ZETA (VII) METAPHYSICS, chaps. i and ii What is ousia? Dio tauta men apheisthO, skepteon de tou ontos autou ta aitia kai tas archas hE on, therefore let all that be put aside, and let us inquire into the causes and principles of being itself, qua being, 1028a3-a4. So ends Epsilon, dismissing all that has gone before. And we come to the beginning of Book Zeta (VII): To on legetai pollachOs, semainei gar to men ti esti kai tode ti, to de poion E poson E hekaston tOn houtO katEgoroumenOn. tosautachOs de legomenou tou ontos phaneron hoti toutOn prOton on to ti estin, hoper sEmainei tEn ousian . . . hOste to prOtOs on kai ou ti on all' on haplOs hE ousia an eiE, being means many things; it means what is and what this is, and quality and quantity and each of the categories. With so many meanings for being, it is clear that the first is the what, meaning the ousia . . . so the first being and not some [particular] being but plain being would be ousia, 1028a10-a31 There it is stated as emphatically in word and context as possible: after all the preliminaries are said and done, it is ousia that is the object of our search. The rest of the first chapter of Zeta, 1028a31-b7, is devoted to the many meanings (pollachOs legetai-s) of first, prOton, but the chapter ends: kai dE kai to palai te kai nun kai aei zEtoumenon kai aei aporoumenon, ti to on, touto esti tis hE ousia . . . dio kai hEmin kai malista kai prOton kai monon hOs eipein peri tou outOs ontos theOreteon ti estin, and so the old, the present and the ever sought for and ever puzzling [question], what is being? is what is ousia? . . . therefore let us look most and first of all and only, as they say, for what this sort of being is, b2-b7. This should suffice to put the sharp point of the Metaphysics before us. 1. being of the categories, chap i a. ousia is first, 1028a10-a31 b. meanings of first, a31-1028b7 (1) they are four, a31-a33 (a) absolutely, pantOs: it is the only one that can be stand alone, tOn men gar allOn kategorEmatOn outhen chOriston, autE de monE, a33-a34 (b) in any account, tOi logOi: in each account there must be an account of the ousia, a34-a36 (c) in knowledge, gnOsei: we think we know something best when we know the ti estin, a36-b2 (d) in time [historically], chronOi: what ousia is, is the age old question pursued by our predecessors (hoi...hoi...hoi...hoi), b2-b6 c. so most of all, first and only, we must look for what this sort of being is [that they were searching for], b6-b7 2. what is ousia? tis hE ousia; Some theories, chapter ii a. it is what is in bodies, huparchein tois sOmasin, b8-b15 (1) living beings & their parts, ta zOia kai ta moria autOn (2) plants & their parts, ta phuta kai ta moria autOn, b9 (3) the elements, fire water earth & their parts, stars, moon sun, b10-b13 (4) these and/or others? b13-b15 b. the limits of bodies, planes, lines, points [Pythagoreans], b16-b18 c. nothing other than bodies [Presocratics], b18-b19 d. Plato: two eternal entities, forms & mathematicals, along with the third, sensible, b19-b21 e. Speusippus [Plato's successor]: several ousiai, of numbers, of magnitudes, of soul and more, b21-b24 f. [Xenocrates:] forms, numbers, then lines & planes, even the universe and sensibles, b24-b27 d. [program:] some of this is well said; some, poorly. What ousiai are, let us examine, having first formed a general notion of it, b27-b32 There it is, the central question of the Metaphysics: let us examine what ousiai are, or, as stated formerly near the end of chapter ii, tis hE ousia, what is ousia? It is a barely veiled substitute for: what is being? After all, ousia is derived from the present participle of eimi, being. There is also in this last sentence a long clause, kai tines eisin ousiai . . . , b28-b31, which sounds much like Porphyry's famous recusal, passed on by Boethius, to become the trigger of the universals controversy and hence of the metaphysics of the Middle Ages. Comparison of the two passages convinces me that this is a main link in the transmission of metaphysical speculation to later ages. If so, the importance of this chapter and this question is further highlighted. kai tines eisin ousiai, kai poteron eisi tines para tas aisthEtas E ouk eisi, kai autai pOs eisi, kai poteron esti tis chOristE ousia, kai dia ti kai pOs, E oudemia, para tas aisthEtas, skepteon . . . , 1028b28-b31 The words are not the same in all respects, but in many. The similarity of the two passages is striking, up to the point at the end where Porphyry recuses himself. EFL, 7/20/96 ZETA (VII) METAPHYSICS, chap. iii Ousia is to hupokeimenon One of the puzzles of the Metaphysics is that in this chapter Aristotle immediately gives two answers to the question, what is ousia? Indeed he gives us four, but two of those are deferred for later treatment in chapter xii and beyond, and two are subject to investigation in the first eleven chapters, beginning with to hupokeimenon in iii, and turning to to ti En einai in iv. Let us look at chapter iii now, and first in brief outline: 1. Summary statement: ousia = 028b33-b36 to ti En einai to katholou to genos to hupokeimenon 2. to hupokeimenon = kath' hou ta alla legetai, b36-a2 ekeino auto mE kat' allou 3. to hupokeimenon = 1029a2-a33 a. hE hulE, adunaton de a2-27 b. to ex amphoin, apheteon a27-32 c. hE morphE, to eidos a32-33 4. zEtEteon prOton en aisthEtais hE ousia a33-34 5. Excurse on method (see Jaeger, Ross, app. crit.) b3-12 Now let us look at it in greater detail: 1. ousia is read four ways: to ti En einai, the being what it was to katholou, the general, the universal to genos, the kind, the class to hupokeimenon, the substrate, 1028b33-b36 2. to hupokeimenon is a substrate, that of which other things are said; it is never said of other things. More than anything ousia seems to be the first substrate, b36-1029a2 3. it is in a sense, matter; in another sense, form; in a third sense, the combination of both. So if the form is prior to the matter, and is more being, it will by the same token be prior to the combination, a2-a7 Now we have said briefly what ousia is, that it is the substrate, but this is not enough; by itself it is not clear how matter, hulE, becomes ousia, a7- a10. If it is not ousia, it escapes [us] what else it is. Stripping away everything else, there doesn't seem to be anything remaining. All the other are properties of bodies, actions, powers, dimensions, qualities, but not ousiai; but what all these reside in first, is ousia. Take away length, breadth and depth, and you don't see anything left, unless the circumscribed is something under these. So only matter must appear to those who look at ousia thus. I mean matter itself, legO d' hulEn hE kath' hautEn, not something and not quantity or anything else with which being is circumscribed, a10-a21. There is something of which each of these is predicated, in which [is] the different being of the categories in each case, for those others are predicated of ousia, but this [autE ousia], of matter, a21-a24. So the final thing by itself, to exchaton kath' hauto, is not something, ti, or a quantity or anything else, nor even negatives, because these exist kata sumbebEkos. From which it occurs to those looking into it, that ousia is matter, a24-a27. But that is impossible, adunaton de, a27, because the individual and this thing seem more to exist in the ousia, so the form and the combination, to ex amphoin, seem to be ousia more than matter. Let the combined ousia, I mean [the combination] of matter and form be be dismissed, since it is clearly later, hustera gar kai dElE. Matter is manifest. Then let the third [he means form] be investigated; it is the most problematical, peri de tEs tritEs skepteon, autE gar aporOtatE, a27-a33 [which in effect he does the next three chapters, iv - vi]. 4. Some agree the ousiai are of sensibles, so let them be looked into first, a33-a34 [which he gets around to in chapter vii]. 5. [the remainder of this chapter is a digression on method. It is somewhat garbled (see Ross' note, II, 166, and notice that Ross puts this in chap. iii; Tredennick, in chap. iv), and perhaps you will find Aristotle's point put much better in Physics, I, 187a17-a22. It adds little to the main thread of the discussion here, anyway], b3-b12 So this chapter leaves us with another ambiguity on our hands. Aristotle clearly states that ousia is a substrate, hupokeimenon, and gives reasons for so believing. It also comports with his election of on hE on, on haplOs, to eschaton kath' hauto, as the object of Metaphysics, from which his ousia is derived. Equivalent for substrate would be matter. Hupokeimenon = hulE. "But that is impossible! Because the individual and the this thing seem more to exist in the ousia." He is lacking feeling for the abstraction, lacking the insight that pure being or ousia hupokeimenE or matter, for that matter, might be a pure notion, a pure conception. He is in fact drawn back to sensible things: en tautais zEtEteon prOton (a34). This is a retreat from the insight that there is an underlying substrate to all things, a being qua being. But this substrate is mental. The hupokeimenon ousia and being qua being, even matter, are concepts. They can be thought. They had been thought with slow and imperfect recognition by Parmenides and Plato. They were thought right here by Aristotle, But he was not self-conscious of that. It is fruitless to suggest mental concepts, if you fail to see that they are mental concepts, if you think instead that they might be or should be physical things, after all. Yet it is done all the time, and with the best religious intentions, and that is one reason why Aristotle's experience is important to us. Since Aristotle has brought up the question of ousia, essence, and the tode ti, the this thing, the individual, he devotes the next two chapters to that. In what follows in those chapters, to