Appetitive powers: The Soul's Activators

Yes. It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul because appetite is found in things which have knowledge, above the common manner in which it is found in all things.

Necesse est ponere quandam potentiam animae appetitivam quia appetere invenitur in habentibus cognitionem, supra modum communem quo invenitur in omnibus.

Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a natural inclination to something. Wherefore each power desires by the natural appetite that object which is suitable to itself.

Unaquaeque potentia animae est quaedam forma seu natura, et habet naturalem inclinationem in aliquid. Unde unaquaeque appetit obiectum sibi conveniens naturali appetitu.

Above which natural appetite is the animal appetite, which follows the apprehension, and by which something is desired, not as suitable to this or that power (such as sight for seeing, or sound for hearing), but simply as suitable to the animal.

Supra quem est appetitus animalis consequens apprehensionem, quo appetitur aliquid, non ea ratione qua est conveniens ad actum huius vel illius potentiae (utpote visio ad videndum et auditio ad audiendum), sed quia est conveniens simpliciter animali.

What is apprehended and what is desired are the same in reality, but differ in aspect, for a thing is apprehended as something sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable or good. Now, it is diversity of aspect in the objects, and not material diversity, which demands a diversity of powers.

Id quod apprehenditur et appetitur, est idem subiecto, sed differt ratione, apprehenditur enim ut est ens sensibile vel intelligibile, appetitur vero ut est conveniens aut bonum. Diversitas autem rationum in obiectis requiritur ad diversitatem potentiarum; non autem materialis diversitas.

To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination follows every form.

Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod quamlibet formam sequitur aliqua inclinatio.

Now, the form is found to have a more perfect existence in those things which participate knowledge than in those which lack knowledge.

Forma autem in his quae cognitionem participant, altiori modo invenitur quam in his quae cognitione carent.

For in those which lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its own being: that is, to its nature. Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite.

In his enim quae cognitione carent, invenitur tantummodo forma ad unum esse proprium determinans unumquodque, quod etiam naturale uniuscuiusque est. Hanc igitur formam naturalem sequitur naturalis inclinatio, quae appetitus naturalis vocatur.

But in those things which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural being by its natural form, in such a manner that it is nevertheless receptive of the species of other things; for example, sense receives the species of all things sensible, and the intellect, of all things intelligible, so that the soul of man is, in a way, all things by sense and intellect, and thereby, those things that have knowledge, in a way, approach to a likeness to God, "in Whom all things pre-exist," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).

In habentibus autem cognitionem, sic determinatur unumquodque ad proprium esse naturale per formam naturalem, quod tamen est receptivum specierum aliarum rerum; sicut sensus recipit species omnium sensibilium, et intellectus omnium intelligibilium, ut sic anima hominis sit omnia quodammodo secundum sensum et intellectum, in quo quodammodo cognitionem habentia ad Dei similitudinem appropinquant, "in quo omnia praeexistunt", sicut Dionysius dicit.

Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a higher manner and above the manner of natural forms, so must there be in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite.

Sicut igitur formae altiori modo existunt in habentibus cognitionem supra modum formarum naturalium, ita oportet quod in eis sit inclinatio supra modum inclinationis naturalis, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis.

And this superior inclination belongs to the appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined by its natural form. And so it is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul.

Et haec superior inclinatio pertinet ad vim animae appetitivam, per quam animal appetere potest ea quae apprehendit, non solum ea ad quae inclinatur ex forma naturali. Sic igitur necesse est ponere aliquam potentiam animae appetitivam.

Yes. The intellectual appetite is distinct from the sensitive because what is apprehended by the intellect and what is apprehended by sense are generically different.

Quia igitur est alterius generis apprehensum per intellectum et apprehensum per sensum, consequens est quod appetitus intellectivus sit alia potentia a sensitivo.

The intellectual appetite, though it tends to individual things which exist outside the soul, yet tends to them as with respect to a certain universal aspect, as when it desires something because it is good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhetoric. ii, 4) that hatred is able to be about something universal; as when "we hate every kind of thief." In the same way by the intellectual appetite we are able to desire immaterial goods, which are not apprehended by sense, such as knowledge, virtue, and suchlike.

Appetitus intellectivus, etsi feratur in res quae sunt extra animam singulares, fertur tamen in eas secundum aliquam rationem universalem, sicut cum appetit aliquid quia est bonum. Unde philosophus dicit in sua rhetorica, quod odium potest esse de aliquo universali; puta cum odio habemus omne latronum genus. Similiter etiam per appetitum intellectivum appetere possumus immaterialia bona, quae sensus non apprehendit; sicut scientiam, virtutes, et alia huiusmodi.

Now things passive and movable are differentiated according to the distinction of the corresponding active and motive principles, because the motive must be proportionate to the movable, and the active to the passive; indeed, the passive power itself has its proper aspect from its relation to its active principle.

Passiva autem et mobilia distinguuntur secundum distinctionem activorum et motivorum, quia oportet motivum esse proportionatum mobili, et activum passivo; et ipsa potentia passiva propriam rationem habet ex ordine ad suum activum.

The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9) distinguishes a double appetite, and says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite moves the lower.

Philosophus, in III de anima, distinguit duplicem appetitum, et dicit quod appetitus superior movet inferiorem.

For the appetitive power is a passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended, wherefore the apprehended appetible is an activator (a mover which is not moved); while the appetite is a receptor (a mover moved), as the Philosopher says in De Anima iii, 10 and Metaph. xii (Did. xi, 7).

Potentia enim appetitiva est potentia passiva, quae nata est moveri ab apprehenso, unde appetibile apprehensum est movens non motum; appetitus autem movens motum, ut dicitur in III de anima, et XII Metaphys.

It is not accidental to the thing desired to be apprehended by the sense or the intellect, rather this belongs to it intrinsically; for the appetible does not move the appetite except as it is apprehended.

