Philosophical Distinctions in the Social Thought of Benedict XVI: Maritain, Ratzinger, and Voegelin on Natural Law, Reason, and Gnosticism

Christopher S. Morrissey

Maritain and the Problem of Written Laws

Some Catholics have staked a lot on the notion of “fair trade.” They have even gone so far as to equate campaigns for “fair trade coffee,” for example, with the ideal implementation of Catholic social doctrine. The danger of such an approach is that the unwitting adoption of an ideology might end up deleteriously narrowing the ability of reason to fully address the challenges of a global economy. Although an economic analysis of such problems is required, there is also need for fundamental philosophical reflection on what is at stake in such controversies.

Accordingly, in this article I offer a few reflections that aim to distinguish the ontological aspects involved in understanding things like food and water as human rights, in order to assess the role of the free market within a legislative framework for human rights. In what follows, my inspiration comes from Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI), who said,

It seems to me important, precisely amid the rising resentment against technical rationality, to emphasize clearly the essential reasonableness of faith. In a criticism of the modern period, which has long been going on, one must not

---

1 An early version of this article was delivered as the paper “Does Free Trade Undermine Food and Water as Human Rights? Distinguishing Ontological Aspects of the Problem with Contributions from Jacques Maritain and Thomas Aquinas,” at the Canadian Jacques Maritain Association 2011 Conference on “Religion, Philosophy and Economics,” at Dominican University College, Ottawa, Ontario (October 29, 2011).
reproach its confidence in reason as such but only the narrowing of the concept of reason, which has opened the door to irrational ideologies.\textsuperscript{5}

In a recent debate about the implementation of Catholic social teaching, Father Robert A. Sirico observed: “To jump so seamlessly from the Magisterium’s insistence on the fundamental and non-negotiable moral obligation to the poor to the specifics of contingent, prudential, and political legislation is wholly unjustified in Catholic social teaching.”\textsuperscript{6} In other words, the principle of subsidiarity in Catholic social teaching, which affirms the diversity of circumstances that render top-down schemes unwieldy and inefficient (and thus all too frequently unjust), cautions us against falling in love with “one size fits all” schemes.

Pope Benedict himself noted recently, on the 50\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of Blessed John XXIII’s landmark social encyclical \textit{Mater et Magistra}, that Catholics may legitimately disagree on the best implementation of the Church’s social teaching.\textsuperscript{7} To do this, Benedict quoted \textit{Mater et Magistra} itself:

\textit{
\ldots differences of opinion in the application of principles can sometimes arise even among sincere Catholics. When this happens, they should be careful not to lose their respect and esteem for each other. Instead, they should strive to find points of agreement for effective and quick action, and not wear themselves out in interminable arguments, and, under pretext of the better or the best, omit to do the good that is possible and therefore obligatory.}\textsuperscript{8}

Thus, reasonable people can reasonably disagree with regard to how we might properly achieve “world social justice”. But what then are “human rights” if there is no “one size fits all” way to expect implementation of their observance?

In “Water: An Essential Element for Life,” a “Note prepared by the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace as a contribution of the Holy See to the Third World Water Forum” in Kyoto, Japan, in March 2003, it is only the abuse of the free market that is condemned. It clearly endorses, however, the


\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., n. 238.
market’s proper role (even for water distribution) when subject to the rule of law: “At times individual enterprises attained almost monopoly powers over public goods. A prerequisite for effective privatization is that it be set within a clear legislative framework which allows government to ensure that private interventions do in actual fact protect the public interest.”

How might the common good be best safeguarded? The same document (in section IV on “Water: An Economic Good”) says: “The debate today is not whether the private sector will be involved but how and to what extent it will be present as the actual provider of water services. In any formation of private sector involvement with the state, there must exist a general parity among the parties allowing for informed decisions and sound agreements. A core concern in private sector involvement in the water sector is to ensure that efforts to achieve a water service that is efficient and reliable do not cause undue negative effects for the poor and low-income families.”