ti, to tode ti = the this thing, the individual to ti en einai = essence, what lasts thru change to _____Oi einai, where = the essence of -----Oi (whatever the noun supplied is the noun is) in the dative case hoper tode ti = just this thing EFL, 7/27/96 ZETA (VII) METAPHYSICS, chaps. iv - v Ousia is to ti En einai 1. to ti En einai must be investigated, b1-b2, chap. iv [The pledge to study the individual and the "this thing, to chOriston kai to tode ti, brings him now to to ti En einai, the second of his meanings for ousia. This investigation will center upon the relation of essence and the individual, of to _____Oi einai (the essence of _____) and tode ti. The problem, you will see, is that particular essences don't come by themselves. They are always loaded with properties and casual accidentia]. TheOrEteon peri autou (tou ti En einai): a. logikOs, logically [the word is used here in this chapter in opposition to pOs echei, how it (really) is, in line 1030a28 in the middle of the chapter, below]: the to ti En einai of each thing is what it is said to be by or in itself, b13-b14 [there is no problem there, but what is the essence of some thing that is NOT by itself, i.e. of something combined, as in combined with qualities, properties, and such] (1) the essence of something (eg. you, a white surface, etc.) EXcludes predicates (e.g. musical, white, smooth, etc.), but (2) consider [such] compounds [of subject and predicate]. Take the compound, to himation, piece of cloth, i.e. "x". What is the essence of x? Not the compound, or any part of it, ouden tOn kath' hauto legomenon oude touto. A white man is indeed white, but his essence is not the essence of white, to dE leukos anthrOpos esti men leukon, ou mentoi to ti En einai leukOi einai, b22-1030a2. (3) But is the essence of "x" really some essence? or not? An essence is precisely something, but when one thing is predicated of another, this is not [so], if the thing is predicated of ousiai, a2-a6. (4) [more on the relation of to ti En einai, logos and horismos, essence, account and definition] a7-a27 [The emphasis in this section is, as you see, on the relation of to ti En einai to combinations of subject and predicate. Thus its "logical" character. True essence ignores predicates. Next Aristotle turns to how it really is, as if from logic to ontology.] b. pOs exei, how it actually is, a27-b13 (1) to ti En einai likewise exists first and simply, prOtOs kai haplOs, in ousia, and then in other things like quality and quantity, a27-a32 (2) homonymous, equivocal speech ruled out. It makes no difference how you choose to say it; clearly the first and simple definition and essence is of ousiai. There is a difference between a logos of many things and a definition (horismos) of one. There is an account and a definition of a combined in one sense, and of the separate elements, ousia and its properties in another, a32-b13. What is the difference between these two sections, a. logikOs and b. pOs echei? The first looks at to ti En einai in terms of predication, as though this were another chapter of his Organon; the second, emphasizes being. alla tauta men hopoterOs tis ethelei legein diapherei ouden, but it makes no difference how you choose to say it, eikeino de phaneron hoti ho prOtOs kai haplOs horismos kai to ti En einai tOn ousiOn estin, it is obvious that the first and simple definition and to ti En einai is of ousiai, 1030b3-b6. Aristotle always proceeded along two parallel lines. His logic and his ontology, his Organon and his Metaphysics are very closely connected. Logic aside, he insists that to ti En einai is of ousia only, without qualifications. 2. but there is a problem, 1030b14, chap. v. a. essence and definition are of ousia, without "essential" properties too, b14-b28, hOste toutOn to ti En einai kai ho horismos E ouk estin oudenos E, ei estin, allOs, kathaper eirEkamen (a17ff. above) b. [there would be] confusion and reduplication of such properties, b28-1031a1 c. clearly there is definition and essence of ousia only, first and simply; and not of subjects with accidents, dElon toinun hoti monEs ousias estin ho horismos . . . oude sunduazomenOn estai . . . hoti men oun estin ho horismos ho tou ti En einai logos, kai to ti En einai E monOn tOn ousiOn estin E malista kai prOtOs kai haplOs, dElon, a1-a14 [Qualifications (accidentia) of a subject, of ousia, are of two kinds: (1) separable and (2) inseparable. We usually apply the word, "accidental," to the former (1), although all qualifications may be called accidentia. The word is ambiguous. And we usually call the latter (2) essential properties, also ambiguously since (as Aristotle has just shown) they are not part of the essence. It is the problem of compounds all over again. These so-called essential properties, where compounded with essence, do not belong to it either. There is definition and essence of ousia alone.] Don't look now, but there is an even larger problem remaining. If you strip away all the predicates, properties, qualifications, non- essential and essential, what then is left? Essence, indeed, but what is that? EFL, 8/3/96 ZETA (VII) METAPHYSICS, chap. vi Do essences = individuals? If ousia is essence (one of the four possible meanings given at the beginning of chapter iii), does that mean it is the individual thing itself (tode ti)? Or, as Aristotle asks: Are the essence and the individual thing, to ti En einai and to ti (or tode ti) the same or different? Poteron de tauton estin E heteron to ti En einai kai hekaston, skepteon. We had better find out, 1031a15-a17. 1. The individual seems to be the same as its own ousia, and the essence (to ti En einai) is said to be its ousia, hekaston te gar ouk allo dokei einai tEs heautou ousias, kai to ti En einai legetai einai hE hekastou ousia, a17-a18. a. tOn legomenOn kata sumbebEkos? of qualified things (with predicates)? No, doxeien an heteron einai, a19-a28 [this was the achievement of chapter iv] b. tOn kath' hauta legomenOn? of things unqualified (without predicates)? YES, they must be the same [implied], a28-a29 (1) if there are no superior ousiai, as some say there are Ideas, a29-b3, [he gives away his game here: this chapter is written "adversus Ideas," against the Platonists' separate ideas, the "men and horses" crowd (of 997b6)] (2) but if these [Idea and essence] are separated from each other, there will be no knowledge, of them; they will have no being, b3-b11 (3) therefore the good and the essence of good, etc. must be one, and this is sufficient, b11-b18 [more reference to Platonists' theory of separate Ideas] (4) for these reasons each thing and its essence are one and the same, and to know each thing is to know its essence, thus from this both must be one thing, b18-b22 (5) but the accidental, on account of its double meaning, is not the same as the essence, b22-b28 (a) the absurdity appears if one gives a name to each of the essences, because it will be something else (par' ekeino allo), b28-b32 (b) and they are not just one, but their logos is the same, b32-1032a2 (c) if it will be different, it will go on to infinity, a2-a4 (d) recap, a4-a11 In short, what he is saying here is that the essence is not some separate, heavenly (as it were) Idea, but is right here in the thing before us, of which it is the essence. No hocus pocus. What he is objecting to is of course just what many of us have ascribed to Plato as his doctrine of Ideas, probably more correctly ascribed to Plato's followers. I have said enough about that. The important point here and now is that his remarks here in chapter vi have a context. Aristotle, taking issue with what many thought Plato thought (tines phasi tas ideas einai), made the Ideas essences in each thing, instead of some distant ethereal objects. And he was right to do so. But he still hasn't told us what they are. Rather, only where. And indeed, not very well! Because obviously the essence is NOT in the thing. It is in our minds. (All these concepts we are dealing with here now are in our minds: we are thinking these things.) An essence is an abstraction, a concept, what we call an idea. Not so very different from Plato's, except in the supposed whereabouts. But this of course puts the matter in terms that neither Plato or Aristotle did. When Aristotle (we saw) wanted to point out the difference between concrete and abstract, he could only do it in a concrete manner by pointing out the snubness and the concavity of a nose. He had no other word for it, not even "idea" in the sense we use it. Restated: the context of this chapter is the Platonist doctrine of Ideas, and Aristotle's quite justifiable substitution of essences for the Ideas. The essence of each individual tode ti takes the place of the Platonist Idea of the individual tode ti. It IS the individual tode ti (rather than the Idea), except that (like the Idea) it is the abstraction of it, a concept. The concrete individual also remains, and in this sense the essence is not the tode ti. Or, to put it another way: the essence is the tode ti, except that it is an abstraction of it. One cannot say that the essence and the individual are in every respect identical, or if you think you can, that is wrong. Are the thing and its concept (idea, essence) the same? Yes AND no! There lies the metaphysical trap that has tripped so many of us for so many centuries. It should be clear and distinct above, what Aristotle said, and what I think of what he said. There is little question that he was oriented toward the particular, but he was also aware of the general. There is little question that he made great contributions to science and philosophy, biology, logic and metaphysics for example, but his was not the last word. We need not stop with Aristotle. It has been very plain here that his "particularism" (on haplOs = ousia = to ti En einai = tode ti, to hekaston), which led him to