Appetibili non accidit esse apprehensum per sensum vel intellectum, sed per se ei convenit; nam appetibile non movet appetitum nisi inquantum est apprehensum.

Wherefore differences in the thing apprehended are of themselves differences of the appetible. And so the appetitive powers are distinct according to the distinction of the things apprehended, as according to their proper objects.

Unde differentiae apprehensi sunt per se differentiae appetibilis. Unde potentiae appetitivae distinguuntur secundum differentiam apprehensorum, sicut secundum propria obiecta.

Yes. Sensuality is defined as "the appetite of things belonging to the body" because the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination to the bodily senses, since we desire things which are apprehended through the bodily senses, and thus the bodily senses appertain to sensuality as a preamble.

Sensualitas definitur esse "appetitus rerum ad corpus pertinentium" quia motus sensualitatis sit inclinatio quaedam ad sensus corporis, dum scilicet appetimus ea quae per corporis sensus apprehenduntur et sic corporis sensus pertinent ad sensualitatem quasi praeambuli.

Sensuality is divided against higher and lower reason, as having in common with them the act of movement; for the apprehensive power, to which belong the higher and lower reason, is a motive power, as is appetite, to which appertains sensuality.

Sensualitas dividitur contra rationem superiorem et inferiorem, inquantum communicant in actu motionis; vis enim cognitiva, ad quam pertinet ratio superior et inferior, est motiva, sicut et appetitiva, ad quam pertinet sensualitas.

The name sensuality seems to be taken from the sensual movement, of which Augustine speaks (De Trin. xii, 12, 13), just as the name of a power is taken from its act; for instance, sight from seeing.

Nomen sensualitatis sumptum videtur a sensuali motu, de quo Augustinus loquitur XII de Trin., sicut ab actu sumitur nomen potentiae, ut a visione visus.

Now the sensual movement is an appetite following sensitive apprehension. For the act of the apprehensive power is not so properly called a movement, as the act of the appetite is, since the operation of the apprehensive power is completed in the very fact that the thing apprehended is in the one that apprehends; while the operation of the appetitive power is completed in the fact that he who desires is borne towards the thing desirable.

Motus autem sensualis est appetitus apprehensionem sensitivam consequens. Actus enim apprehensivae virtutis non ita proprie dicitur motus, sicut actio appetitus, nam operatio virtutis apprehensivae perficitur in hoc, quod res apprehensae sunt in apprehendente; operatio autem virtutis appetitivae perficitur in hoc, quod appetens inclinatur in rem appetibilem.

Therefore the operation of the apprehensive power is likened to rest; whereas the operation of the appetitive power is rather likened to movement.

Et ideo operatio apprehensivae virtutis assimilatur quieti; operatio autem virtutis appetitivae magis assimilatur motui.

Wherefore by sensual movement we understand the operation of the appetitive power, so that sensuality is the name of the sensitive appetite.

Unde per sensualem motum intelligitur operatio appetitivae virtutis. Et sic sensualitas est nomen appetitus sensitivi.

Yes. The sensitive appetite is one generic power, and is called sensuality; but it is divided into two powers, which are species of the sensitive appetite -- the irascible and the concupiscible, because the concupiscible power regards both what is suitable and what is unsuitable, but the object of the irascible power is to resist the onslaught of the unsuitable.

Appetitus sensitivus est una vis in genere, quae sensualitas dicitur; sed dividitur in duas potentias, quae sunt species appetitus sensitivi, scilicet in irascibilem et concupiscibilem quia vis concupiscibilis est et convenientis et inconvenientis, sed irascibilis est ad resistendum inconvenienti quod impugnat.

As in the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part there is an estimative power, which perceives those things which do not impress the senses, as we have said above (Q78, A2); so also in the sensitive appetite there is a certain appetitive power which regards something as suitable, not because it pleases the senses, but because it is useful to the animal for self-defense: and this is the irascible power.

Sicut in apprehensivis virtutibus in parte sensitiva est aliqua vis aestimativa, scilicet quae est perceptiva eorum quae sensum non immutant, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam in appetitu sensitivo est aliqua vis appetens aliquid quod non est conveniens secundum delectationem sensus, sed secundum quod est utile animali ad suam defensionem. Et haec est vis irascibilis.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that in natural corruptible things there is needed an inclination not only to the acquisition of what is suitable and to the avoiding of what is harmful, but also to resistance against corruptive and contrary agencies which are a hindrance to the acquisition of what is suitable, and are productive of harm.

Ad cuius evidentiam, considerari oportet quod in rebus naturalibus corruptibilibus, non solum oportet esse inclinationem ad consequendum convenientia et refugiendum nociva; sed etiam ad resistendum corrumpentibus et contrariis, quae convenientibus impedimentum praebent et ingerunt nocumenta.

Therefore, since the sensitive appetite is an inclination following sensitive apprehension, as natural appetite is an inclination following the natural form, there must needs be in the sensitive part two appetitive powers--one through which the soul is simply inclined to seek what is suitable, according to the senses, and to fly from what is hurtful, and this is called the concupiscible: and another, whereby an animal resists these attacks that hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm, and this is called the irascible. Whence we say that its object is something arduous, because its tendency is to overcome and rise above obstacles.

Quia igitur appetitus sensitivus est inclinatio consequens apprehensionem sensitivam, sicut appetitus naturalis est inclinatio consequens formam naturalem; necesse est quod in parte sensitiva sint duae appetitivae potentiae. Una, per quam anima simpliciter inclinatur ad prosequendum ea quae sunt convenientia secundum sensum, et ad refugiendum nociva, et haec dicitur concupiscibilis. Alia vero, per quam animal resistit impugnantibus, quae convenientia impugnant et nocumenta inferunt, et haec vis vocatur irascibilis. Unde dicitur quod eius obiectum est arduum, quia scilicet tendit ad hoc quod superet contraria, et superemineat eis.