Perhaps the most important philosophical contribution to be made to this debate is to distinguish, with Jacques Maritain, the three aspects involved in food and water as human rights: (1) the aspect pertaining to natural law (what it means to distinguish them in possession as natural human rights, namely, that by possessing human nature, we have a right to food and water); (2) the aspect pertaining to the law of nations (what it means for international law to justly limit the exercise of these rights, namely, that the rights do not mean that I can freely and without impunity draw upon your stock of food and water, but rather that somehow an international framework has to assure me of access to food and water rather than to simply make them into common property); and (3) the aspect pertaining to positive law (what it means at a local level, given the juridical status of these rights; for example, whether access to or delivery of food and water is ensured locally by public or private means, or some kind of combination of both). Thus, Maritain’s distinctions should remind us that we ought to be wary about writing universal laws pertaining to the latter aspects, in order not to violate the principle of subsidiarity.

Maritain writes of “the long history of the idea of natural law and of the law of nations evolved by the ancient world and the Middle Ages” which has only recently undergone a “one-sided distortion and rationalistic petrifaction … since the time of Grotius and the birth of a mechanistic ratiocination”: “Thus there arose the fatal misconception of natural law – which is interior to the creature and precedes any explicit expression – as a written code to be proclaimed to all, whereof every just law would be a copy and which would decide a priori every detail of the norms of human conduct on lines claiming to be dictated by Nature and Reason, but in fact arbitrary and artificial. Moreover, the end of the matter was that the individual was deified and all the rights to
which he was deemed entitled were looked on as the absolute and unlimited rights of a god.”

Hence the challenge remains today for social justice advocates that they should not adopt a mindset about rights that has more in common with this distorted modern understanding than with the classical way of thinking about natural rights and natural law. What then can we learn from a classical understanding of natural law, in order to avoid ideological distortions?

Robert Sokolowski, in a marvelous passage that reminds us of how natural law has everything to do with virtue ethics, writes how an authentic understanding of natural law cautions us against expecting to write down a list that will capture the depth and complexity of the full order of being:

We might be tempted to think of natural law as a kind of codex, a set of imperatives that could be formulated in a purely theoretic, systematic exercise, identifiable and arguable apart from any particular moral tradition. The use of the term law to name what is good by nature reinforces this tendency. But if we think of natural law in this way, we could easily be led into skepticism: If the precepts of natural law are so lucid and rational, why is there so much disagreement and so much obscurity about them? The fact of moral controversy would, in this viewpoint, show that natural law cannot be a codex, and if that is the only concept we have of it, we might conclude that there is no such thing. If, on the other hand, we recognize that not everyone will have a good sense of the true ends of things (the impulsive, obtuse, immature, and vicious are far less able to recognize them), and if we see such ends not as grasped beforehand but as differentiating themselves from our purposes and our conventions, we will be the more ready to admit that this kind of natural law does play a role in our moral thinking, in the way we evaluate situations and agents. This picture of natural law is more realistic and more persuasive precisely because it accounts for the obscurities associated with moral judgments.

It would also be obvious, furthermore, that we are obliged by the ends that come to light in this way. … An end should show up for us first and foremost as that which it would be unworthy of us to violate.

This sense of the noble should be the primary and the core sense of moral ‘obligation.’ It is not that a law is imposed on us, that we are fettered by an imperative, but that we would be ashamed to act otherwise. Nobility obliges us in a way different from commands. The nobility of what is good by nature shows up most forcefully to the virtuous agent, who experiences it not as an imposed duty but as the way he wants to be.  

---


The openness to transcendence that constitutes the human person is thereby preserved by this classical natural law view of the proper *limited* scope of political and legislative activity.

**Ratzinger’s Confidence in the Non-Ideological Use of Reason**

It is this philosophical background that seems to be presupposed in the teaching of *Caritas in Veritate* on globalization. Before becoming Pope, Ratzinger famously kept the widest possible horizons for reason in his thinking on these problems: “A morality that believes itself able to dispense with the technical knowledge of economic laws is not morality but moralism. As such it is the antithesis of morality.”

