Illumination and Abstraction

Yes. Material things must needs be understood according as they are abstracted from matter and from material images, namely, phantasms, because the object of knowledge is proportionate to the power of knowledge.

Oportet quod materialia intelligantur inquantum a materia abstrahuntur, et a similitudinibus materialibus, quae sunt phantasmata, quia obiectum cognoscibile proportionatur virtuti cognoscitivae.

We must needs say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things, just as, on the contrary, angels know material things through the immaterial.

Necesse est dicere quod intellectus noster intelligit materialia abstrahendo a phantasmatibus; et per materialia sic considerata in immaterialium aliqualem cognitionem devenimus, sicut e contra Angeli per immaterialia materialia cognoscunt.

The things which belong to the formal aspect of species of a material thing, such as a stone, or a man, or a horse, can be thought of apart from the individualizing principles which do not belong to the formal aspect of the species. This is what we mean by abstracting the universal from the particular, or the intelligible species from the phantasm; that is, by considering the nature of the species apart from its individual qualities represented by the phantasms.

Ea quae pertinent ad rationem speciei cuiuslibet rei materialis, puta lapidis aut hominis aut equi, possunt considerari sine principiis individualibus, quae non sunt de ratione speciei. Et hoc est abstrahere universale a particulari, vel speciem intelligibilem a phantasmatibus; considerare scilicet naturam speciei absque consideratione individualium principiorum, quae per phantasmata repraesentantur.

The thing understood is immaterially in the one who understands, according to the mode of the intellect, and not materially, according to the mode of a material thing.

Intellectum est in intelligente immaterialiter, per modum intellectus; non autem materialiter, per modum rei materialis.

The intellect therefore abstracts the species of a natural thing from the individual sensible matter, but not from the common sensible matter.

Intellectus igitur abstrahit speciem rei naturalis a materia sensibili individuali, non autem a materia sensibili communi.

Mathematical species, however, can be abstracted by the intellect from sensible matter, not only from individual, but also from common matter; not, however, from common intelligible matter, but only from individual [quantified] matter.

Species autem mathematicae possunt abstrahi per intellectum a materia sensibili non solum individuali, sed etiam communi; non tamen a materia intelligibili communi, sed solum individuali.

The intellect would be false if it abstracted the species of a stone from its matter in such a way as to regard the species as not existing in matter, as Plato held.

Unde falsus esset intellectus, si sic abstraheret speciem lapidis a materia, ut intelligeret eam non esse in materia, ut Plato posuit.

He held that all those things which we have stated to be abstracted by the intellect, are abstract in reality.

Et quia Plato non consideravit quod dictum est de duplici modo abstractionis, omnia quae diximus abstrahi per intellectum, posuit abstracta esse secundum rem.

Colors, as being in individual corporeal matter, have the same mode of existence as the power of sight: therefore they can impress their own image on the eye. But phantasms, since they are images of individuals, and exist in corporeal organs, have not the same mode of existence as the human intellect, and therefore have not the power of themselves to make an impression on the passive intellect.

Colores habent eundem modum existendi prout sunt in materia corporali individuali, sicut et potentia visiva: et ideo possunt imprimere suam similitudinem in visum. Sed phantasmata, cum sint similitudines individuorum, et existant in organis corporeis, non habent eundem modum existendi quem habet intellectus humanus, ut ex dictis patet; et ideo non possunt sua virtute imprimere in intellectum possibilem.

This is done by the power of the active intellect which by turning towards the phantasms produces in the passive intellect a certain similitude which is representative — as far as concerns the nature of the species — of those things which are phantasms. It is thus that the intelligible species is said to be abstracted from the phantasms; not that the identical form which previously was in the phantasms is subsequently in the passive intellect, as a body transferred from one place to another.

Sed virtute intellectus agentis resultat quaedam similitudo in intellectu possibili ex conversione intellectus agentis supra phantasmata, quae quidem est repraesentativa eorum quorum sunt phantasmata, solum quantum ad naturam speciei. Et per hunc modum dicitur abstrahi species intelligibilis a phantasmatibus; non quod aliqua eadem numero forma, quae prius fuit in phantasmatibus, postmodum fiat in intellectu possibili, ad modum quo corpus accipitur ab uno loco et transfertur ad alterum.