Now these two are not to be reduced to one principle: for sometimes the soul busies itself with unpleasant things, against the inclination of the concupiscible appetite, in order that, following the impulse of the irascible appetite, it may fight against obstacles.

Hae autem duae inclinationes non reducuntur in unum principium, quia interdum anima tristibus se ingerit, contra inclinationem concupiscibilis, ut secundum inclinationem irascibilis impugnet contraria.

Wherefore also the passions of the irascible appetite counteract the passions of the concupiscible appetite: since the concupiscence, on being aroused, diminishes anger; and anger being roused, diminishes concupiscence in many cases.

Unde etiam passiones irascibilis repugnare videntur passionibus concupiscibilis, nam concupiscentia accensa minuit iram, et ira accensa minuit concupiscentiam, ut in pluribus.

This is clear also from the fact that the irascible is, as it were, the champion and defender of the concupiscible when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition of the suitable things which the concupiscible desires, or against what inflicts harm, from which the concupiscible flies.

Patet etiam ex hoc, quod irascibilis est quasi propugnatrix et defensatrix concupiscibilis, dum insurgit contra ea quae impediunt convenientia, quae concupiscibilis appetit, et ingerunt nociva, quae concupiscibilis refugit.

And for this reason all the passions of the irascible appetite rise from the passions of the concupiscible appetite and terminate in them; for instance, anger rises from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates in joy. For this reason also the quarrels of animals are about things concupiscible--namely, food and sex, as the Philosopher says [De Animal. Histor. viii.].

Et propter hoc, omnes passiones irascibilis incipiunt a passionibus concupiscibilis, et in eas terminantur; sicut ira nascitur ex illata tristitia, et vindictam inferens, in laetitiam terminatur. Propter hoc etiam pugnae animalium sunt de concupiscibilibus, scilicet de cibis et venereis, ut dicitur in VIII de animalibus.

Yes. The irascible and concupiscible are subject to reason because the exterior senses require for action exterior sensible things, whereby they are affected, and the presence of which is not ruled by reason, but the interior powers, both appetitive and apprehensive, do not require exterior things; therefore they are subject to the command of reason, which can not only incite or modify the affections of the appetitive power, but can also form the phantasms of the imagination.

Irascibilis et concupiscibilis rationi subduntur quia sensus exteriores indigent ad suos actus exterioribus sensibilibus, quibus immutentur, quorum praesentia non est in potestate rationis. Sed vires interiores, tam appetitivae quam apprehensivae, non indigent exterioribus rebus. Et ideo subduntur imperio rationis, quae potest non solum instigare vel mitigare affectus appetitivae virtutis, sed etiam formare imaginativae virtutis phantasmata.

As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2): "We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for the soul dominates the body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates the appetite by a politic and royal power." For a power is called despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the ability to resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, since they have nothing of their own.

Sicut philosophus dicit in I politicorum, "est quidem in animali contemplari et despoticum principatum, et politicum, anima quidem enim corpori dominatur despotico principatu; intellectus autem appetitui, politico et regali." Dicitur enim despoticus principatus, quo aliquis principatur servis, qui non habent facultatem in aliquo resistendi imperio praecipientis, quia nihil sui habent.

But that power is called politic and royal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands.

Principatus autem politicus et regalis dicitur, quo aliquis principatur liberis, qui, etsi subdantur regimini praesidentis, tamen habent aliquid proprium, ex quo possunt reniti praecipientis imperio.

And so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic power, because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul, but at the soul's command both hand and foot, and whatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, are moved at once. But the intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power, because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason.

Sic igitur anima dicitur dominari corpori despotico principatu, quia corporis membra in nullo resistere possunt imperio animae, sed statim ad appetitum animae movetur manus et pes, et quodlibet membrum quod natum est moveri voluntario motu. Intellectus autem, seu ratio, dicitur principari irascibili et concupiscibili politico principatu, quia appetitus sensibilis habet aliquid proprium, unde potest reniti imperio rationis.

For the sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the estimative power in other animals, and in man by the cogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and sense. Whence it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we sense or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the fact that the irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something, we must not conclude that they do not obey.

Natus est enim moveri appetitus sensitivus, non solum ab aestimativa in aliis animalibus, et cogitativa in homine, quam dirigit universalis ratio, sed etiam ab imaginativa et sensu. Unde experimur irascibilem vel concupiscibilem rationi repugnare, per hoc quod sentimus vel imaginamur aliquod delectabile quod ratio vetat, vel triste quod ratio praecipit. Et sic per hoc quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis in aliquo rationi repugnant, non excluditur quin ei obediant.

In two ways the irascible and concupiscible powers obey the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the will; first, as to reason, secondly as to the will. They obey the reason in their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by the estimative power; for instance, a sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid.

Rationi quidem obediunt quantum ad ipsos suos actus. Cuius ratio est, quia appetitus sensitivus in aliis quidem animalibus natus est moveri ab aestimativa virtute; sicut ovis aestimans lupum inimicum, timet.

In man the estimative power, as we have said above (Q78, A4), is replaced by the cogitative power, which is called by some 'the particular reason,' because it compares individual intentions. Wherefore in man the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by this particular reason. But this same particular reason is naturally guided and moved according to the universal reason; wherefore in syllogistic matters particular conclusions are drawn from universal propositions.

Loco autem aestimativae virtutis est in homine, sicut supra dictum est, vis cogitativa, quae dicitur a quibusdam ratio particularis, eo quod est collativa intentionum individualium. Unde ab ea natus est moveri in homine appetitus sensitivus. Ipsa autem ratio particularis nata est moveri et dirigi secundum rationem universalem; unde in syllogisticis ex universalibus propositionibus concluduntur conclusiones singulares.

Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the sensitive appetite, which is divided into concupiscible and irascible, and this appetite obeys it. But because to draw particular conclusions from universal principles is not the work of the intellect, as such, but of the reason, hence it is that the irascible and concupiscible are said to obey the reason rather than to obey the intellect.