Hence it is no surprise that as Benedict XVI he expresses confidence in the ability of reason to cope with the great challenge facing the world today:

... the *explosion of worldwide interdependence*, commonly known as globalization ... has been the principal driving force behind the emergence from underdevelopment of whole regions, and in itself it represents a great opportunity. Nevertheless, without the guidance of charity in truth, this global force could cause unprecedented damage and create new divisions within the human family. Hence charity and truth confront us with an altogether new and creative challenge, one that is certainly vast and complex. It is about *broadening the scope of reason and making it capable of knowing and directing these powerful new forces.*

In keeping with this broad understanding of reason, Benedict is careful to avoid the pitfalls of ideological approaches that emphasize either free markets or State control:

The exclusively binary model of market-plus-State is corrosive of society, while economic forms based on solidarity, which find their natural home in civil society without being restricted to it, build up society. The market of gratuitousness does not exist, and attitudes of gratuitousness cannot be established by law. Yet both the market and politics need individuals who are open to reciprocal gift.

Instead, Benedict is in harmony with this broad philosophical framework that we have heard outlined above by Maritain and also in Sokolowski. The Pope is able to thus give voice to the widest possible application of reason to the problems at hand:

12 *Caritas in Veritate* #33.
The truth of globalization as a process and its fundamental ethical criterion are given by the unity of the human family and its development towards what is good. Hence a sustained commitment is needed so as to promote a person-based and community-oriented cultural process of world-wide integration that is open to transcendence.\textsuperscript{14}

In keeping with this wide application of reason, the Pope refuses to make a pronouncement for or against globalization. Instead, he quotes John Paul II: “Despite some of its structural elements, which should neither be denied nor exaggerated, ‘globalization, \textit{a priori}, is neither good nor bad. It will be what people make of it,’”\textsuperscript{15} and then he goes on to express confidence in the ability of reason to face the challenges of globalization: “We should not be its victims, but rather its protagonists, acting in the light of reason, guided by charity and truth. Blind opposition would be a mistaken and prejudiced attitude, incapable of recognizing the positive aspects of the process, with the consequent risk of missing the chance to take advantage of its many opportunities for development. The processes of globalization, suitably understood and directed, open up the unprecedented possibility of large-scale redistribution of wealth on a world-wide scale: if badly directed, however, they can lead to an increase in poverty and inequality, and could even trigger a global crisis. It is necessary to correct the malfunctions, some of them serious, that cause new divisions between peoples and within peoples, and also to ensure that the redistribution of wealth does not come about through the redistribution or increase of poverty: a real danger if the present situation were to be badly managed.”\textsuperscript{16}

Perhaps the greatest danger of mismanagement lies in that artificial contraction of reason that would propose ideological “one size fits all” solutions. The mania for simple action plans to be written down and pursued (for example, in “fair trade” activism) calls to mind the warnings of Eric Voegelin about “Gnosticism” in its modern political forms.

**Eric Voegelin’s Challenge: Is “Fair Trade” Another Gnostic Mass Movement?**

Voegelin is most famous for his articulation of the thesis that modern thought is a variation on ancient Gnosticism. Voegelin was inspired to pursue this line of inquiry by his reading of Catholic thinkers, most notably the early analyses of Hans Urs von Balthasar. Subsequent scholarship has both taken issue with, and attempted to defend, the idea of a historical continuity between ancient and

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., #42.

\textsuperscript{15} John Paul II, \textit{Address to the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences} (April 27, 2001).

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Caritas in Veritate} #42.
modern Gnosticism. I would agree with the assessment of the controversy given by Michael Franz, who judiciously observes:

Voegelin’s famous assertion from *The New Science of Politics* that, “Gnosticism is the essence of modernity” is correct at its core, in the sense that what people generally call “modernity” was born of a series of personal, spiritual revolts against the limitations and imperfections of human existence. We can see that pre-modern writings that hubristically celebrate human capacities were occasionally admired by modern ideologists in the course of their own revolts, and that this genre includes Gnostic texts as well as Hermetic writings, speculations on alchemy, magic, apocalypticism, messianism, and so forth. However, though we can legitimately take one further step to find in hubristic pre-modern writings a pattern of personal revolt that is analogous to modern revolts, these pre-modern writings do not “cause” modern instances of spiritual revolt in any meaningful sense. Voegelin’s late work suggests that if there is such a “cause,” it is the complex of tensions that inhere in the human condition itself, in the metaxy. It is the tension itself – not early symbolizations of the tension – that prompts the various revolts, whether ancient or modern. The earlier ones do not “cause” or even influence the later ones in any substantial way. From this perspective, it is almost completely meaningless in a *literal* sense to say that “Gnosticism is the essence of modernity.” Historical Gnosticism has nothing substantial to do with the revolts of individuals like Hegel and Marx and Comte (or their various epigones and functionaries), and as Voegelin’s late work on historiogenesis demonstrates, there is nothing essentially “modern” about these revolts. Thus, due to the problematic character of the concept of Gnosticism, we can see that a proposition such as “Gnosticism is the essence of modernity” can be – at once – virtual nonsense on its face but also a profound discovery at its core.

