionantur ea quae sunt intrinseca rei.

Nothing prevents things which coincide in subject, from being considered under different aspects; therefore they can belong to various powers of the soul.

Nihil prohibet id quod est subiecto idem esse diversum secundum rationem. Et ideo potest ad diversas potentias animae pertinere.

Not any variety of objects diversifies the powers of the soul, but a difference in that to which the power of its very nature is directed.

Sic igitur non quaecumque diversitas obiectorum diversificat potentias animae, sed differentia eius ad quod per se potentia respicit.

Thus the senses of their very nature are directed to the passive quality which of itself is divided into color, sound, and the like, and therefore there is one sensitive power with regard to color, namely, the sight, and another with regard to sound, namely, hearing.

Sicut sensus per se respicit passibilem qualitatem, quae per se dividitur in colorem, sonum et huiusmodi, et ideo alia potentia sensitiva est coloris, scilicet visus, et alia soni, scilicet auditus.

Wherefore we seek to know the nature of a power from the act to which it is directed, and consequently the nature of a power is diversified, as the nature of the act is diversified.

Unde oportet rationem potentiae accipi ex actu ad quem ordinatur, et per consequens oportet quod ratio potentiae diversificetur, ut diversificatur ratio actus.

Now the nature of an act is diversified according to the various natures of the objects. For every act is either of an active power or of a passive power.

Ratio autem actus diversificatur secundum diversam rationem obiecti. Omnis enim actio vel est potentiae activae, vel passivae.

Now, the object is to the act of a passive power, as the principle and moving cause: for color is the principle of vision, inasmuch as it moves the sight.

Obiectum autem comparatur ad actum potentiae passivae, sicut principium et causa movens, color enim inquantum movet visum, est principium visionis.

On the other hand, to the act of an active power the object is a term and end; as the object of the power of growth is perfect quantity, which is the end of growth.

Ad actum autem potentiae activae comparatur obiectum ut terminus et finis, sicut augmentativae virtutis obiectum est quantum perfectum, quod est finis augmenti.

Now, from these two things an act receives its species, namely, from its principle, or from its end or term; for the act of heating differs from the act of cooling, in this, that the former proceeds from something hot, which is the active principle, to heat; the latter from something cold, which is the active principle, to cold. Therefore the powers are of necessity distinguished by their acts and objects.

Ex his autem duobus actio speciem recipit, scilicet ex principio, vel ex fine seu termino; differt enim calefactio ab infrigidatione, secundum quod haec quidem a calido, scilicet activo, ad calidum; illa autem a frigido ad frigidum procedit. Unde necesse est quod potentiae diversificentur secundum actus et obiecta.

If any power were to have one of two contraries as such for its object, the other contrary would belong to another power. But the power of the soul does not regard the nature of the contrary as such, but rather the common aspect of both contraries.

Si potentia aliqua per se respiceret unum contrariorum sicut obiectum, oporteret quod contrarium ad aliam potentiam pertineret. Sed potentia animae non per se respicit propriam rationem contrarii, sed communem rationem utriusque contrariorum.

The higher power of itself regards a more universal formality of the object than the lower power; because the higher a power is, to a greater number of things does it extend. Therefore many things are combined in the one formality of the object, which the higher power considers of itself; while they differ in the formalities regarded by the lower powers of themselves. Thus it is that various objects belong to various lower powers; which objects, however, are subject to one higher power.

Potentia superior per se respicit universaliorem rationem obiecti, quam potentia inferior, quia quanto potentia est superior, tanto ad plura se extendit. Et ideo multa conveniunt in una ratione obiecti, quam per se respicit superior potentia, quae tamen differunt secundum rationes quas per se respiciunt inferiores potentiae. Et inde est quod diversa obiecta pertinent ad diversas inferiores potentias, quae tamen uni superiori potentiae subduntur.

Things that are subsequent are distinguished by what precedes. But the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "acts and operations precede the powers according to reason; and these again are preceded by their opposites," that is their objects. Therefore the powers are distinguished according to their acts and objects.

Posteriora distinguuntur secundum priora. Sed philosophus dicit II de anima, quod "priores potentiis actus et operationes secundum rationem sunt"; et adhuc his priora sunt opposita, sive obiecta. Ergo potentiae distinguuntur secundum actus et obiecta.