look for essence in the individual, and to prefer essence over substrate as the seat of ousia, arose out of the context of his contest with the followers of Plato. What he failed to take into account was that there was another escape from the hypostasization of Ideas, in the recognition of an ontological status for the contents and productions of the mind. Just what this ontological status is, remains of course a problem and a matter of argument. Whatever it is, it is certainly not just physical. And there are indeed many who do not recognize any other status than the physical. But this takes us back to an issue that Plato had already raised in the Theaetetus. We do not need to retrace that here, but only to take note of the fact that after twenty three centuries the issue does not seem to be settled to everyone's satisfaction. Meanwhile the greatest impass to progress with this issue is the continued failure to distinguish these two orders, and to recognize the permanent problem they pose for us. I have wandered far from the immediate topic, if only to show some of its far-reaching implications. What concerns us immediately is Aristotle's position on the question, what is ousia? If Aristotle sold out his position that ousia is hupokeimenon, which I believe he did not, this would have been an uncharacteristic "failure of nerve" on his part. Perhaps we must also conclude that ousia is ambivalent: to hupokeimenon and to ti En einai. EFL, 8/10/96 ZETA (VII) METAPHYSICS, chapter vii The sensible world, "things that become" Before moving to chapter vii, let us review our position. E, Kinds of being, on = accidental being truth potentiality & actuality the catgories (ousia, etc.) Z, i, on = ousia ii, prior theories of what ousia is iii, ousia is fourfold: to hupokeimenon, to ti En einai, to katholou, and to genos ousia is to hupokeimenon iv, ousia is to ti En einai logikOs: without attributes, uncombined pOs echei: prOtOs kai haplOs tEi ousiai, in other categories only secondarily v, to ti En einai is without essential properties vi, to ti En einai = the individual, not separate Ideas (contra platonicos) Two problems have arisen from all this for us: (1) what is left when all properties, essential and non-essential are removed? Certainly THEY are not part of the ousia or of the on hE on, and (2) the essence in the individual thing is the Idea "brought home," repatriated as it were to the land of the living, but this is not pure being. It is the essence of this particular being. We wil ask Aristotle at some appropriate later time, if there is not some other way that the Idea can be "brought home." Meanwhile, we will stick to the text before us. What we were supposed to be looking for was being-by-itself. But this is nothing but a pure concept. All we can do is think of it. We cannot touch it, only things. So essence is and is not in individuals, depending what we wish to mean by it. It cannot be limited to either alternative alone. The scholastic position, for example, that ousia is essence is not wrong. It is just incomplete, half the story. If he is not to go back on what he said in E, i, all this follows from his original statement there. Such an utter abstraction as this ousia (= on hE on) may not seem like much, especially to us in our bodies, but it is something unusual, something wholly sui generis. It is a thought. It establishes the ontology of the mind. That is something for us to reckon with, don't you think? To go on: In the last three chapters Aristotle has been dealing with essences as ousiai, and latterly with Ideas. Now he makes what appears at first to be an abrupt change, turning to the sensible world, to "things that become," tOn gignomenOn ta men phusei gignetai ta de technE ta de apo tautomatou . . . , 1032a12-a13. It is not as though we were not warned of this turn, however. His last words, before he launched into the investigation of ousia as to ti En einai, were: homologountai d' ousiai einai tOn aisthEtOn tines, hOste en tautais zEtEteon prOton, some ousiai, it is granted, are of sensibles [or, some agree that ousiai are of sensibles], so let us look at these first, 1029a33-a34. Sensibles are "things that become." It makes sense to study sensible things. After all, the apposition of on and onta was pointed out as long ago as in Gamma. Sensibles are conceivable. The two classes are complementary. What will we learn by looking at them? We will learn that they in turn are analyzable into matter and form, parallels of substrate and essence, as we have seen, and that they can be as abstract and ambiguous as these can be. So these chapters vii through xi are NOT an "interruption" in the course of things, as some scholars (Ross and others) have called them and rejected them. They are a very proper development of Aristotle's analysis. An outline of chapter vii: 1. ta gignomena, things that become: a. three kinds, 1032a12-a13 (1) ta phusei, physicals (2) ta apo technEs, artificials (3) ta apo tautomatou, accidentals, spontaneous things b. their three causes, a13-a15 (1) hupo tinos, moving (2) ek tinos, material (3) ti, formal (to de ti legO kath' hekastEn katEgorian) 2. physicals exhibit all three causes [repeats 1. b.] 1032a15-a26 a. their origin is natural, a15-a19 (1) what they are made of, we call matter, (2) they come from natural things (3) what they are, like a man or plant or some such, we call their ousia b. their potentiality (to be or not to be) is their matter, a20-a22 [linkage of potentiality with matter] c. on the whole, what they are made of [matter], what they are [form] and what starts them [moving cause], are of like form, homoeidEs; man produces man, a22-a26 3. artificials, hai poiEseis E apo technEs, 1032a26-1033a27 a. some are by bolidly strength or by thought, a27-a28 b. some are spontaneous or by chance, like the physicals (some of these from seed, some without seed). We'll see about these later [in this and the next chapter], a28-a32 c. artificials, like health, begin as forms [concepts] in the mind. Form is the essence of each thing, ousia without matter. Examples. A physician heals by producing health, after beginning with the idea of it. So also a builder. They start with the form in mind of what they then produce in the body or matter. This is a progress from potentiality to actuality, from a dunamis to a poiEsis, a32-1033a1 d. but what about [the matter in] accounts [and definitions]? all' ara kai tOn en tOi logOi; 1033a1-a2 [Here Aristotle is doing what he did in chapter iv above with his eipein logikOs (1029b13) and his pOs echei (1030a28). He always seems to like to consider essence and matter from these two perspectives of pragmata (gignomena) and logos] e. An artefact or concrete thing like a bronze ring has matter in one sense. An activity involving a steresis and a pre- existing form in the healer's mind has matter in another sense. There are two kinds of matter, of hulE, 1033a2-a23 (1) the material of an object like the bronze of a bronze ring; in this case the form, not the matter, determines the genus, a2-a7 (2) the formless substrate (sterEseos kai hupokeimenou, b9), as of a healthy man it is man, substrate first of a steresis, then of a form of health [in which case the substrate man determines the genus], a7-a23 This chapter has an interesting function: it introduces the notions of form and matter into the discussion, after showing the mental origin of sensible (physical) things, at least in the case of artefacts. Ta phusei may not be pre-conceived, as artefacts are, but they are conceivable. Thus even ta gignomena, artificial or natural, not only are closely bound to conceivables, but they may be dealt with by way of concepts such as matter and form. So the discussion of ta gignomena brings us back to the question of substrate and essence. Matter and form have simply taken their place. Ta gignomena, at least in physicals and artificials, all have matter and form. The basic question remains. If Aristotle seems to have put his own stamp on this inquiry with terms of his own, he has only brought us back to the starting point: what is the nature of Being? the question inherited from Parmenides, Plato, and perhaps countless others. Terms have been changed, but the question is the same. EFL, 8/17/96 ZETA (VII) METAPHYSICS, chapter viii - ix Matter and form, and their combination Chapter viii continues with the investigation of ta gignomena. It is an explicit statement of Aristotle's hylomorphic theory as a foundation of his ontology here, and it is a repudiation of Ideas. It is not unusual for Aristotle to use the craft analogy of how things are constituted. The aetiology is good for physicals, too. 1. (things that become, cont.). Recap of three causes, a24-a28 a. hupo tinos, hothen hE archE tEs geneseOs [= kinEseOs] b. ek tinos, hE hulE [here the bronze] c. ti [to eidos], here the ball or ring [ti usually means thing, but when he completes his analysis here, you will see that the thing is something else: form better fits his usual scheme and fits what follows next] 2. [the craftsman] makes neither the substrate matter nor the form, a28-b11, a. example of the bronze sphere: the form does not come into being, but the bronze sphere does, a29-b8 b. [the craftsman] makes the bronze ball out of bronze [material] and spherical [form] into this particular bronze ball, b8-b11 3. but the combination, hE sunolos [sometimes, to sunolon] a. The thing that becomes must be divided into its form (en hOi ho poiei) and matter (en ekeinOi) and the whole (to de hapan) created out of them, b12-b16 b. the form is not created, but the combination (hE sunolos) is, and there is matter, and this or that [form], phaneron de ek tOn eirEmenOn hoti to men hOs eidos E ousia legomenon ou gignetai, hE de sunolos hE kata tautEn legomenE gignetai, kai hoti en panti tOi gennOmenOi hulE enesti, kai esti to men tode to de