Therefore, if we avoid a “monolithic and monochromatic use of the term,” and regard “Gnosticism” as an analogical term that is valid insofar as it stimulates further inquiry, and not use it univocally as a species (or even a

---


then we stay true to Voegelin’s cautionary use of the term. A phenomenological analysis of the experiential equivalences between ancient and modern “Gnosticisms” would be complementary to Voegelin’s later explorations of the phenomena of alienation and rebellion and as such would be worthy of scholarly attention. Alienation from the world and rebellion against God are two themes highlighted by Voegelin for such phenomenological analysis.

In his later meditations on “the Beginning” and “the Beyond,” Voegelin engages in an experiential analysis of consciousness that contrasts with the “egophanic revolt” of modern autonomy. In response to the ideological deformations of modernity, Voegelin explores, with “anamnetic experiments”, the unitary experience of philosophy and of faith, a unity that contrasts with the certitudes of deformational “Gnostic” dogmatisms that would cleave the experiential unity of philosophy and faith into a dualism.

The practical consequences of this sort of theoretical construct are far from harmless. The action inspired by Gnostic plans can quickly become destructive: “Gnostic movements have normative features, such as an obsession with temporal evil that is caused by social disorganization rather than a condition of human experience and that the salvation from this evil can be achieved through a historical process dictated by action of those who possess this special knowledge. This Gnostic order creates a … type of law where the ordering

---

21 Cf. Stephen A. McKnight, “Gnosticism and Modernity: Voegelin’s Reconsiderations Twenty Years After The New Science of Politics”, Political Science Reviewer 34 (2005), pp. 122–142, esp. p. 141: “His experience with trends in scholarship warned him that the attention being focused on Gnosticism in the ‘70s would cause more confusion than clarity when the term was applied to modern forms of disorder.”
22 Cf. Sandoz, “Introduction,” p. xi: “Aside from tracing the historical ties through substantial scholarship, which demonstrates that much of modern thought is rooted in Gnosticism, we have the experiential analysis. The latter hinges on two related experiences – alienation from a hostile world, and rebellion against the divine Ground of being.”
23 Sandoz (“Introduction,” p. xvi) notes that Voegelin “pursued the experiential analysis of Gnosticism in a meditation on the Beginning and the Beyond, which augmented and further solidified the theory as presented in his earlier work” and added the analysis of the “egophanic revolt” of the modern autonomous human self.
24 Cf. Sandoz (“Introduction,” p. xiv) on how Voegelin insists that “the only reality is reality experienced”; moreover, “Philosophy and faith considered experientially, in Voegelin’s account, yield alternatives that lack the dogmatic certitude of the Gnostic doctrines.” In contrast to the Gnostic attitude, “The Christian solution to the imperfection of the world remains open,” because salvation is only attained “through grace in death” (p. xv).
elements of society are rooted not in reason or revelation but in grotesque fantasy and the destructive whim of madmen.”

Voegelin said in *The New Science of Politics* that “it will require all our efforts to kindle this glimmer into a flame by repressing Gnostic corruption and restoring the forces of civilization.” In *Science, Politics, and Gnosticism*, Voegelin gives us a summary of what he says are six characteristic features that as a constellation can help to identify Gnosticism. These stated very concisely are: (1) dissatisfaction with one’s life; (2) belief that one’s life is unsatisfactory because the world is somehow suffering from poor organization; (3) salvation from the evil of the world’s disorder is possible; (4) to bring order, the order of being must be altered and reality must thus be remade on some fundamental level; (5) one must will to bring about this alteration in a historical process; (6) special knowledge ("gnosis") of the required plan is available to the intellect that wants to know what to will in order to change the fundamental structure of being in history.