Not only does the active intellect (A) throw light on the phantasms, it does more; (B) by its own power it abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasms.

Phantasmata et illuminantur ab intellectu agente; et iterum ab eis, per virtutem intellectus agentis, species intelligibiles abstrahuntur.

(A) It throws light on the phantasms, because, just as the sensitive part acquires a greater power by its conjunction with the intellectual part, so by the power of the active intellect the phantasms are made more fit for the abstraction therefrom of intelligible intentions.

Illuminantur quidem, quia, sicut pars sensitiva ex coniunctione ad intellectivam efficitur virtuosior, ita phantasmata ex virtute intellectus agentis redduntur habilia ut ab eis intentiones intelligibiles abstrahantur.

Furthermore, (B) the active intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasms, inasmuch as by the power of the active intellect we are able to take into our consideration the natures of the species apart from the individual conditions: the passive intellect is informed according to the similitudes of [the relations between] the individual conditions.

Abstrahit autem intellectus agens species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, inquantum per virtutem intellectus agentis accipere possumus in nostra consideratione naturas specierum sine individualibus conditionibus: secundum quarum similitudines intellectus possibilis informatur.

Our intellect both (B) abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasms, inasmuch as it considers the natures of things as universal, and nevertheless (A) understands these natures in the phantasms, since it cannot understand even the things of which it abstracts the species, without turning itself to the phantasms.

Intellectus noster et abstrahit species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, inquantum considerat naturas rerum in universali, et tamen intelligit eas in phantasmatibus, quia non potest intelligere etiam ea quorum species abstrahit, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata.

No. The soul knows external things by means of its intelligible species because the intelligible species is not what is actually understood, but that by which the intellect understands.

Anima per species intelligibiles cognoscat res quae sunt extra animam quia species intelligibilis non est quod intelligitur actu, sed id quo intelligit intellectus.

Since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own act of intelligence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily; but that which is primarily understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness. This also appears from the opinion of the ancient philosophers, who said that "like is known by like."

Quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, secundum eandem reflexionem intelligit et suum intelligere, et speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellectiva secundario est id quod intelligitur. Sed id quod intelligitur primo, est res cuius species intelligibilis est similitudo. Et hoc etiam patet ex antiquorum opinione, qui ponebant simile simili cognosci.

There are two operations in the sensitive part. One, in regard of impression only, and thus the operation of the senses takes place by the senses being impressed by the sensible. The other is formation, inasmuch as the imagination forms for itself an image of an absent thing, or even of something never seen. Both of these operations are found in the intellect.

In parte sensitiva invenitur duplex operatio. Una secundum solam immutationem, et sic perficitur operatio sensus per hoc quod immutatur a sensibili. Alia operatio est formatio, secundum quod vis imaginativa format sibi aliquod idolum rei absentis, vel etiam nunquam visae. Et utraque haec operatio coniungitur in intellectu.

For in the first place there is the passion of the passive intellect as informed by the intelligible species; and then the passive intellect thus informed forms a definition, or a division, or a composition, expressed by a word. Wherefore the formal aspect conveyed by a word is its definition; and a proposition conveys the intellect's division or composition. Words do not therefore signify the intelligible species themselves; but that which the intellect forms for itself for the purpose of judging of external things.

Nam primo quidem consideratur passio intellectus possibilis secundum quod informatur specie intelligibili. Qua quidem formatus, format secundo vel definitionem vel divisionem vel compositionem, quae per vocem significatur. Unde ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio; et enuntiatio significat compositionem et divisionem intellectus. Non ergo voces significant ipsas species intelligibiles; sed ea quae intellectus sibi format ad iudicandum de rebus exterioribus.

Yes. Our intellect knows "animal" before it knows "man", and the same reason holds in comparing any more universal idea with the less universal, because our intellect proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality.

Prius occurrit intellectui nostro cognoscere animal quam cognoscere hominem, et eadem ratio est si comparemus quodcumque magis universale ad minus universale, quia intellectus noster de potentia in actum procedit.

And every power thus proceeding from potentiality to actuality comes first to an incomplete act, which is the medium between potentiality and actuality, before accomplishing the perfect act.