tode, b16-b19 [In short, sensibles, gignomena, onta are sunola, combinations of matter and form. Matter and form are both substrate, and in a combination they both pre-exist, and both individuate. And the matter-form dichotomy replicates itself in analysis. There are palpable matter and logical matter. There are palpable form and logical form. Later we will see also that an account such as this account of ta gignomena, which analyzes how things are composed, will be complemented by a differential account which tells how things are logically divided. Confusing? What is ousia? We have been told that it is substrate and essence (hupokeimenon kai to ti En einai), matter and form (hE hule kai to eidos E hE morphE); that form is and is not a substrate; that matter is both palpable and not palpable. We will be told that the thing (to ti) is a product of division as well as of combination; that essence is individual and universal . . . What are we to make of all this? Well, - one thing is noticeable: these are all pairs, indeed parallel pairs. What can we make of THAT?] 4. [Platonic] Ideas are useless, b19-1034a8 a. is there some Idea beside this particular thing (e.g. tode, ball or house)? or not this, but [only] such a kind of thing (toionde)? [as already suggested in chapter vii, 1033a6- a7] This ball or Kallias or Socrates is a particular, but man or living being is general. Such Forms, as some are wont to call them, are useless for the generation or ousia [of particular things], b19-b29 b. the created is like the creator, not identical, not one except in form (except for cross breeds), b29-1034a2 c. form and matter suffice. There is no need to postulate a paradigm, but it is sufficient that a begetter be the cause of form in matter, a2-a5 d. Kallias and Socrates are such and such a form in such and such flesh and bone, different in matter, same in form (for form is generic) to d' hapan hEdE, to toionde eidos en taisde tais sarxi kai ostois, Kallias kai SokratEs, kai heteron men dia tEn hulEn (hetera gar), tauto de tOi eidei (atomon gar to eidos), a5-a8 [atomon is another ambiguous term, meaning either individual or genus. See Liddell & Scott, p. 271. I choose genus, since Kallias and Socrates are obviously not the same individual. Aristotle seems to be telling us here that matter, not form, differentiates.] Chapter ix: 1. Why do some things come into being both by art (technEi) and spontaneously (apo tautomatou); others, not? Because in some the matter that begins the change has the power to move itself, 1034a9-a21 [This section and the next seem a bit of a digression except that they add to the argument in derogation of Forms] 2. Everything is a "namesake", a21-a22, a. artificials, technEi, a23-a32 b. naturals, phusei, a33-b4 c. spontaneous products, apo tautomatou, b4-b7 3. [repeating chapter viii] neither matter nor form come into existence, neither of ousia or of any of the other categories (although the latter only potentially). Matter and form always pre-exist, aei gar dei prouparchein tEn hullEn kai to eidos, b7-b19 EFL, 8/24/96 (If there should ever be a major or prolonged interruption in the Internet, I will furnish by other means copies of guides and comment to the remaining Books of this text, on request by mail to me, at 1170 Indian Hill Blvd., Claremont, CA, 91711, USA.) ZETA (VII) METAPHYSICS, chapter x The parts of ousia: parts of a sunolon and parts of a logos In this chapter Aristotle discusses the parts of a logical entity. It is not, he claims, really a sunolon, since there is no matter there. In this he is mistaken (see 7., below). 1. it should be asked, is there a need in an account of a whole for an account of the parts, or not? aporeitai EdE poteron dei ton tOn merOn logon enuparchein en tOi tou holou logOi E ou; [The answer to this rhetorical question is: yes] ex hOn de hE ousia hOs merOn, touto skepteon, let the parts of ousia examined, 1034b20-b34 2. if there are matter and form and the combination, and ousia is these, matter is sometimes called a part, sometimes not, but of these [latter, only] the account of form is [a part], 1035a1-a4 [He is claiming that matter is not a part of a logical account, but he overlooks abstract, substrate matter. The substrate of a logos is a universal] 3. Examples [matter in the material (not the substrate) sense, flesh, bronze and the like, hulE aisthEtE, is not part of a logos. Matter in the other sense is ignored], a4-a25 4. more examples of sunola (suneilEmmena), combinations of matter and form on the one hand, and of logicals, hOn hoi logoi tou eidous monon, on the other, a25-b4 5. parts of a logos are prior to the whole; parts of a sunolon are posterior, hosa men tou logou merE protera, hosa hOs hulE hustera, b4-b14 [more on this at 9., 1036a13-a25 below] 6. since the soul is kata ton logon ousia and form and essence of the body, and its parts are prior to the living being, and the flesh posterior [is this the reason for sections 3., 4. and 5. above?] and this ousia [the soul] is not divisible into matter but [only] the combined sunolon [is divisible], this [ousia, the soul] is prior sometimes [as separate soul and an ousia in its own right], sometimes not [as part of a sunolon ousia, combined body and soul. Ousia is an ambiguous term!], b14-b27 [the protasis is from b14 to b22; apodosis, b22-b27] [I use the word, "soul", there for the Greek, psuchE, with trepidation. "Soul" is loaded word for us, loaded with overtones the Greeks never dreamed of. Mind might be better, but best of all might be to keep in mind Aristotle's treatise, On the Soul. He seems to have felt obliged to relate his inquiry to the soul, here in what you may find a bit of a digression (It wasn't, for him)] 7. [the two kinds of matter] universals such as man and horse, ta houtOs epi tOn kath' hekasta [= hen epi pollOn], katholou de, are not ousia but a combination, sunolon ti, of this particular formula, logos, and this particular [substrate] matter as a universal, katholou. [This is the model: genus (a universal) plus difference yields species (a "lower" universal). The genus is the substrate here; the difference, the form; the species is the whole or result of this logical operation. Something like this is what Aristotle has in mind here] Individuals, kath' hekasta, are of the final matter, ek tEs eschatEs hulEs, viz. Socrates and the like, b27-b31 [Note the distinction of hulE hOs katholou (substrate matter, as in a logos) and hulE eschatE, bronze, flesh, and the like] 8. Recapitulation: a. there are parts of the form (and essence), of the composite (tou sunolou), and of matter itself (kai tEs hulEs autEs), 1035b31-b33 b. but parts of a logos are only of form, since the logos is of a universal [the mistake here has been pointed out above], b33-1036a1 c. [for example] the essence of a circle [= form] and a circle, and the essence of a soul and a soul, are the same [the soul being an abstract entity], a1-a2 d. but a composite, like this circle, or some [particular] individual, whether sensed or thought ["thought" here applied to mathematicals] is not defined, but known by sensation or mathematical intuition [about which he and his contemporaries were uncertain], a2-a6 e. departing from actuality [i.e. entering the abstract realm of definition and logos] it is not clear whether it [essence or form, like soul] exists or not, but is always known and spoken of with the formula of the universal, a6-a8 f. matter by itself is unknown, hE d' hulE agnOstos kath' hautEn [unknown by sensation], a8-a9 [it is not clear whether this remark is in apposition to the discussion of essence and the composite above (it would make for symmetry), or in explanation of e., explaining why the universal might not exist. Anyhow, matter by itself IS known, conceptually, as he goes on to point out in the next section] g. there is sensible and intelligible matter, sensible like bronze and wood and such changeables, intelligible existing in sensibles but not qua sensible, like mathematicals [again, those puzzlers], a9-a13 9. relations of priority and posteriority of parts and wholes [mentioned in 1035b4-14, paragraph 5. above] are not absolute a13-a25 [Aristotle's analysis of the parts of ousia is lop-sided. To begin with he recognizes that there is palpable ousia - that is sunola ousia, composed of matter and form - and there is an impalpable, abstract ousia - this is the defined ousia that he addresses logikOs. We met it first in chapter iv. But, according to the above in this chapter, while the palpable sunolos ousia is partible two ways, the logical ousia is not. It has no matter. It is form only. This is wrong, by his own count. There is another kind of matter, beside the palpable. It is quite obvious that universals ARE part of ousia in a logical substrate sense, and that the whole arrangement of the material world is mirrored in the logical, only in reverse. HE SAYS SO HIMSELF here, at 1036a9-a10: there is sensible matter and intellectual matter, hulE de hE men aisthEtE hE de noEtE. Why should he restrict this to mathematicals? They are but half the picture. He says again at 1035b27-b30 that universals like man and horse are not ousia [in the material sense] but a certain combination of this account and that matter as universal, ho d'anthrOpos kai ho hippos kai ta houtOs epi tOn kath' hekasta, katholou de, ouk estin ousia alla sunolon ti ek toudi tou logou kai tEsdi tEs hulEs hOs katholou. But why rely upon one-line quotes, when there is a larger context to look to? This sudden oversight of substrate ousia (a notion he has entertained since chapter iii) and hulE noEtE is untypical of Aristotle, and a glaring imbalance of the factors he brings into play throughout. What is his reason for abandoning his balanced presentation, if not the influence of his training as Plato's long-time disciple in the original Academy? A pretty