Yes. Since the soul is one, and the powers are many; and since a number of things that proceed from one must proceed in a certain order; there must be some order among the powers of the soul.

Cum anima sit una, potentiae vero plures; ordine autem quodam ab uno in multitudinem procedatur; necesse est inter potentias animae ordinem esse.

This order among the powers of the soul is both on the part of the soul (which, though it be one according to its essence, has a certain aptitude to various acts in a certain order) and on the part of the objects, and furthermore on the part of the acts.

Ordo iste potentiarum animae est et ex parte animae (quae secundum ordinem quendam habet aptitudinem ad diversos actus, licet sit una secundum essentiam) et ex parte obiectorum, et etiam ex parte actuum.

Accordingly we may observe a triple order among them, two of which correspond to the dependence of one power on another; while the third is taken from the order of the objects.

Triplex autem ordo inter eas attenditur. Quorum duo considerantur secundum dependentiam unius potentiae ab altera, tertius autem accipitur secundum ordinem obiectorum.

Now the dependence of one power on another can be taken in two ways: (1) according to the order of nature [on the part of the essential potential of the soul], forasmuch as perfect things are by their nature prior to imperfect things; and (2) according to the order of generation and time [on the part of the empowered properties of objects]; forasmuch as from being imperfect, a thing comes to be perfect.

Dependentia autem unius potentiae ab altera dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo, secundum naturae ordinem, prout perfecta sunt naturaliter imperfectis priora; alio modo, secundum ordinem generationis et temporis, prout ex imperfecto ad perfectum venitur.

Thus, according to the first kind of order among the powers, the intellectual powers [of concept formation] are prior to the sensitive powers [(which include sensation and perception: the inner and outer senses)]; wherefore they direct them and command them. Likewise the sensitive powers [(which include sensation and perception: the inner and outer senses)] are prior in this order to the powers of the nutritive soul.

Secundum igitur primum potentiarum ordinem, potentiae intellectivae sunt priores potentiis sensitivis, unde dirigunt eas et imperant eis. Et similiter potentiae sensitivae hoc ordine sunt priores potentiis animae nutritivae.

In the second kind of order, it is the other way about. For the powers of the nutritive soul are prior by way of generation to the powers of the sensitive soul [(which include sensation and perception: the inner and outer senses)], for which, therefore, they prepare the body. The same is to be said of the sensitive powers [(which include sensation and perception: the inner and outer senses)] with regard to the intellectual [powers of concept formation].

Secundum vero ordinem secundum, e converso se habet. Nam potentiae animae nutritivae sunt priores, in via generationis, potentiis animae sensitivae, unde ad earum actiones praeparant corpus. Et similiter est de potentiis sensitivis respectu intellectivarum.

But (3) in the third kind of order [on the part of the incidental ("accidental") operation of acts], certain sensitive powers are ordered among themselves, namely, sight, hearing, and smelling. [For example, you may see something before you hear it; or vice versa.]

Secundum autem ordinem tertium, ordinantur quaedam vires sensitivae ad invicem, scilicet visus, auditus et olfactus.

But the action of one power of the soul does not depend on that of another: for sight can act independently of hearing, and conversely. This argument is verified as regards those powers among which order of the third kind exists. Those powers among which the two other kinds of order exist are such that the action of one depends on another.

Sed actus unius potentiae animae non dependet ab actu alterius: potest enim visus exire in actum absque auditu, et e converso. Ratio illa procedit de illis potentiis in quibus attenditur ordo solum secundum tertium modum. Illae autem potentiae quae ordinantur secundum alios duos modos, ita se habent quod actus unius dependet ab altera.

No. The soul alone is not the subject of all the powers because the subject of operative power is that which is able to operate (for every accident denominates its proper subject).

Non sola anima est subiectum omnium potentiarum suarum quia illud est subiectum operativae potentiae, quod est potens operari (omne enim accidens denominat proprium subiectum).

All the powers are said to belong to the soul, not as their subject, but as their principle; because it is by the soul that the composite has the power to perform such operations.

Omnes potentiae dicuntur esse animae, non sicut subiecti, sed sicut principii, quia per animam coniunctum habet quod tales operationes operari possit.

The Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigilia i) that "sensation belongs neither to the soul, nor to the body, but to the composite." Therefore the sensitive power is in "the composite" as its subject.