Omne autem quod procedit de potentia in actum, prius pervenit ad actum incompletum, qui est medius inter potentiam et actum, quam ad actum perfectum.

Knowledge of the singular and individual is prior, as regards us, to the knowledge of the universal, as sensible knowledge is prior to intellectual knowledge. But in both sense and intellect the knowledge of the more common precedes the knowledge of the less common.

Cognitio singularium est prior quoad nos quam cognitio universalium, sicut cognitio sensitiva quam cognitio intellectiva. Sed tam secundum sensum quam secundum intellectum, cognitio magis communis est prior quam cognitio minus communis.

The reason of this is clear: because he who knows a thing indistinctly is in a state of potentiality as regards its principle of distinction; as he who knows "genus" is in a state of potentiality as regards "difference." Thus it is evident that indistinct knowledge is midway between potentiality and act.

Et huius ratio manifesta est. Quia qui scit aliquid indistincte, adhuc est in potentia ut sciat distinctionis principium; sicut qui scit genus, est in potentia ut sciat differentiam. Et sic patet quod cognitio indistincta media est inter potentiam et actum.

The universal can be considered in two ways.

Universale dupliciter potest considerari.

First, the universal nature may be considered together with the intention of universality. And since the intention of universality--viz., the relation of one and the same to many--is due to intellectual abstraction, the universal thus considered is a secondary consideration. Hence it is said (De Anima i, 1) that the "universal animal is either nothing or something secondary." But according to Plato, who held that universals are subsistent, the universal considered thus would be prior to the particular, for the latter, according to him, are mere participations of the subsistent universals which he called ideas.

Uno modo, secundum quod natura universalis consideratur simul cum intentione universalitatis. Et cum intentio universalitatis, ut scilicet unum et idem habeat habitudinem ad multa, proveniat ex abstractione intellectus, oportet quod secundum hunc modum universale sit posterius. Unde in I de anima dicitur quod "animal universale aut nihil est, aut posterius est." Sed secundum Platonem, qui posuit universalia subsistentia, secundum hanc considerationem universale esset prius quam particularia, quae secundum eum non sunt nisi per participationem universalium subsistentium, quae dicuntur ideae.

Secondly, the universal can be considered in the nature itself--for instance, animality or humanity as existing in the individual. And thus we must distinguish two orders of nature: one, by way of generation and time; and thus the imperfect and the potential come first. In this way the more common comes first in the order of nature; as appears clearly in the generation of man and animal; for "the animal is generated before man," as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal ii, 3). The other order is the order of perfection or of the intention of nature: for instance, act considered absolutely is naturally prior to potentiality, and the perfect to the imperfect: thus the less common comes naturally before the more common; as man comes before animal. For the intention of nature does not stop at the generation of animal but goes on to the generation of man.

Alio modo potest considerari quantum ad ipsam naturam, scilicet animalitatis vel humanitatis, prout invenitur in particularibus. Et sic dicendum est quod duplex est ordo naturae. Unus secundum viam generationis et temporis, secundum quam viam, ea quae sunt imperfecta et in potentia, sunt priora. Et hoc modo magis commune est prius secundum naturam, quod apparet manifeste in generatione hominis et animalis; nam prius generatur animal quam homo, ut dicitur in libro de Generat. Animal. Alius est ordo perfectionis, sive intentionis naturae; sicut actus simpliciter est prius secundum naturam quam potentia, et perfectum prius quam imperfectum. Et per hunc modum, minus commune est prius secundum naturam quam magis commune, ut homo quam animal, naturae enim intentio non sistit in generatione animalis, sed intendit generare hominem.

The universal, as understood with the intention of universality, is, indeed, in a way, a principle of knowledge, in so far as the intention of universality results from the mode of understanding by way of abstraction. But what is a principle of knowledge is not of necessity a principle of existence, as Plato thought: since at times we know a cause through its effect, and substance through accidents. Wherefore the universal thus considered, according to the opinion of Aristotle, is neither a principle of existence, nor a substance, as he makes clear (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 13).