irony this. There is more of Plato in Aristotle than has been imagined for a long time. Whatever the reason, the asymmetry there is plain to behold. [My criticism of Aristotle above is not intended to be contentious. These inconsistencies must be seen, in order simply to understand what he is saying. Trying to avoid them makes the task hopeless, and requires some rather arbitrary translation. That of ousia in 1036a33 (next week) will be a case in point. [It may be objected, if Aristotle could be turned from thorough objectivity by his training in the Academy, and if we are all products of our education, who am I to think that my analysis is unbiased? It isn't. In the Greek spirit of self-knowledge, it pays to know and declare one's bias. I will get to that before we are done. [To sum up, what are the parts of matter? Sensible and intelligible (abstract) matter. What are the parts of form? Same: sensible and intelligible form. The parts of to sunolon, the combined, hardly need mention again. Matter by itself is unknown, that is unpercieved and unperceivable, only because by itself it is an abstraction. It IS known conceivably. So matter and form are both divisible into parts, which in each case are perceivable and conceivable respectively, material and formal. They replicate the dichotomy they participate in. The dichotomy is in us.] EFL, 8/31/96 ZETA (VII) METAPHYSICS, chap xi Parts of forms, and parts of combineds compared This is a continuation of the discussion of the last chapter, but with a shift in perspective to particular kinds of matter: 1. what kind [of parts] are parts of a form? and what kind are parts of a combined? aporeitai de eikotOs kai poia esti tou eidous merE kai poia ou, alla tou suneilEmenou [= sunolou]. We must know this if we are to define and account for things. Definition is of form and the universal, 1036a26-a31 2. kinds of matter, a31-b7 a. hosa men oun phainetai epigignomena eph' heterOn tOi eidei, hoion kuklos en chalkOi kai lithOi kai xulOi, tauta men dEla einai dokei hoti ouden tEs tou kuklou ousias ho chalkos oud' ho lithos dia to chOrizesthai autOn, in a bronze, stone or wooden circle [combined] the bronze, stone and wood are not part of the ousia of the circle, due to their separability, a31-b3 [eph' heterOn tOi eidei means different kinds of matter, and he names them. They are not part of the ousia of the circle: he does NOT say essence, as Tredennick does, or form, as Ross. Preserve the ambiguity. Also he has "switched gears" from general to particular. He interjects a particularity that has not been present before. I examine this passage further in a separate appendix below] b. the flesh and bones of a man, are they part of his form and definition, or not, but matter? they are not separable, b3-b7 [that would admit much argument. The material flesh etc. is not part of the definition. The intellectual is, until you take apart the definition. There is much ambiguity here] 3. some prior opinions on the relation of form and matter, b7-b22 a. some [Pythagoreans] would not define figures with lines and the continuous. They reduce everything to numbers, b7-b13 b. Platonists were divided: some identified forms and things; some did not, b13-b17 c. there is one form of many, different from them (as occurs to the Pythagoreans); and it is possible to make one the form of many, the others not forms, so that all will be one, b17-b20 4. that there is a problem with definitions, and why, has been shown,[yet] one cannot bring up all [this] and do away with matter. Some things are form in matter, dio kai to panta anagein houtO kai aphairein tEn hulEn periergon, enia gar isOs tod' en tOid' estin E Odi tadi echonta, b21-b24 a. the analogy of Socrates the Younger is no good [Socrates the Younger is mentioned in the Theaetetus and Sophist, and given an interlocutor's role by Plato in the Statesman. What the analogy referred to is, I do not know, unless it has to do with the question raised in b3-b7 just above]: living beings are not like circles [in which form can be abstracted] b24-b32 [cf. 1035b14-b27] b. special case of mathematicals; there are two kinds of matter, esti gar hulE eniOn kai mE aisthEtOn . . . esti gar hulE hE men aisthEtE hE de noEtE, b32-a5 c. living beings, e.g. man, are composites of form and matter, 1037a5-a10 [psuchE = form; flesh = matter] d. whether there is another kind of matter, and another ousia, like numbers and mathematicals, will be examined later [M and N], a10-a20 (1) we will try to distinguish these from physicals, a13-a14 (2) even though in a sense this is the job of physics, in a sense it is also ours, a14-a20 5. Recap of chapters x and xi, a21-b7: We have stated a. what essence is, and how it is something apart, a21-a22 b. why the account of essence in some cases is [or has] the parts of the defined; in others, not, a22-a24 c. that in the definitions of ousia there are no [sensible] material parts, ta houtO moria hOs hulE ouk enesti, a24-a25 d. [the ambiguity of ousia] that there are two kinds of ousia: protos ousia (essence and form) and sunolos ousia (the combined). Definition is of the first kind, a25-b7 [This concludes the examination of ta gignomena, of things that become. Although at the beginning of chapter vii Aristotle professed to turn to the examination of these physical things, he found he could not do so without comparison to things that do not become but are quite static and un-physical: namely, definitions and accounts, horismoi and logoi. This should hardly be a surprise, since he is after all engaged in an account, and using definitions. Intellectually distinguishable, the two realms are inextricably entangled. He himself is still puzzled here about some aspects of this relation (xi), and does not make himself completely clear, to me at least (viz.: the status of living beings, and soul, the nature of mathematicals) so that I have to resort to the argument from symmetry, to judge what he says. [What he has shown us, to put it in a nutshell, is that there are parts of ousia, matter and form, and that there are parts of these parts: in addition to the substrate there are forms of matter, bronze, wood, stone, etc., and in addition to essence there is materialized form, your and my face and figure, etc. Both form and matter are formal and material in turn. Once you come up with a theory such as this hylemorphic theory, you have to carry it all the way. It is an all or nothing proposition. If there is form and matter there is form and matter of form and matter. [Now Aristotle will next (in the coming chapters) take the whole discussion, and turn it on its head, to take up the opposite position, that of things that DON'T become (ta ou gignomena, as it were). For he addresses the other two meanings of ousia (chapter iii), to genos and to katholou, genus and universal, and these are the opposite of gignomena: non-material, intellectual, unchanging abstractions, if ever there were such things. And they matter! [This may not be the only way to present the structure of Zeta, but whatever way you present it, you must recognize the distinct and remarkable tension that exists betwee the two ways of describing ousia here: the "componential" and the "differential;" between ousia as genus and difference, and ousia as matter and form; pOs echei and logos. The intermingling of the two is as unavoidable as their contrast. It reflects the actual nature of the world as a world percieved and a world conceived, two states that are as different as they are bound to oneanother. It also reflects the human condition. For us there is no escape from it.] Appendix on 1036a31-b3(or b7): Let us start from the text, (1) and (2), and make some comparisons to it, (3) - (8). I abbreviate, for clarity. The key phrases are: (1) hoion kuklos en chalchOi kai lithOi kai xulOi = eph' heterOn tOi eidei [the eidE here are not meant in opposition to matter, but are kinds of matter (bronze, stone, wood)] (2) ouden tEs kuklou ousias ho chalchos oud' ho lithos, etc. the bronze & stone & wood are not of the ousia of the circle [he does not specify essence or form, as Tredennick and Ross say. He says just ousia] Those are particular statements about ta gignomena, in xi (3) the matter is not [part] of ousia This is the equivalent general statement. It is wrong. Matter IS part of ousia. But he substituted particulars for general terms. With those he is right. Ousia is ambiguous. In the overall context of his system here, the following statements would be true, and would take into account the ambiguities: (4) sensible matter is not part of "logical" ousia, definition x (5) sensible matter is part of a sunola ousia, ix (6) particular matter is part of a particular thing xi (7) particular matter is not part of a logos, definition or universal (no sensible matter is) xi (8) substrate and intellectual matter is part of these x (esp. 1035b30) EFL, 9/7/96 ZETA (VII) METAPHYSICS, chapter xii The "differential" account [In the course of his examination of ta gignomena in the last several chapters, Aristotle has frequently paused to ask about horismoi and logoi, definitions and accounts. This seems to have been inescapable, even though definitions and accounts are quite different than things themselves. They may be different, but they are inextricably bound to each other. A thing is something palpable, movable and changeable; while a definition and an account is a mental concept that we try to fix permanently, yet things may be defined, and definitions are of things. Should we be surprised that Aristotle switches back and forth between them? Yet chapters vii - xi, have been (by his declared intent, and in fact) devoted mainly to ta gignomena, and it never loses sight of them. They are sunola, combineds, with the component parts, matter and form. Ousia is composed of matter and form. I call this a componential account of ousia. [But, as he says (at 1037a25-b7), there are two kinds of ousia. Commencing in chapter xii, Aristotle turns his full attention to the other kind: definitions and accounts, horismoi kai logoi. Definition is characterized by division, genera and universals. And, lo and behold, there are the other two meanings of ousia that Aristotle gave us in chapter iii! My name for this second approach is the differential account of ousia. Definition and division establish differences. (Plato's major treatment of this topic was in his dialogue, The Statesman.) 