Et ideo patet quod ratio universalis imperat appetitui sensitivo, qui distinguitur per concupiscibilem et irascibilem, et hic appetitus ei obedit. Et quia deducere universalia principia in conclusiones singulares, non est opus simplicis intellectus, sed rationis, ideo irascibilis et concupiscibilis magis dicuntur obedire rationi, quam intellectui.

Anyone can experience this in himself, for by applying certain universal considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited.

Hoc etiam quilibet experiri potest in seipso, applicando enim aliquas universales considerationes, mitigatur ira aut timor aut aliquid huiusmodi, vel etiam instigatur.

To the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in execution, which is accomplished by the motive power. For in other animals movement follows at once the concupiscible and irascible appetites; for instance, the sheep, fearing the wolf, flees at once, because it has no superior counteracting appetite.

Voluntati etiam subiacet appetitus sensitivus, quantum ad executionem, quae fit per vim motivam. In aliis enim animalibus statim ad appetitum concupiscibilis et irascibilis sequitur motus; sicut ovis, timens lupum statim fugit, quia non est in eis aliquis superior appetitus qui repugnet.

On the contrary, man is not moved at once, according to the irascible and concupiscible appetites; but he awaits the command of the will, which is the superior appetite. For wherever there is order among a number of motive powers, the second only moves by virtue of the first; wherefore the lower appetite is not sufficient to cause movement, unless the higher appetite consents.

Sed homo non statim movetur secundum appetitum irascibilis et concupiscibilis; sed expectatur imperium voluntatis, quod est appetitus superior. In omnibus enim potentiis motivis ordinatis, secundum movens non movet nisi virtute primi moventis; unde appetitus inferior non sufficit movere, nisi appetitus superior consentiat.

And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), that "the higher appetite moves the lower appetite, as the higher sphere moves the lower." In this way, therefore, the irascible and concupiscible are subject to reason.

Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod "appetitus superior movet appetitum inferiorem, sicut sphaera superior inferiorem." Hoc ergo modo irascibilis et concupiscibilis rationi subduntur.

Yes. The will desires something of necessity because the desire of the ultimate end does not regard those actions of which we are masters.

Voluntas ex necessitate aliquid vult quia appetitus ultimi finis non est de his quorum domini sumus.

We are masters of our own actions by reason of our being able to choose this or that. But choice regards not the end, but "the means to the end," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9).

Sumus domini nostrorum actuum secundum quod possumus hoc vel illud eligere. Electio autem non est de fine, sed de his quae sunt ad finem, ut dicitur in III Ethic.

For as the intellect of necessity adheres to the first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness: since the end is in practical matters what the principle is in speculative matters.

Sicut intellectus ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ex necessitate inhaereat ultimo fini, qui est beatitudo: finis enim se habet in operativis sicut principium in speculativis, ut dicitur in II Physic.

Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 4) that "all desire happiness with one will."

Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin., quod "beatitudinem omnes una voluntate appetunt."

No. The will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires because the will can tend to nothing except under the aspect of good, but because good is of many kinds, for this reason the will is not of necessity determined to one.

Voluntas non ex necessitate vult quaecumque vult quia voluntas in nihil potest tendere nisi sub ratione boni. Sed quia bonum est multiplex, propter hoc non ex necessitate determinatur ad unum.

The sensitive power does not compare different things with each other, as reason does, but it simply apprehends some one thing. Therefore, according to that one thing, it moves the sensitive appetite in a determinate way. But the reason is a power that compares several things together; therefore from several things the intellectual appetite--that is, the will--may be moved, but not of necessity from one thing.

Vis sensitiva non est vis collativa diversorum, sicut ratio, sed simpliciter aliquid unum apprehendit. Et ideo secundum illud unum determinate movet appetitum sensitivum. Sed ratio est collativa plurium, et ideo ex pluribus moveri potest appetitus intellectivus, scilicet voluntas, et non ex uno ex necessitate.

The mover, then, of necessity causes movement in the thing movable, when the power of the mover exceeds the thing movable, so that its entire capacity is subject to the mover. But as the capacity of the will regards the universal and perfect good, its capacity is not subjected to any individual good. And therefore it is not of necessity moved by it.

Movens tunc ex necessitate causat motum in mobili, quando potestas moventis excedit mobile, ita quod tota eius possibilitas moventi subdatur. Cum autem possibilitas voluntatis sit respectu boni universalis et perfecti, non subiicitur eius possibilitas tota alicui particulari bono. Et ideo non ex necessitate movetur ab illo.

There are certain individual goods which have not a necessary connection with happiness, because without them a man can be happy: and to such the will does not adhere of necessity. But there are some things which have a necessary connection with happiness, by means of which things man adheres to God, in Whom alone true happiness consists. Nevertheless, until through the certitude of the Divine Vision the necessity of such connection be shown, the will does not adhere to God of necessity, nor to those things which are of God. But the will of the man who sees God in His essence of necessity adheres to God, just as now we desire of necessity to be happy.

Sunt enim quaedam particularia bona, quae non habent necessariam connexionem ad beatitudinem, quia sine his potest aliquis esse beatus, et huiusmodi voluntas non de necessitate inhaeret. Sunt autem quaedam habentia necessariam connexionem ad beatitudinem, quibus scilicet homo Deo inhaeret, in quo solo vera beatitudo consistit. Sed tamen antequam per certitudinem divinae visionis necessitas huiusmodi connexionis demonstretur, voluntas non ex necessitate Deo inhaeret, nec his quae Dei sunt. Sed voluntas videntis Deum per essentiam, de necessitate inhaeret Deo, sicut nunc ex necessitate volumus esse beati.

Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is the will by which we sin and live well," and so the will extends to opposite things. Therefore it does not desire of necessity all things whatsoever it desires.