Universale, secundum quod accipitur cum intentione universalitatis, est quidem quodammodo principium cognoscendi, prout intentio universalitatis consequitur modum intelligendi qui est per abstractionem. Non autem est necesse quod omne quod est principium cognoscendi, sit principium essendi, ut Plato existimavit, cum quandoque cognoscamus causam per effectum, et substantiam per accidentia. Unde universale sic acceptum, secundum sententiam Aristotelis, non est principium essendi, neque substantia, ut patet in VII Metaphys.

But if we consider the generic or specific nature itself as existing in the singular, thus in a way it is in the formal aspect of a formal principle in regard to the singulars: for the singular is the result of matter, while the formal aspect of species is from the form. But the generic nature is compared to the specific nature rather after the fashion of a material principle, because the generic nature is taken from that which is material in a thing, while the formal aspect of species is taken from that which is formal: thus the formal aspect of animal is taken from the sensitive part, whereas the formal aspect of man is taken from the intellectual part.

Si autem consideremus ipsam naturam generis et speciei prout est in singularibus, sic quodammodo habet rationem principii formalis respectu singularium: nam singulare est propter materiam, ratio autem speciei sumitur ex forma. Sed natura generis comparatur ad naturam speciei magis per modum materialis principii, quia natura generis sumitur ab eo quod est materiale in re, ratio vero speciei ab eo quod est formale: sicut ratio animalis a sensitivo, ratio vero hominis ab intellectivo.

Thus it is that the ultimate intention of nature is to the species and not to the individual, or the genus: because the form is the end of generation, while matter is for the sake of the form. Neither is it necessary that, as regards us, knowledge of any cause or principle should be secondary: since at times through sensible causes we become acquainted with unknown effects, and sometimes conversely.

Et inde est quod ultima naturae intentio est ad speciem, non autem ad individuum, neque ad genus: quia forma est finis generationis, materia vero est propter formam. Non autem oportet quod cuiuslibet causae vel principii cognitio sit posterior quoad nos: cum quandoque cognoscamus per causas sensibiles, effectus ignotos, quandoque autem e converso.

No. It is impossible for one and the same intellect to be perfected at the same time by different intelligible species so as actually to understand different things because whatever things the intellect understands under different species, it does not understand at the same time.

Impossibile est quod idem intellectus simul perficiatur diversis speciebus intelligibilibus, ad intelligendum diversa in actu, quia quaecumque intellectus per diversas species intelligit, non simul intelligit.

The reason of this is that it is impossible for one and the same subject to be perfected at the same time by many forms of one genus and diverse species, just as it is impossible for one and the same body at the same time to have different colors or different shapes. Now all intelligible species belong to one genus, because they are the perfections of one intellectual faculty; although the things which the species represent belong to different genera.

Et huius ratio est, quia impossibile est idem subiectum perfici simul pluribus formis unius generis et diversarum specierum, sicut impossibile est quod idem corpus secundum idem simul coloretur diversis coloribus, vel figuretur diversis figuris. Omnes autem species intelligibiles sunt unius generis, quia sunt perfectiones unius intellectivae potentiae; licet res quarum sunt species, sint diversorum generum.

The intellect can, indeed, understand many things as one, but not as many; that is to say: by "one" but not by "many" intelligible species. For the mode of every action follows the form which is the principle of that action.

Intellectus quidem potest multa intelligere per modum unius, non autem multa per modum multorum; dico autem: per modum unius vel multorum, per unam vel plures species intelligibiles. Nam modus cuiusque actionis consequitur formam quae est actionis principium.

Therefore whatever things the intellect can understand under one species, it can understand at the same time: hence it is that God sees all things at the same time, because He sees all in one, that is, in His Essence.

Quaecumque ergo intellectus potest intelligere sub una specie, simul intelligere potest: et inde est quod Deus omnia simul videt, quia omnia videt per unum, quod est essentia sua. Quaecumque vero intellectus per diversas species intelligit, non simul intelligit.

The intellect is above that time which is the measure of the movement of corporeal things. But the multitude itself of intelligible species causes a certain vicissitude of intelligible operations, according as one operation succeeds another. And this vicissitude is called time by Augustine, who says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22), that "God moves the spiritual creature through time."