Philosophus dicit, in libro de somno et vigilia quod "sentire non est proprium animae neque corporis, sed coniuncti". Potentia ergo sensitiva est in coniuncto sicut in subiecto.

Now the same is that which is able to operate, and that which does operate. Wherefore the "subject of power" is of necessity "the subject of operation," as again the Philosopher says in the beginning of De Somno et Vigilia.

Idem autem est quod potest operari, et quod operatur. Unde oportet quod eius sit potentia sicut subiecti, cuius est operatio; ut etiam philosophus dicit, in principio de somno et vigilia.

Some operations of the soul are performed without a corporeal organ, as understanding and will. Hence the powers which are the principles of these operations are in the soul as their subject.

Quaedam operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur sine organo corporali, ut intelligere et velle. Unde potentiae quae sunt harum operationum principia, sunt in anima sicut in subiecto.

But some operations of the soul are performed by means of corporeal organs; as sight by the eye, and hearing by the ear. And so it is with all the other operations of the nutritive and sensitive parts. Therefore the powers which are the principles of such operations have their subject in the composite, and not in the soul alone.

Quaedam vero operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur per organa corporalia; sicut visio per oculum, et auditus per aurem. Et simile est de omnibus aliis operationibus nutritivae et sensitivae partis. Et ideo potentiae quae sunt talium operationum principia, sunt in coniuncto sicut in subiecto, et non in anima sola.

Plato's opinion was that sensation is an operation proper to the soul, just as understanding is. Now, in many things relating to philosophy, Augustine makes use of the opinions of Plato, not asserting them as true, but relating them: Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) that the soul senses certain things, not through the body, in fact, without the body, as fear and such like; and some things through the body.

Opinio Platonis fuit quod sentire est operatio animae propria, sicut et intelligere. In multis autem quae ad philosophiam pertinent, Augustinus utitur opinionibus Platonis, non asserendo, sed recitando: Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod anima quaedam sentit non per corpus, immo sine corpore, ut est timor et huiusmodi; quaedam vero sentit per corpus.

When it is said that the soul senses some things with the body, and some without the body, this can be taken in two ways.

Hoc quod dicitur anima quaedam sentire cum corpore et quaedam sine corpore, dupliciter potest intelligi.

Firstly, the words "with the body or without the body" may determine the act of sense in its mode of proceeding from the sentient. Thus the soul senses nothing without the body, because the action of sensation cannot proceed from the soul except by a corporeal organ.

Uno modo, quod hoc quod dico "cum corpore vel sine corpore", determinet actum sentiendi secundum quod exit a sentiente. Et sic nihil sentit sine corpore, quia actio sentiendi non potest procedere ab anima nisi per organum corporale.

Secondly, they may be understood as determining the act of sense on the part of the object sensed. Thus the soul senses some things with the body, that is, things existing in the body, as when it feels a wound or something of that sort; while it senses some things without the body, that is, which do not exist in the body, but only in the apprehension of the soul, as when it feels sad or joyful on hearing something.

Alio modo potest intelligi ita quod praedicta determinent actum sentiendi ex parte obiecti quod sentitur. Et sic quaedam sentit cum corpore, idest in corpore existentia, sicut cum sentit vulnus vel aliquid huiusmodi, quaedam vero sentit sine corpore, idest non existentia in corpore, sed solum in apprehensione animae, sicut cum sentit se tristari vel gaudere de aliquo audito.

All such powers are primarily in the soul, as compared to the composite; not as in their subject, but as in their principle.

Omnes huiusmodi potentiae per prius sunt in anima quam in coniuncto, non sicut in subiecto, sed sicut in principio.

Yes. The powers of the soul proceed from its essence as their cause because the composite is actual by the soul.

Potentiae animae procedunt ab eius essentia sicut a causa quia compositum est in actu per animam.

All the powers of the soul, whether their subject be the soul alone, or the composite, flow from the essence of the soul, as from their principle.

Omnes potentiae animae, sive subiectum earum sit anima sola, sive compositum, fluunt ab essentia animae sicut a principio.

From the one essence of the soul many and various powers proceed; both because order exists among these powers, and also by reason of the diversity of the corporeal organs.

Ab una essentia animae procedunt multae et diversae potentiae; tum propter ordinem potentiarum, tum etiam secundum diversitatem organorum corporalium.