1. why do the elements in a definition become one? Like living being and two footed, etc., in the case of man? Not because they are immanent. Not because they participate (metechein). They are one because of [the nature of] definition, 1037b8-b25 2. A definition is a single account of an ousia, of one thing, because ousia means one thing and this thing, as we were saying [chap. vi], ho gar horismos logos tis estin heis kai ousias, hOste henos tinos dei auton einei logon, kai gar hE ousia hen ti kai tode ti sEmainei, hOs phamen, b25-b28 [The association of ousia, essence and the individual (of ousia, to ti En einai, and tode ti) we met already in chapter vi, where it was proposed as a counter to the Platonists. But in any case, all being, even absolute being and ousia as substrate, we only perceive through individual beings (we are reminded again of Gamma, ii: being (on) is found in on hE on AND onta), so there is a sense in which ousia and essence IS known in individuals, and in which the ousia does mean hen kai tode ti. By now its ambiguity should be no surprise. And it is just in this last sense that division and definition come into play. Definition, as he says here (b25), is a single account of a single ousia. How do we define? By starting with some broad class, and dividing it until we reach the infima species. Such a process leads finally to the individual thing, phaneron hoti hE teleutaia diaphora hE ousia tou pragmatos estai kai ho horismos (1038a10-20). This is also reached from the opposite direction by composition, beginning with the purest substrate ousia, and gradually informing it by adding attributes. That however is not definition, but a sort of poiEsis, a "putting together," a composition. The two processes are complementary, one mental (logikOs), the other actual (pOs echei). Their meeting is a "coincidentia oppositorum" (to use Nicholas of Cues' phrase). [Why should the subject of the definition, the ousia, be one? Indeed, IS it one? Yes. But on the other hand, if you were to strip the attributes away, leaving only a substrate, that would not leave an individual, but a universal. If ousia is one, is this the one of individuality or of universality? Our tendency seems to be to think of one here as individuality. It need not be. It can be the unity of a substrate, hupokeimenon. This is a unity of universality. One means many things, pollachOs legetai to hen. Returning to the text: 3. Consider definition by division. We have a first genus and differences. The subordinate genera, ta d'alla genE, are in turn established by differences. Whether many or few, or only as species (eidE) or matter, definition is the account of [these] differences, b28-1038a9 4. But the differences must be appropriate [he gives examples], and the final difference will be the essence and the definition of the thing [all that remains is to name it], a9-a20 5. There is no need for repetition of terms, as in "two-footed, footed, animal," a20-a25 6. There will be one final difference, the form and the ousia. If [the difference] is accidental, they would be as many as the [possible] logical divisions. But redundancy is unnecessary, a25- a35 [Now in this section (chapters xii - xvi) on the definition of o usia, we are going to encounter a special tension, the tension between universal and individual. Definition starts with the universal, and ends in the individual. Which is ousia? This will be the question addressed. Is ousia a universal or an individual? Let us see.] EFL, 9/14/96 A Reflective Digression Periodically I stop and ask myself, what is the point of all this? For us? Some very important points indeed! On the one hand, Aristotle is addressing questions that we all face, whether we know it or not: what are abstractions? what is their relation to the world as we know it? when are we justified in using them? We face these questions practically in our daily life in activities of all sorts. Some of us face them theoretically in addressing what has now come to be called the mind-body question. What Aristotle had to say about these questions, may supply us with some helpful perspective about them. At least, knowing how old they are may preserve us from egoism or anxiety. On the other hand Aristotle also gives us example after example here of a situation common to many other fields of discourse: the omnipresence of ambiguity. It is a very instructive lesson. It suggests that there is a dialectical logic that is applicable to some inquiries that is not applicable to others, a logic that is different and parallel to that single line apodictic process which we have been accustomed to associate with "logic," and which Aristotle explored in Prior Analytics. There was a time when philosophy aimed to eliminate ambiguity. Since we ourselves, homines sapientes, are all ambiguities, we might better accept the fact, and come to grips with it, as many of these ancient Greeks tried to do. But more on this at another time, perhaps when we are done reading the text. I only mention this here inasmuch as, while it is fine to proceed on faith, it is helpful to have a hope that there is some usefulness in all this effort. - EFL ZETA (VII) METAPHYSICS, chapter xiii - xiv Is ousia a universal? In chapter xii ousia, in its sense of essence, was associated with definition, and definition is achieved by differentiation of a genus, a universal. Is ousia, then, a universal? Chapter xiii: 1. let us consider again, what ousia is: substrate, essence, the combination of these, and the universal, to hupokeimenon kai to ti En einai kai to ek toutOn kai to katholou, 1038b1-b3 [notice that he has dropped genus from his earlier list in chapter iii, presumably because it is much the same as to katholou, and added to ek toutOn, incorporating the result of the prior section. For what is to ek toutOn, if not the sunolon of substrate and essence here, much the same as the sunolon of matter and form in the earlier chapter x?] 2. the first two have been discussed, essence and substrate, but the universal seems more a cause and principle of things, so let us take it up, b3-b8 [presumably the ek toutOn has been covered enough in the componential account of the previous chapters] 3. it seems impossible for ousia to be a universal, b8-b9 a. ousia belongs to individuals; a universal is common, b9-b15 b. ousia is not, while a universal is a predicate, b15-b16 c. but can't a universal be in it as an essence? all' ara houtO men ouk endechetai hOs to ti En einai, en toutOi de enuparchein, hoion to zOion en tOi anthrOpoi kai hippOi; It makes no difference if it can't be an account of all of it [cf. chap. iii], b16-b23 d. impossible and absurd to put a quality [as a universal] ahead of ousia, adunaton kai atopon to tode kai ousian, ei estin ek tinOn, mE ex ousiOn einai mEd' ex tou tode ti all' ek poiou, b23-b29 e. it would lead to redundancy, b29-b30 f. In short, there is no ousia in the account of anything, or outside, or anywhere else but in things, b30-b34 g. recap: ousia is no universal. A universal is not a tode ti, but a toionde [an observation he has made before, 1033a6-a7, b21-b22, the latter in derogation of Ideas], otherwise it would raise the "third Man" [whom we have also met before, notably last year in Plato's Parmenides. The "third man" is Aristotles' name for infinite regress], b34-1039a3 h. ousia cannot contain ousiai actually, a3-a14 4. but this is a problem: if ousia is not a universal, there is no definition of it. But we said before definition is of ousia. There will be no definition of anything, unless in different senses, a14-a23 [Aristotle seems to be at odds with himself here. What are we to make of this? Ross comments, II, 211, "Aristotle is not very successful in solving the problem." Right. The reason is, he is caught on the horns of an ambiguity. The individual todi ti-s, the onta, their essences, are only one meaning of ousia, one of two meanings that run like two colored threads through all this discussion. Consider the other, ousia as substrate. It IS universal. So the answer to Aristotle's problem is simple and obvious: as a substrate ousia is a universal; as an essence, individual. But does he see this?] Chapter xiv: 5. the consequence is clear for those who say that there are Ideas and separate ousiai (ousias te chOristas) and who at the same time make species [or Form, to eidos] out of genus and difference, 1039a24-a26 6. if there are Forms and genera distributed among species (kai to zOion en tOi anthOpOi kai hippOi), they are either one and the same in number, or different, a26-a28 a. it is clear, they are one, since the definition is the same in each case, a28-a30. But (1) if there is some individual and separate Form of Man (anthrOpos autos kath' hauton tode ti kai kechOrismenon), the consituent Forms (ex hOn) like living Being (to zOion) and two-footed (to dipoun) must also be individual and be separate and ousiai, a30-a33 (2) but if the same unity [scilicet, to zOion] is in a horse and a man, how will the unity in things be separate unit[s], and why will not this Form [to zOion] be outside itself? a33-b2 (3) further, it seems impossible that it participates in two- footedness and many-footedness because opposites will exist in the same one thing, b2-b4 (4) If not, what is meant, when someone says a living being is