Intellectus est supra tempus quod est numerus motus corporalium rerum. Sed ipsa pluralitas specierum intelligibilium causat vicissitudinem quandam intelligibilium operationum, secundum quam una operatio est prior altera. Et hanc vicissitudinem Augustinus nominat tempus, cum dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., quod "Deus movet creaturam spiritualem per tempus."

Yes. The human intellect must of necessity understand by composition and division because although the intellect abstracts from the phantasms, it does not understand actually without turning to the phantasms, and inasmuch as it turns to the phantasms, composition and division of the intellect involves time.

Intellectus humanus necesse habet intelligere componendo et dividendo quia intellectus et abstrahit a phantasmatibus et tamen non intelligit actu nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, et ex ea parte qua se ad phantasmata convertit, compositioni et divisioni intellectus adiungitur tempus.

The likeness of a thing is received into the intellect according to the mode of the intellect, not according to the mode of the thing. Wherefore something on the part of the thing corresponds to the composition and division of the intellect; but it does not exist in the same way in the intellect and in the thing. For the proper object of the human intellect is the definable structure of a material thing, which comes under the action of the senses and the imagination.

Similitudo rei recipitur in intellectu secundum modum intellectus, et non secundum modum rei. Unde compositioni et divisioni intellectus respondet quidem aliquid ex parte rei; tamen non eodem modo se habet in re, sicut in intellectu. Intellectus enim humani proprium obiectum est quidditas rei materialis, quae sub sensu et imaginatione cadit.

Since the intellect passes from potentiality to act, it has a likeness to things which are generated, which do not attain to perfection all at once but acquire it by degrees: so likewise the human intellect does not acquire perfect knowledge by the first act of apprehension; but it first apprehends something about its object, such as the definable structure of the thing itself, which is the first and proper object of the intellect; and then it understands the properties, accidents, and the various relations implicated in the essence of the thing. Thus it necessarily compares one [apprehended] thing with another by composition or division; and from one composition and division it proceeds to another, which is the process of reasoning.

Cum enim intellectus humanus exeat de potentia in actum, similitudinem quandam habet cum rebus generabilibus, quae non statim perfectionem suam habent, sed eam successive acquirunt. Et similiter intellectus humanus non statim in prima apprehensione capit perfectam rei cognitionem; sed primo apprehendit aliquid de ipsa, puta quidditatem ipsius rei, quae est primum et proprium obiectum intellectus; et deinde intelligit proprietates et accidentia et habitudines circumstantes rei essentiam. Et secundum hoc, necesse habet unum apprehensum alii componere vel dividere; et ex una compositione vel divisione ad aliam procedere, quod est ratiocinari.

But the angelic and the Divine intellect, like all incorruptible things, have their perfection at once from the beginning. Hence the angelic and the Divine intellect have the entire knowledge of a thing at once and perfectly; and hence also in knowing the definable structure of a thing they know at once whatever we can know by composition, division, and reasoning. Therefore the human intellect knows by composition, division and reasoning. But the Divine intellect and the angelic intellect know, indeed, composition, division, and reasoning, not by the process itself, but by understanding the simple definable structure.

Intellectus autem angelicus et divinus se habet sicut res incorruptibiles, quae statim a principio habent suam totam perfectionem. Unde intellectus angelicus et divinus statim perfecte totam rei cognitionem habet. Unde in cognoscendo quidditatem rei, cognoscit de re simul quidquid nos cognoscere possumus componendo et dividendo et ratiocinando. Et ideo intellectus humanus cognoscit componendo et dividendo, sicut et ratiocinando. Intellectus autem divinus et angelicus cognoscunt quidem compositionem et divisionem et ratiocinationem, non componendo et dividendo et ratiocinando, sed per intellectum simplicis quidditatis.

No. In regard to those propositions, which are understood immediately when the definable structure of the terms is cognized, the intellect cannot err, as in the case of first principles from which arises infallible truth in the certitude of scientific conclusions, because the proper object of the intellect is the definable structure of a material thing.

Circa illas propositiones errare non potest, quae statim cognoscuntur cognita terminorum quidditate, sicut accidit circa prima principia, ex quibus etiam accidit infallibilitas veritatis, secundum certitudinem scientiae, circa conclusiones, quia obiectum proprium intellectus est quidditas rei.