Augustinus dicit, quod "voluntas est qua peccatur et recte vivitur", et sic se habet ad opposita. Non ergo ex necessitate vult quaecumque vult.

No. The intellect is nobler than the will because good which is understood moves the will.

Intellectus est nobilior quam voluntas quia bonum intellectum movet voluntatem.

What precedes in order of generation and time is less perfect: for in one and in the same thing potentiality precedes act, and imperfection precedes perfection. But what precedes absolutely and in the order of nature is more perfect: for thus act precedes potentiality. And in this way the intellect precedes the will, as the motive power precedes the thing movable, and as the active precedes the passive.

Illud quod est prius generatione et tempore, est imperfectius, quia in uno et eodem potentia tempore praecedit actum, et imperfectio perfectionem. Sed illud quod est prius simpliciter et secundum naturae ordinem, est perfectius, sic enim actus est prior potentia. Et hoc modo intellectus est prior voluntate, sicut motivum mobili, et activum passivo.

If therefore the intellect and will be considered with regard to themselves, then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear if we compare their respective objects to one another. For the object of the intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of the will; since the object of the intellect is the very idea of appetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of which is in the intellect, is the object of the will. Now the more simple and the more abstract a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and therefore the object of the intellect is higher than the object of the will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its order to its object, it follows that the intellect in itself and absolutely is higher and nobler than the will.

Si ergo intellectus et voluntas considerentur secundum se, sic intellectus eminentior invenitur. Et hoc apparet ex comparatione obiectorum ad invicem. Obiectum enim intellectus est simplicius et magis absolutum quam obiectum voluntatis, nam obiectum intellectus est ipsa ratio boni appetibilis; bonum autem appetibile, cuius ratio est in intellectu, est obiectum voluntatis. Quanto autem aliquid est simplicius et abstractius, tanto secundum se est nobilius et altius. Et ideo obiectum intellectus est altius quam obiectum voluntatis. Cum ergo propria ratio potentiae sit secundum ordinem ad obiectum, sequitur quod secundum se et simpliciter intellectus sit altior et nobilior voluntate.

Yes. These powers include one another in their acts, because the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the intellect to understand, because good is contained in truth, inasmuch as it is an understood truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as it is a desired good.

Hae potentiae suis actibus invicem se includunt, quia intellectus intelligit voluntatem velle, et voluntas vult intellectum intelligere, quia bonum continetur sub vero, inquantum est quoddam verum intellectum, et verum continetur sub bono, inquantum est quoddam bonum desideratum.

The intellect may be considered in two ways: as apprehensive of universal being and truth, and as a thing and a particular power having a determinate act.

Intellectus dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, secundum quod intellectus est apprehensivus entis et veri universalis; alio modo, secundum quod est quaedam res, et particularis potentia habens determinatum actum.

In like manner also the will may be considered in two ways: according to the common nature of its object--that is to say, as appetitive of universal good--and as a determinate power of the soul having a determinate act.

Et similiter voluntas dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, secundum communitatem sui obiecti, prout scilicet est appetitiva boni communis; alio modo, secundum quod est quaedam determinata animae potentia habens determinatum actum.

If, therefore, the intellect and the will be compared with one another according to the universality of their respective objects, then, as we have said above (Q82 A3), the intellect is simply higher and nobler than the will.

Si ergo comparentur intellectus et voluntas secundum rationem communitatis obiectorum utriusque, sic dictum est supra quod intellectus est simpliciter altior et nobilior voluntate.

If, however, we take the intellect as regards the common nature of its object and the will as a determinate power, then again the intellect is higher and nobler than the will, because under the notion of being and truth is contained both the will itself, and its act, and its object.

Si autem consideretur intellectus secundum communitatem sui obiecti, et voluntas secundum quod est quaedam determinata potentia, sic iterum intellectus est altior et prior voluntate, quia sub ratione entis et veri, quam apprehendit intellectus, continetur voluntas ipsa, et actus eius, et obiectum ipsius.

Wherefore the intellect understands the will, and its act, and its object, just as it understands other species of things, as stone or wood, which are contained in the common notion of being and truth.

Unde intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et actum eius, et obiectum ipsius, sicut et alia specialia intellecta, ut lapidem aut lignum, quae continentur sub communi ratione entis et veri.

But if we consider the will as regards the common nature of its object, which is good, and the intellect as a thing and a special power; then the intellect itself, and its act, and its object, which is truth, each of which is some species of good, are contained under the common notion of good. And in this way the will is higher than the intellect, and can move it.

Si vero consideretur voluntas secundum communem rationem sui obiecti, quod est bonum, intellectus autem secundum quod est quaedam res et potentia specialis; sic sub communi ratione boni continetur, velut quoddam speciale, et intellectus ipse, et ipsum intelligere, et obiectum eius, quod est verum, quorum quodlibet est quoddam speciale bonum. Et secundum hoc voluntas est altior intellectu, et potest ipsum movere.

There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. For every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will; but the principle of counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher than our intellect --namely, God--as also Aristotle says (Eth. Eudemic. vii, 14), and in this way he explains that there is no need to proceed indefinitely.

Non oportet procedere in infinitum, sed statur in intellectu sicut in primo. Omnem enim voluntatis motum necesse est quod praecedat apprehensio, sed non omnem apprehensionem praecedit motus voluntatis; sed principium consiliandi et intelligendi est aliquod intellectivum principium altius intellectu nostro, quod est Deus, ut etiam Aristoteles dicit in VII Ethicae Eudemicae, et per hunc modum ostendit quod non est procedere in infinitum.

The intellect moves the will in one sense, and the will moves the intellect in another. A thing is said to move in two ways:

Intellectus alio modo movet voluntatem, quam voluntas intellectum. Aliquid dicitur movere dupliciter:

First, as an end; for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way the intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end.

Uno modo, per modum finis; sicut dicitur quod finis movet efficientem. Et hoc modo intellectus movet voluntatem, quia bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis, et movet ipsam ut finis.