two-footed and on foot? Perhaps these terms are combined or mixed. But this is all absurd, b4-b6 b. but if they are different, b7 (1) there will be infinitely many, because a man is not accidentally a living being, b7-b9 (2) and so the Form of Living Being will be many, b7-b14 (3) what will each living being (touto) come from? and how from the Form of Living Being? and how can there be the living being beside the Form of a Living Being? b14-b16 (4) With respect to sensibles, these are more absurd. If this is impossible, clearly there are no Ideas, as some say, b16-b19 [In a nutshell, what Aristotle is doing here is to raise this problem: if there is a hierarchy of genera and species, and the genus is found in many species and individuals, is it one genus or many? If it is one (= a universal), how can it be used to define an individual? If it is many (= different in each species and individual) it will be infinitely many, and there will be a form of each individual. [This is the problem that Plato brought up in the dialogue, the Parmenides, at the point where Parmenides was challenging Socrates' theory of Forms, as Plato's story goes, at paragraph 131. Some of you will recall this from last year's slow-read. Plato, speaking through his Parmenides, finally equivocated (135B): although he raised these problems, and did not resolve them, he nevertheless admitted the need for Forms, whatever these are. In fact, the greater part of the Parmenides is a grand demonstration of the ambiguities of Unity and Being, and as such is the forerunner of the Metaphysics. Neither Plato of Aristotle resolve this problem. [So - sic et non, yes and no: ousia is and is not a universal. As a substrate (hupokeimenon) it is a universal. As a tode ti it is not.] EFL, 9/21/96 SIDEBAR: On Definition How does one define? What differentiae should one pick when we define? There is a good answer to this question in Plato's dialogue, the Statesman, at the end thereof. Aristotle himself must have been well aware of it, although I am not sure he pays much attention to it. Two-footed is not the difference I would pick for man a.k.a. homo sapiens sapiens. But it doubtless answers to Aristotle's needs here. - EL ZETA (VII) METAPHYSICS, chapter xv - xvi Are definitions of individuals? No. (xv) 1. there is no defining of individual sensibles: a. if ousia is two "things," the combination [matter and form], and the definition, the combined comes and goes in and out of existence, but not the definition, 1039b20-b27 b. the reason that there is no definition or demonstration of sensible individual ousiai, tOn ousiOn tOn aisthEtOn tOn kath' hekasta oute horismos oute apodeixis estin, is that they contain matter, which by nature can be or not be, so they are perishable, b27-b31 c. if demonstration and definition of certain truth are science, they cannot change, and it is clear that there is no definition or demonstration of these [individual sensibles], only opinion (doxa). Things that cease to exist are unknown to those who knew them, when they are gone from sensation, and saving them in memory is neither definition nor proof. Therefore one must not forget, when one defines some individual thing, that it is fleeting (aei anairein estin). It cannot be defined, b31-1040a8 2. or of Ideas: a. nor is there defining any Idea, for an Idea is individual, [or of individuals] AS THEY SAY, and separate, tOn gar kath' hekaston hE idea, hOs phasi, kai chOristE. But definition uses words; the definer does not make up words; they are common to all, a8-a14 b. if someone says [that] nothing prevents all [the genera] from being in many, and at the same time in this one [species or thing], let it be said first that [they can be] in both, and yet [they are] prior in being. They are not to be counted out (so too it must be with imperishables, being prior and parts of a compound, and with separates (chOrista). It's both or neither. Genera and differences imply each other), a14-a22 c. and if there are Ideas of Ideas, the latter must be predicated of many individuals, or how would it be known? Every Idea must be able to be shared, a22-a27 d. special treatment of eternal individuals like Sun & Moon: it is wrong to add some account of the Sun, without which it is still the Sun, a27-b2 e. why doesn't ONE OF THEM [those Platonists] produce a definition of an idea, b2-b4 [The message of this chapter is initially simple and clear: there is no definition of sensible individuals. But then in the middle of things it seems to break into a new theme (1040a8): "there is no defining of any Idea, because an Idea is of an individual and separate, as they say," oude dE idean oudemian estin horisasthai. tOn gar kath' hekaston hE idea, hOs phasi, kai chOristE. Aristotle is here taking up the apposite case. Having declared his position on sensible individuals, he now takes up the case of the separate (chOristE) individual Idea, tOn gar kath' hekasta hE idea, hOs phasi, kai chOristE. But what is this? And who are "they" (whom he refers to twice, a8 and b1)? It sounds like a rogue doctrine, and "they" sound suspiciously like the "men and horses" crowd of 997b- b12 of Book B (III), whom indeed we are shortly to meet again in the next chapter at 1040b30-b34. You might think that this is a bit of a digression. He didn't have to bring it up. He does not himself believe in Ideas, much less Ideas of individuals. But he can't help bringing it up. I detect subtle traces of an animus in these "hOs phasi" passages, an animus not directed at his teacher but against colleagues who might have been rivals for the succession after the teacher's death, and in whose hands the Ideas took strange turns. This is a mere surmise on my part, not based on explicit evidence but upon the implication of repeated remarks. [Aristotle has made the point several times that definition is of universals, so his objection here to the suggestion that there are Ideas of individuals, or that they might be defined, is consistent. But what about his emphatic contention in chapter vi, that essence is the same as individual (poteron de tauton estin E heteron to ti En einai kai hekaston, etc.)? Essence and Idea are not far apart. Is Aristotle contradicting himself? Hardly. Recall that in chapter vi he was not saying baldly that essence is to be equated with the individual, but saying (against the Platonists) that essence is IN (or sometimes OF) the individual, as opposed to in some wild blue yonder. And after that he has made the points over and over again that definition is of essence, and of the universal. Further, to say that individuals have essences, or essences are in individuals, and that individuals participate in Ideas, is not to say that essences ARE individuals or that there are Ideas of individuals. Essence is Aristotle's replacement for Ideas. They may not be far apart, yet there is a world of difference. There is much possibility for misunderstanding here.] Ousia is not a universal (xvi) 1. most apparent ousiai are potentialities, like parts of living things and the elements. They have no unity, but are aggregates, or parts of a unity, until they are finalized [for lines 10-16 see Ross' notes, p. 219. Aristotle the biologist speaks here] 1040b5-b16 2. [addresses a whole tradition of speculation about one and being, that goes back to Plato's Parmenides and to Parmenides himself, who said that being is one, and was understood by some to have meant that being and one were equivalents, as though either could be substituted for the other. Remember also: these were a problem in Book B (III), 1001a&b. It was an important question to those ancients, and evidently was much bruited about in their times. Aristotle here challenges it. More on this in Book Iota] a. one and being are not the ousia of things, nor, in essence, element or principle, b16-b21 b. but they are more the ousia of things than are principle and element and cause. These [latter] are no way ousia, if ousia is not something universal [as he maintains in chapter xiii, 1038b8-1039a14, and here]. Ousia exists in nothing but itself and what it is the ousia of [as shown in chap. vi, and again a thinly veiled riposte to the Platonists], b21-b24 c. unity cannot exist in many places at once, but the universal does, so clearly no universal exists separately, aside from individuals [another riposte to the "heavenly" Ideas of oi ta eidE legontes], b25-b27 d. Those who say there are Ideas speak correctly in separating them [individually], but incorrectly in saying form is an Idea, hoi ta eidE legontes tEi men orthOs legousi chorizontes auta, eiper ousiai eisi, tEi d' ouk orthOs, hoti to hen epi pollOn eidos legousin, because they cannot explain what such imperishable ousiai are, aside from individual sensibles. They make them the same as perishables, proposing Absolute Man and Absolute Horse [recall 997b5-12], adding the word "absolute" to sensibles, b27-b34 e. [Yet Aristotle does not deny there are such things as eternal eternal ousia, albeit they are not Ideas:] Yet even if we had never seen the stars, there would nevertheless be (I think) eternal ousiai aside from those we do perceive. So now, even if we don't know what they are, we know that they must exist [in the Greek, the second clause there is as poetical as I have ever seen Aristotle get: ouden an hEtton, oimai, Esan ousiai aidioi par has hEmeis Edeimen!], b34-1041a3 f. It is clear that no universal is an ousia, and there is no ousia outside of ousiai, a3-a5 [This chapter is made somewhat difficult at first by the usual ambiguities, but the main thrust of it is clear: Aristotle sees ousia as the essence of the individual, to ti En einai tou kath' hekaston. This is clearly part of the textual basis of the scholastic reading that lays stress on form and essence as ousia. Such an interpretation however overlooks Aristotle's opposite observations, that