And hence, properly speaking, the intellect is not at fault concerning this definable structure; whereas it may go astray as regards those things which accompany the essence of the thing or the definable structure, in referring one thing to another, as regards composition or division, or also in the process of reasoning discursively.

Unde circa quidditatem rei, per se loquendo, intellectus non fallitur. Sed circa ea quae circumstant rei essentiam vel quidditatem, intellectus potest falli, dum unum ordinat ad aliud, vel componendo vel dividendo vel etiam ratiocinando.

The intellect, however, may be accidentally deceived regarding that structure which is definable in composite things; not by the defect of its organ, for the intellect is a faculty that is independent of an organ, but on the part of the composition affecting the definition, when, for instance, the definition of a thing is false in relation to something else.

Per accidens tamen contingit intellectum decipi circa quod quid est in rebus compositis; non ex parte organi, quia intellectus non est virtus utens organo, sed ex parte compositionis intervenientis circa definitionem, dum vel definitio unius rei est falsa de alia.

Hence, as regards simple objects, not subject to composite definitions, we cannot be deceived; unless, indeed, we understand nothing whatever about them.

Unde in rebus simplicibus, in quarum definitionibus compositio intervenire non potest, non possumus decipi; sed deficimus in totaliter non attingendo.

Yes. Experience shows that some understand more profoundly than do others because one who carries a conclusion to its first principles and ultimate causes understands it better than the one who reduces it only to its proximate causes.

Per experimentum inveniuntur aliqui aliis profundius intelligentes, sicut profundius intelligit qui conclusionem aliquam potest reducere in prima principia et causas primas, quam qui potest reducere solum in causas proximas.

Those in whom the imaginative, cogitative, and memorative powers are of better disposition, are better disposed to understand.

Illi enim in quibus virtus imaginativa et cogitativa et memorativa est melius disposita, sunt melius dispositi ad intelligendum.

The truth of the intellect consists in the intellect understanding a thing as it is.

Veritas enim intellectus in hoc consistit, quod intelligatur res esse sicuti est.

No. In the acquisition of knowledge, principles and elements are not always known first, because sometimes from sensible effects we arrive at the knowledge of principles and intelligible causes.

In accipiendo scientiam, non semper principia et elementa sunt priora, quia quandoque ex effectibus sensibilibus devenimus in cognitionem principiorum et causarum intelligibilium.

But if our intellect understood by participation of certain separate indivisible (forms), as the Platonists maintained, it would follow that a like indivisible is understood primarily; for according to the Platonists what is first is first participated by things.

Si autem intellectus noster intelligeret per participationem indivisibilium separatorum, ut Platonici posuerunt, sequeretur quod indivisibile huiusmodi esset primo intellectum, quia secundum Platonicos, priora prius participantur a rebus.

The object of our intellect in its present state is the definable structure of a material thing, which it abstracts from the phantasms, as above stated (Q84, A7). And since that which is known first and of itself by our cognitive power is its proper object, we must consider its relationship to that definable structure in order to discover in what order the indivisible is known.

Obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum praesentem statum, est quidditas rei materialis, quam a phantasmatibus abstrahit, ut ex praemissis patet. Et quia id quod est primo et per se cognitum a virtute cognoscitiva, est proprium eius obiectum, considerari potest quo ordine indivisibile intelligatur a nobis, ex eius habitudine ad huiusmodi quidditatem.

Now the indivisible is threefold, as is said De Anima iii, 6.

Dicitur autem indivisibile tripliciter, ut dicitur in III de anima.

The third kind of indivisible is what is altogether indivisible, as a point and unity, which cannot be divided either actually or potentially. And this indivisible is known secondarily, through the privation of divisibility.

Tertio modo dicitur indivisibile quod est omnino indivisibile, ut punctus et unitas, quae nec actu nec potentia dividuntur. Et huiusmodi indivisibile per posterius cognoscitur, per privationem divisibilis.

This indivisible has a certain opposition to a corporeal being, the definable structure of which is the primary and proper object of the intellect.

Et huius ratio est, quia tale indivisibile habet quandam oppositionem ad rem corporalem, cuius quidditatem primo et per se intellectus accipit.