Secondly, a thing is said to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De Similitudinibus).

Alio modo dicitur aliquid movere per modum agentis; sicut alterans movet alteratum, et impellens movet impulsum. Et hoc modo voluntas movet intellectum, et omnes animae vires; ut Anselmus dicit in libro de similitudinibus.

The reason is, because wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that power which regards the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends. And we may observe this both in nature and in things politic. For the heaven, which aims at the universal preservation of things subject to generation and corruption, moves all inferior bodies, each of which aims at the preservation of its own species or of the individual. The king also, who aims at the common good of the whole kingdom, by his rule moves all the governors of cities, each of whom rules over his own particular city.

Cuius ratio est, quia in omnibus potentiis activis ordinatis, illa potentia quae respicit finem universalem, movet potentias quae respiciunt fines particulares. Et hoc apparet tam in naturalibus quam in politicis. Caelum enim, quod agit ad universalem conservationem generabilium et corruptibilium, movet omnia inferiora corpora, quorum unumquodque agit ad conservationem propriae speciei, vel etiam individui. Rex etiam, qui intendit bonum commune totius regni, movet per suum imperium singulos praepositos civitatum, qui singulis civitatibus curam regiminis impendunt.

Now the object of the will is good and the end in general, and each power is directed to some suitable good proper to it, as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as agent moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our will.

Obiectum autem voluntatis est bonum et finis in communi. Quaelibet autem potentia comparatur ad aliquod bonum proprium sibi conveniens; sicut visus ad perceptionem coloris, intellectus ad cognitionem veri. Et ideo voluntas per modum agentis movet omnes animae potentias ad suos actus, praeter vires naturales vegetativae partis, quae nostro arbitrio non subduntur.

No. The irascible and concupiscible are not parts of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will, because, as was said above (Q59, A4; Q79, A7), a power which is directed to an object according to some common formal aspect is not differentiated by special differences which are contained under that common formal aspect.

Irascibilis et concupiscibilis non sunt partes intellectivi appetitus, qui dicitur voluntas quia, sicut supra dictum est, potentia quae ordinatur ad aliquod obiectum secundum communem rationem, non diversificatur per differentias speciales sub illa ratione communi contentas.

For instance, because sight regards the visible thing under the common aspect of something colored, the visual power is not multiplied according to the different kinds of color: but if there were a power regarding white as white, and not as something colored, it would be distinct from a power regarding black as black.

Sicut quia visus respicit visibile secundum rationem colorati, non multiplicantur visivae potentiae secundum diversas species colorum, si autem esset aliqua potentia quae esset albi inquantum est album, et non inquantum est coloratum, diversificaretur a potentia quae esset nigri inquantum est nigrum.

Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common aspect of good, because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. And therefore the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by the different aspects of particular good, for the concupiscible regards as proper to it the aspect of good, as something pleasant to the senses and suitable to nature; whereas the irascible regards the aspect of good as something that wards off and repels what is hurtful.

Appetitus autem sensitivus non respicit communem rationem boni, quia nec sensus apprehendit universale. Et ideo secundum diversas rationes particularium bonorum, diversificantur partes appetitus sensitivi, nam concupiscibilis respicit propriam rationem boni, inquantum est delectabile secundum sensum, et conveniens naturae; irascibilis autem respicit rationem boni, secundum quod est repulsivum et impugnativum eius quod infert nocumentum.

But the will regards good according to the common aspect of good, and therefore in the will, which is the intellectual appetite, there is no differentiation of appetitive powers, so that there be in the intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from a concupiscible power: just as neither on the part of the intellect are the apprehensive powers multiplied, although they are on the part of the senses.

Sed voluntas respicit bonum sub communi ratione boni. Et ideo non diversificantur in ipsa, quae est appetitus intellectivus, aliquae potentiae appetitivae, ut sit in appetitu intellectivo alia potentia irascibilis, et alia concupiscibilis, sicut etiam ex parte intellectus non multiplicantur vires apprehensivae, licet multiplicentur ex parte sensus.

Love, concupiscence, and the like can be understood in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions--arising, that is, with a certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are commonly understood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive appetite.

Aamor, concupiscentia, et huiusmodi, dupliciter accipiuntur. Quandoque quidem secundum quod sunt quaedam passiones, cum quadam scilicet concitatione animi provenientes. Et sic communiter accipiuntur, et hoc modo sunt solum in appetitu sensitivo.

They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they are simple affections without passion or commotion of the soul, and thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they are attributed to the angels and to God.

Alio modo significant simplicem affectum, absque passione vel animi concitatione. Et sic sunt actus voluntatis. Et hoc etiam modo attribuuntur Angelis et Deo.

The will itself may be said to be "irascible", as far as it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden movement of a passion, but from a judgment of the reason. And in the same way the will may be said to be "concupiscible" on account of its desire for good. And thus in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope--that is, in the will as ordered to such acts.

Ipsa voluntas potest dici irascibilis, prout vult impugnare malum, non ex impetu passionis, sed ex iudicio rationis. Et eodem modo potest dici concupiscibilis, propter desiderium boni. Et sic in irascibili et concupiscibili sunt caritas et spes; idest in voluntate secundum quod habet ordinem ad huiusmodi actus.

Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) says "that the irrational" part of the soul is divided into the desiderative and irascible, and Damascene says the same (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). And the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9) "that the will is in reason, while in the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and anger," or "desire and animus."

Gregorius Nyssenus, dicit, quod irrationalis pars animae dividitur in desiderativum et irascitivum; et idem dicit Damascenus, in libro II. Et philosophus dicit, in III de anima quod "voluntas in ratione est, in irrationali autem parte animae concupiscentia et ira, vel desiderium et animus."

Yes. Man has free choice because otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain; but man is rational.