The powers of the soul are its natural properties. But the subject is the cause of its proper accidents; whence also it is included in the definition of accident, as is clear from Metaph. vii (Did. vi, 4).

Potentiae animae sunt quaedam proprietates naturales ipsius. Sed subiectum est causa propriorum accidentium, unde et ponitur in definitione accidentis, ut patet in VII Metaphys.

The accident is caused by the subject according as it is actual, and is received into it according as it is in potentiality.

Accidens causatur a subiecto secundum quod est actu, et recipitur in eo inquantum est in potentia.

Now it is clear, from what has been said (Q77, A5), that either the subject of the soul's powers is the soul itself alone, which can be the subject of an accident, forasmuch as it has something of potentiality, as we have said above (Q77, A1, RO6); or else this subject is the composite.

Manifestum est autem ex dictis quod potentiarum animae subiectum est vel ipsa anima sola, quae potest esse subiectum accidentis secundum quod habet aliquid potentialitatis, ut supra dictum est; vel compositum.

The substantial and the accidental form partly agree and partly differ. They agree in this, that each is an act; and that by each of them something is after a manner actual. They differ, however, in two respects.

Forma substantialis et accidentalis partim conveniunt, et partim differunt. Conveniunt quidem in hoc, quod utraque est actus, et secundum utramque est aliquid quodammodo in actu. Differunt autem in duobus.

First, because the substantial form makes a thing to exist absolutely, and its subject is something purely potential.

Primo quidem, quia forma substantialis facit esse simpliciter, et eius subiectum est ens in potentia tantum.

But the accidental form does not make a thing to exist absolutely but to be such, or so great, or in some particular condition; for its subject is an actual being.

Forma autem accidentalis non facit esse simpliciter; sed esse tale, aut tantum, aut aliquo modo se habens, subiectum enim eius est ens in actu.

Hence it is clear that actuality is observed in the substantial form prior to its being observed in the subject, and since that which is first in a genus is the cause in that genus, the substantial form causes existence in its subject.

Unde patet quod actualitas per prius invenitur in forma substantiali quam in eius subiecto, et quia primum est causa in quolibet genere, forma substantialis causat esse in actu in suo subiecto.

On the other hand, actuality is observed in the subject of the accidental form prior to its being observed in the accidental form; wherefore the actuality of the accidental form is caused by the actuality of the subject.

Sed e converso, actualitas per prius invenitur in subiecto formae accidentalis, quam in forma accidentali, unde actualitas formae accidentalis causatur ab actualitate subiecti.

So the subject, forasmuch as it is in potentiality, is receptive of the accidental form; but forasmuch as it is in act, it produces it. This I say of the proper and "per se" accident; for with regard to the extraneous accident, the subject is receptive only: the accident being caused by an extrinsic agent.

Ita quod subiectum, inquantum est in potentia, est susceptivum formae accidentalis; inquantum autem est in actu, est eius productivum. Et hoc dico de proprio et per se accidente; nam respectu accidentis extranei, subiectum est susceptivum tantum: productivum vero talis accidentis est agens extrinsecum.

Secondly, substantial and accidental forms differ, because, since that which is the less principal exists for the sake of that which is the more principal, matter therefore exists on account of the substantial form; while on the contrary, the accidental form exists on account of the completeness of the subject.

Secundo autem differunt substantialis forma et accidentalis, quia, cum minus principale sit propter principalius, materia est propter formam substantialem; sed e converso, forma accidentalis est propter completionem subiecti.

The emanation of proper accidents from their subject is not by way of transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance; thus one thing results naturally from another.

Emanatio propriorum accidentium a subiecto non est per aliquam transmutationem, sed per aliquam naturalem resultationem; sicut ex uno naturaliter aliud resultat.

From one simple thing many things may proceed naturally, in a certain order; or again if there be diversity of recipients.

Ab uno simplici possunt naturaliter multa procedere ordine quodam. Et iterum propter diversitatem recipientium.

The subject is both the final cause, and in a way the active cause, of its proper accident. It is also as it were the material cause, inasmuch as it is receptive of the accident.

Subiectum est causa proprii accidentis et finalis, et quodammodo activa; et etiam ut materialis, inquantum est susceptivum accidentis.