Voegelin’s description of this Gnostic mindset seems to describe so much of the way of thinking behind much of the twentieth-century’s most destructive and horrifying political experiences, that it even caught the attention of Joseph Ratzinger. Vincent Toomey has chronicled the link between the two thinkers:

In my essay on ‘The Mind of Pope Benedict XVI,’ (Fall 2005), I noted the close affinity between the views of Eric Voegelin and Cardinal Ratzinger, and concluded that both thinkers reached similar viewpoints from different starting points. This view needs to be corrected in the light of a (rather illegible) copy of what seems to be an authentic letter (in English translation) by Cardinal Ratzinger, dated July 11, 1981, which a colleague gave to me after reading the article. It appears that Voegelin had sent a signed copy of one of his books to Cardinal Ratzinger, who at the time was Archbishop of Munich, together with an invitation to attend the philosopher’s birthday party. In his reply, the cardinal regrets not being able to accept the invitation, as it would have afforded him an opportunity to get to know Voegelin personally. Voegelin’s book, according to Ratzinger, was a “philosophical meditation” intended to introduce its readers to a refined understanding of the imperfect, as opposed to the magic of utopianism. This topic is indeed the cantus firmus, so to say, of much of Ratzinger’s theology of political life. Even more interesting is the comment by Ratzinger: ‘Since your little book *Science, Politics, and Gnosticism* came into my hands in 1959, your

---


thinking has fascinated and enriched me, even though I was unable to follow it up
as thoroughly as I would have wished.\textsuperscript{28}

Nevertheless, Ratzinger learned the essential points from Voegelin well,
such that we can see them philosophically underpinning his later thought in
\textit{Caritas in Veritate}, when Benedict XVI refuses to narrow the application of
reason to purely intramundane considerations of either politics or the market.
Compare especially \textit{Caritas in Veritate} #39, quoted earlier above.

Fr. Twomey has noted that the affinity with Voegelin’s understanding of
history goes all the way back to Ratzinger’s postdoctoral dissertation on
Bonaventure’s Augustinian theology of history:

In Augustine’s view, history is transitory, and empires pass away; only the eternal
Civitas Dei (the “citizenry of God,” as Ratzinger translates it) lasts forever. Its
sacramental expression is the Church, understood as humanity in the process of
redemption. By contrast, Joachim proposed a radically new understanding of
world history as a divine progression of three distinct eras, the last being the era
of the Holy Spirit when all structures (Church and State) would give way to the
perfect society of autonomous men moved only from within by the Spirit. This
understanding of history amounts to what Voegelin called ‘the immanentization
of the eschaton.’ It rests on the assumption that the end of history is immanent in
history itself – the product of its own inner movement towards ever greater
perfection, towards the kingdom of God on earth. This idea is at the root of what
we mean today by ‘progress.’ It underpins, albeit in different ways, both radical
socialism and liberal capitalism. And it has had a profound effect on political life,
giving rise to both revolution and secularism.\textsuperscript{29}

Therefore, we can justifiably conclude that both Maritain’s exposition of the
classical Thomistic understanding of natural law (as an unwritten law in its
most fundamental manifestation), and also Voegelin’s warnings about the
Gnostic mindset’s penchant for immanentization, are guiding philosophical
presuppositions behind Benedict XVI’s social thought. Benedict consistently
keeps reason open to its transcendent dimensions (incapable of being written
down once and for all) and steadfastly refuses to reduce its concerns to the
purely intramundane projects of either market or State.

\textbf{Redeemer Pacific College,}
\textbf{Trinity Western University}

\textsuperscript{28} Rev. Dr. D. Vincent Twomey, SVD, Pontifical University, St. Patrick’s College,
Maynooth, County Kildare, Ireland, in published correspondence with the \textit{Claremont
Review of Books} (Winter 2006),
\textsuperscript{29} Vincent Twomey, “The Mind of Benedict XVI,” \textit{Claremont Review of Books} (Fall