Homo est liberi arbitrii, alioquin frustra essent consilia, exhortationes, praecepta, prohibitiones, praemia et poenae; sed rationalis est homo.

Free choice is the cause of its own movement, because by his free choice man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.

Liberum arbitrium est causa sui motus, quia homo per liberum arbitrium seipsum movet ad agendum. Non tamen hoc est de necessitate libertatis, quod sit prima causa sui id quod liberum est, sicut nec ad hoc quod aliquid sit causa alterius, requiritur quod sit prima causa eius. Deus igitur est prima causa movens et naturales causas et voluntarias. Et sicut naturalibus causis, movendo eas, non aufert quin actus earum sint naturales; ita movendo causas voluntarias, non aufert quin actiones earum sint voluntariae, sed potius hoc in eis facit, operatur enim in unoquoque secundum eius proprietatem.

In order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which lack knowledge.

Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod quaedam agunt absque iudicio, sicut lapis movetur deorsum; et similiter omnia cognitione carentia.

And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals.

Quaedam autem agunt iudicio, sed non libero; sicut animalia bruta.

But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things.

Iudicat enim ovis videns lupum, eum esse fugiendum, naturali iudicio, et non libero, quia non ex collatione, sed ex naturali instinctu hoc iudicat. Et simile est de quolibet iudicio brutorum animalium. Sed homo agit iudicio, quia per vim cognoscitivam iudicat aliquid esse fugiendum vel prosequendum. Sed quia iudicium istud non est ex naturali instinctu in particulari operabili, sed ex collatione quadam rationis; ideo agit libero iudicio, potens in diversa ferri.

For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free choice.

Ratio enim circa contingentia habet viam ad opposita; ut patet in dialecticis syllogismis, et rhetoricis persuasionibus. Particularia autem operabilia sunt quaedam contingentia, et ideo circa ea iudicium rationis ad diversa se habet, et non est determinatum ad unum. Et pro tanto necesse est quod homo sit liberi arbitrii, ex hoc ipso quod rationalis est.

It is written (Sirach 15:14): "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel"; and the gloss adds: "i.e., of his free choice."

Dicitur Eccli. XV, "Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui." Glossa, idest in libertate arbitrii.

Yes. Free choice is a power because free choice is indifferent to good and evil choice, wherefore it is impossible for free choice to be a habit.

Liberum arbitrium est potentia quia liberum arbitrium indifferenter se habet ad bene eligendum vel male, unde impossibile est quod liberum arbitrium sit habitus.

It is not unusual for a power to be named from its act. And so from this act, which is a free judgment, is named the power which is the principle of this act. Otherwise, if free choice denominated an act, it would not always remain in man.

Consuetum est potentiam significari nomine actus. Et sic per hunc actum qui est liberum iudicium, nominatur potentia quae est huius actus principium. Alioquin, si liberum arbitrium nominaret actum, non semper maneret in homine.

Although free choice in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of speaking we call free choice, that which is the principle of the act by which man judges freely. Now in us the principle of an act is both power and habit; for we say that we know something both by knowledge and by the intellectual power. Therefore free choice must be either a power or a habit, or a power with a habit. That it is neither a habit nor a power together with a habit, can be clearly proved in two ways.

Quamvis liberum arbitrium nominet quendam actum secundum propriam significationem vocabuli, secundum tamen communem usum loquendi, liberum arbitrium dicimus id quod est huius actus principium, scilicet quo homo libere iudicat. Principium autem actus in nobis est et potentia et habitus; dicimur enim aliquid cognoscere et per scientiam et per intellectivam potentiam. Oportet ergo quod liberum arbitrium vel sit potentia vel sit habitus, vel sit potentia cum aliquo habitu. Quod autem non sit habitus, neque potentia cum habitu, manifeste apparet ex duobus.

First of all, because, if it is a habit, it must be a natural habit; for it is natural to man to have a free choice. But there is not natural habit in us with respect to those things which come under free choice, for we are naturally inclined to those things of which we have natural habits--for instance, to assent to first principles; while those things to which we are naturally inclined are not subject to free choice, as we have said of the desire of happiness (Q82, A1; Q82, A2). Wherefore it is against the very notion of free choice that it should be a natural habit. And that it should be a non-natural habit is against its nature. Therefore in no sense is it a habit.

Primo quidem, quia si est habitus, oportet quod sit habitus naturalis; hoc enim est naturale homini, quod sit liberi arbitrii. Nullus autem habitus naturalis adest nobis ad ea quae subsunt libero arbitrio, quia ad ea respectu quorum habemus habitus naturales, naturaliter inclinamur, sicut ad assentiendum primis principiis; ea autem ad quae naturaliter inclinamur, non subsunt libero arbitrio, sicut dictum est de appetitu beatitudinis. Unde contra propriam rationem liberi arbitrii est, quod sit habitus naturalis. Contra naturalitatem autem eius est, quod sit habitus non naturalis. Et sic relinquitur quod nullo modo sit habitus.

Secondly, this is clear because habits are defined as that "by reason of which we are well or ill disposed with regard to actions and passions" (Ethic. ii, 5), for by temperance we are well-disposed as regards concupiscences, and by intemperance ill-disposed; and by knowledge we are well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we know the truth, and by the contrary ill-disposed. But the free choice is indifferent to good and evil choice; wherefore it is impossible for free choice to be a habit. Therefore it is a power.

Secundo hoc apparet, quia habitus dicuntur secundum quos "nos habemus ad passiones vel ad actus bene vel male", ut dicitur in II Ethic., nam per temperantiam bene nos habemus ad concupiscentias, per intemperantiam autem male; per scientiam etiam bene nos habemus ad actum intellectus, dum verum cognoscimus per habitum autem contrarium male. Liberum autem arbitrium indifferenter se habet ad bene eligendum vel male. Unde impossibile est quod liberum arbitrium sit habitus. Relinquitur ergo quod sit potentia.