From this we may gather that the essence of the soul is the cause of all its powers, as their end, and as their active principle; and of some as receptive thereof.

Et ex hoc potest accipi quod essentia animae est causa omnium potentiarum sicut finis et sicut principium activum; quarundam autem sicut susceptivum.

Yes. One power of the soul proceeds from the essence of the soul by the medium of another because those powers of the soul which precede the others, in the order of perfection and nature, are the principles of the others, after the manner of the end and active principle.

Una potentia animae ab essentia animae procedit mediante alia quod potentiae animae quae sunt priores secundum ordinem perfectionis et naturae, sint principia aliarum per modum finis et activi principii.

As the power of the soul flows from the essence, not by a transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance, and is simultaneous with the soul, so is it the case with one power as regards another.

Sicut potentia animae ab essentia fluit, non per transmutationem, sed per naturalem quandam resultationem, et est simul cum anima; ita est etiam de una potentia respectu alterius.

The essence of the soul is compared to the powers both as a principle active and final, and as a receptive principle, either separately by itself, or together with the body; and the agent and the end are more perfect, while the receptive principle, as such, is less perfect.

Essentia animae comparatur ad potentias et sicut principium activum et finale, et sicut principium susceptivum, vel seorsum per se vel simul cum corpore; agens autem et finis est perfectius, susceptivum autem principium, inquantum huiusmodi, est minus perfectum.

Powers are known by their actions. But the action of one power is caused by the action of another power, as the action of the imagination by the action of the senses.

Potentiae cognoscuntur per actus. Sed actus unius potentiae causatur ab alio; sicut actus phantasiae ab actu sensus.

For we see that the senses are for the sake of the intelligence, and not the other way about. The senses, moreover, are a certain imperfect participation of the intelligence; wherefore, according to their natural origin, they proceed from the intelligence as the imperfect from the perfect.

Videmus enim quod sensus est propter intellectum, et non e converso. Sensus etiam est quaedam deficiens participatio intellectus, unde secundum naturalem originem quodammodo est ab intellectu, sicut imperfectum a perfecto.

But considered as receptive principles, the more imperfect powers, conversely, are principles with regard to the others; thus the soul, according as it has the sensitive power, is considered as the subject, and as something material with regard to the intelligence.

Sed secundum viam susceptivi principii, e converso potentiae imperfectiores inveniuntur principia respectu aliarum, sicut anima, secundum quod habet potentiam sensitivam, consideratur sicut subiectum et materiale quoddam respectu intellectus.

On this account, the more imperfect powers precede the others in the order of generation, for the animal is generated before the man.

Et propter hoc, imperfectiores potentiae sunt priores in via generationis, prius enim animal generatur quam homo.

The powers of the soul are opposed to one another, as perfect and imperfect; as also are the species of numbers and figures. But this opposition does not prevent the origin of one from another, because imperfect things naturally proceed from perfect things.

Potentiae animae opponuntur ad invicem oppositione perfecti et imperfecti; sicut etiam species numerorum et figurarum. Haec autem oppositio non impedit originem unius ab alio, quia imperfecta naturaliter a perfectis procedunt.

No. The body being dead, the sensitive powers do not remain because accidents cannot remain after the destruction of the subject.

Defuncta carne, potentiae sensitivae non manent quia destructo subiecto, non potest accidens remanere.

Wherefore, the composite being destroyed, such powers do not remain actually; but they remain virtually in the soul, as in their principle or root.

Unde, corrupto coniuncto, non manent huiusmodi potentiae actu; sed virtute tantum manent in anima, sicut in principio vel radice.

All the powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their principle.

Omnes potentiae animae comparantur ad animam solam sicut ad principium.

But some powers belong to the soul alone as their subject: the intelligence and the will. These powers must remain in the soul, after the destruction of the body.

Sed quaedam potentiae comparantur ad animam solam sicut ad subiectum, ut intellectus et voluntas. Et huiusmodi potentiae necesse est quod maneant in anima, corpore destructo.

But other powers are subjected in the composite: all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive parts.

Quaedam vero potentiae sunt in coniuncto sicut in subiecto, sicut omnes potentiae sensitivae partis et nutritivae.

These powers have no act apart from the corporeal organ.

Talium potentiarum nulla est actio nisi per organum corporeum.