Bernard says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. 1,2) that free choice is "the soul's habit of disposing of itself." But Bernard takes habit, not as divided against power, but as signifying a certain aptitude by which a man has some sort of relation to an act. And this may be both by a power and by a habit, for by a power man is, as it were, empowered to do the action, and by the habit he is apt to act well or ill.

Bernardus etiam dicit quod liberum arbitrium est "habitus animae liber sui". Bernardus autem accipit habitum non secundum quod dividitur contra potentiam, sed secundum quod significat habitudinem quandam, qua aliquo modo se aliquis habet ad actum. Quod quidem est tam per potentiam quam per habitum, nam per potentiam homo se habet ut potens operari, per habitum autem ut aptus ad operandum bene vel male.

Free choice is defined as "the faculty of the will and reason." Sometimes faculty denominates a facility of power, which is due to a habit. But faculty sometimes also denominates a power ready for operation: and in this sense faculty is used in the definition of free choice.

Liberum arbitrium dicitur esse facultas voluntatis et rationis. Facultas quandoque nominat facilitatem potestatis, quae quidem est per habitum. Facultas nominat quandoque potestatem expeditam ad operandum. Et sic facultas ponitur in definitione liberi arbitrii.

Yes. Free choice is an appetitive power because free choice is that by which we choose.

Liberum arbitrium est virtus appetitiva quia liberum arbitrium est secundum quod eligimus.

Judgment, as it were, concludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, by the acceptation of the appetite: whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3) says that, "having formed a judgment by counsel, we desire in accordance with that counsel." And in this sense choice itself is a judgment from which free choice takes its name.

Iudicium est quasi conclusio et determinatio consilii. Determinatur autem consilium, primo quidem per sententiam rationis, et secundo per acceptationem appetitus, unde philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod "ex consiliari iudicantes desideramus secundum consilium". Et hoc modo ipsa electio dicitur quoddam iudicium, a quo nominatur liberum arbitrium.

This comparison which is implied in the choice belongs to the preceding counsel, which is an act of reason. For though the appetite does not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some likeness of comparison by choosing one in preference to another.

Ista collatio quae importatur in nomine electionis, pertinet ad consilium praecedens, quod est rationis. Appetitus enim, quamvis non sit collativus, tamen inquantum a vi cognitiva conferente movetur, habet quandam collationis similitudinem, dum unum alteri praeoptat.

The proper act of free choice is choice: for we say that we have a free choice because we can take one thing while refusing another; and this is to choose. Therefore we must consider the nature of free choice, by considering the nature of choice.

Proprium liberi arbitrii est electio, ex hoc enim liberi arbitrii esse dicimur, quod possumus unum recipere, alio recusato, quod est eligere. Et ideo naturam liberi arbitrii ex electione considerare oportet.

Now two things concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred to another: and on the part of the appetitive power, it is required that the appetite should accept the judgment of counsel.

Ad electionem autem concurrit aliquid ex parte cognitivae virtutis, et aliquid ex parte appetitivae, ex parte quidem cognitivae, requiritur consilium, per quod diiudicatur quid sit alteri praeferendum; ex parte autem appetitivae, requiritur quod appetendo acceptetur id quod per consilium diiudicatur.

Therefore Aristotle (Ethic. vi, 2) leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs principally to the appetitive or the cognitive power: since he says that choice is either "an appetitive intellect or an intellectual appetite." But (Ethic. iii, 3) he inclines to its being an intellectual appetite when he describes choice as "a desire proceeding from counsel." And the reason of this is because the proper object of choice is the means to the end: and this, as such, is in the nature of that good which is called useful: wherefore since good, as such, is the object of the appetite, it follows that choice is principally an act of the appetitive power. And thus free choice is an appetitive power.

Et ideo Aristoteles in VI Ethic. sub dubio derelinquit utrum principalius pertineat electio ad vim appetitivam, vel ad vim cognitivam, dicit enim quod electio vel est intellectus appetitivus, vel appetitus intellectivus. Sed in III Ethic. in hoc magis declinat quod sit appetitus intellectivus, nominans electionem desiderium consiliabile. Et huius ratio est, quia proprium obiectum electionis est illud quod est ad finem, hoc autem, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem boni quod dicitur utile, unde cum bonum, inquantum huiusmodi, sit obiectum appetitus, sequitur quod electio sit principaliter actus appetitivae virtutis. Et sic liberum arbitrium est appetitiva potentia.

No. Choice and will -- that is, the act of willing -- are different acts, yet they belong to the same power, because in appetitive matters, the end is related to the means, which is desired on account of the end.

Electio et voluntas, idest ipsum velle, sunt diversi actus, sed tamen pertinent ad unam potentiam, sicut etiam intelligere et ratiocinari, quia in appetitivis se habet finis ad ea quae sunt ad finem, quae propter finem appetuntur.

To "will" implies the simple appetite for something, wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself.

Velle importat simplicem appetitum alicuius rei, unde voluntas dicitur esse de fine, qui propter se appetitur.

But to "choose" is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else, wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means to the end.

Eligere autem est appetere aliquid propter alterum consequendum, unde proprie est eorum quae sunt ad finem.

Wherefore it is evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is free choice. But it has been shown above (Q79, A8) that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose: and on this account the will and free choice are not two powers, but one.

Unde manifestum est quod sicut se habet intellectus ad rationem, ita se habet voluntas ad vim electivam, idest ad liberum arbitrium. Ostensum est autem supra quod eiusdem potentiae est intelligere et ratiocinari, sicut eiusdem virtutis est quiescere et moveri. Unde etiam eiusdem potentiae est velle et eligere. Et propter hoc voluntas et liberum arbitrium non sunt duae potentiae, sed una.

The intellect is compared to the will as moving the will. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an active and a passive will.

Intellectus comparatur ad voluntatem ut movens. Et ideo non oportet in voluntate distinguere agens et possibile.