ousia is substrate and is a universal basis of definition. He himself is not of one mind about this question. He often (as we have seen) overlooks the ambiguities of ousia, matter and form. [As in chapter xv, Aristotle here turns his sights in the middle of the chapter, and takes aim at the Platonists, hoi legontes ta eidE, the hOs phasi crowd. They seem to be never far from his mind.] EFL 9/28/96 ZETA (VII) METAPHYSICS, chapter xvii Predication, and compounds 1. [preamble] what kind of thing is that ousia which is separate from sensible ousiai, opoion ti tEn ousian . . . legOmen. IsOs gar ek toutOn estai dElon kai peri ekeinEs tEs ousias hetis esti kekOrismenE tOn aisthEtOn ousiOn, 1041a6-a10 [This is the ousia that is subject of definition, logikOs] 2. inquiry should always ask what can be predicated of another. To ask why something is itself is no inquiry at all, to men oun dia ti auto estin auto, ouden esti zEtein . . . allo gar houtO kat' allou esti to zEtoumenon, a10-a26 [see Ross' paraphrase, p.222] 3. and it should ask the cause, i.e. the essence, to speak in logical [abstract] terms, phaneron toinun hoti zEtei to aition, touto d'esti to ti En einai, hOs eipein logikOs, which in some cases is the purpose, in other cases, the moving cause, ho ep' eniOn men esti tinos heneka . . . ep' eniOn de ti ekinEse prOton. But these are causes of becoming and perishing, [i.e. sensibles]; the other [essence] [cause] of being, alla to men toiouton aition epi tou gignesthai zEteitai kai phtheiresthai, thateron [to ti En einai] de kai epi tou einai, a26-a32 4. the inquiry fails most of all where there is no predication, like trying to find out what a man is by simple statement, and not defining by predication, mE diorizein hoti tade tode. One must seek articulations, alla dei diarthrOsontas zEtein, a32-b4 5. if being must be and exist, epei de dei echein te kai huparchein to einai, it is clear that we seek the matter in why it is what it is [or: why it is something], dElon dE hoti tEn hulEn zEtei dia ti ti estin. Why is a house these [things]? Because [we] predicate what the essence of house is, hoti huparchei ho En oikiai einai . . . so we search for the cause of the matter (this is the form) in what it is, and this is the ousia, hOste to aition zEteitai tEs hulEs (touto d'esti to eidos) hOi ti estin, touto d' hE ousia, b4-b9 [Remember, as you read that, he is speaking "logikOs" here. We are dealing with intangibles, abstractions, so there is no matter here in the material sense, but only in the substrate sense.] 6. there is no inquiry of simples, tOn haplOn, but only of a single whole compound, which is its ousia, b9-b11 7. [So far so good. His meaning is fairly plain. Now, next, he turns to compounds: there must be these if there is predication. This is a very chopped up section, and I wish to try to unravel it. If you are not interested, skip it. The backbone is three statements, separated by two parentheses. Let us take the three statements first:] if a combination of things is such that it is all a unity, and not just a disorganized heap, but [structured like] a syllable, epei de to ek tinos suntheton houtOs hOste hen einai pan, mE hOs soros all' hOs hE sullabE (lines b11-b12), [and] if that [combination] must be either an element or [a compound] of elements, ei toinun anagkE kakeino E stoicheion E ek stoicheiOn einai (lines b19-b20), then it seems that this is something [i.e. a compound] and not an element, and this body or this structure is the cause of [its] being, and so with others. This is the ousia of each thing, the first cause of being, doxeie d' an einai ti touto kai ou stoicheion, kai aition ge tou einai todi men sarka todi de sullabEn, homoiOs de kai epi tOn allOn. ousia de hekastou men touto (touto gar aition prOton tou einai) (lines b25-b28) [The first of the two parentheses, lines b11-b19, marked off by dashes in Ross' and Jaeger's texts, hE de sullabE ouk esti ta stoicheia . . ., simply differentiates an organized combination [sullabE] and the elements that go to make it up. The second parenthesis is the two conditional clauses, ei men . . . ei de . . . , lines b20-b25:] if it is an element, the argument can be repeated; if it is [a compound] of elements, it is clear that it is not of one but [a compound] of many. 8. nature itself is ousia, phaneiE an autE hE phusis ousia, b28-b33 [this tag end seems to be a sort of a special case] [This chapter is the sort of statement (there are others) that conveys Aristotle's belief that ousia is form. Of course it is just form in a context in which there is no matter, i.e. when we speak of it "logikOs." But matter is ambiguous (as noticed at 1015a7-a11 and 1024 a35, b8-b9), and even to speak logikOs is ambiguous. This can mean (1) to speak of "things" without their matter, i.e. to speak of their definitions, as is done here in the last six chapters of Zeta, or it can mean (2) to speak of the matter and form of ta gignomena, in an analytical way, as is done in chapters vii - xi. You can see that the problems of ambiguity are not just those mentioned in Gamma and Delta. There are ambiguities that Aristotle deals with more or less explicitly, and there are those that he does not.] [What is chapter seventeen about ater all? About predication and compounds (or combinations) of subject and predicate? Yes, - explicitly. But there is an unstated implication: the compound of subject and predicate in the intellectual act of definition and "accounting" (logos) is a parallel of the compound of matter and form in sunola ousia. Chapter seventeen ties this Book Zeta (or the greater part of it) together in one knot. ousia / \ aisthEtE noEtE / \ / \ form matter predicate subject / \ / \ attribute / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ aisthEtE noEtE aisthEtE noEtE accidental essemtial gramm. log. Gramm. = grammatical; log. = logical, i.e. the universal. This replication of a dichotomy should tell us something. ADDENDUM The Aporiai (Problems) of Zeta Some additional justification may be desired for my organization of Book Zeta (VII) into (1) a componential account in chapters vii - xi, and (2) a differential account in chapters xii - xvi. I offer this: Compare their problems. The main problem that arises in (1) chaps. vii - xi is the distinction between the parts of a sunolon and the parts of a definition (or account, logos). It is determined there that only a sunolon has matter. A definition does not have matter, if we overlook the intellectual matter (hulE noEtE). Its substrate is a universal. Such is the problem of (1). The problem of (2), the differential account, is a different, if parallel one. It is this: is a definition of a universal or of an individual? Here too an ambiguity is overlooked, the ambiguity of ousia, as there it was the ambiguity of matter. Be that as it may, it is interesting that (1) eventuates in the problem, what are the parts of a definition? while (2) eventuates in the problem, whether a definition is of an individual or of a universal. These are different approaches to albeit one end (what is the the nature of definition), but one concerns itself with combination; the other, with unity and universality. "There is no matter in a definition of ousia;" "a definition of ousia is neither individual or universal" are two ways of stating the problems. Both of these problems can be solved by the admission of ambiguities of matter and of ousia. Aside from the fact that we have seen these ambiguities admitted, hulE NoEtE, and ousia as substrate in Aristotle's text, why SHOULD we admit them? For the simple reason of our own duality: they are perceivable and conceivable because it is we who can percieve and conceive them. WE are the "culprits," the root and cause of them. No less. EFL, 10/5/96 ZETA (VII) METAPHYSICS Summary of Zeta Zeta is the heart of the Aristotle's Metaphysics. It is one of two metaphysics, as we will see in due course, but it is the one which has the most relevance for us. Let us review the whole: 1. On = ousia chapter i a. prior theories of what ousia is ii b. ousia is fourfold iii to hupokeimenon, substrate To ti En einai, essence to katholou, universal to genos, class, kind 2. ousia is to hupokeimenon iii (let us examine ousia in sensibles first) 3. ousia is to ti En einai iv logikOs, logically, immaterially pOs echei, in fact, in things problem of compounds: a definition is of ousia only, without additions [and what does that leave?] v 4. essences are in individuals, they are not Ideas, as some say (against the Platonists) vi 5. the sensible world vii - xi ta gignomena, what they are: form and matter vii ta sunola, combinations viii pre-existence of matter and form ix parts of a sunolon and parts of a logos x parts of matter and form: sensible and intelligible matter sensible and intelligible form particular kinds of matter xi 6. the intellectual world xii - xvii definition by division xii is ousia a universal? xiii - xvi no - ousia belongs to individuals xiii but - no universal no definition a problem with Ideas and universals xiv are definitions of individuals? No. xv ousia is not a universal xvi predication and compounds xvii Notice that there is some confusion there. After stating that ousia is fourfold, and proceding to examine the first definition, that ousia is to hupokeimenon, Aristotle suggests that ousia in sensibles be examined first. But he does not do this. Instead he turns to the essence, to ti En einai, in chapter iv, which is hardly sensible matter. Essence is forthwith examined logikOs, logically. But in a quick switch again he asks what the situation is, pOs echei, in fact, in presumably material things. Examples of such back-and-forth between the sensible and intellectual approach to ousia are found throughout this Book. Overall Book Zeta shows a major division between a material and a formal (or intellectual) approach to ousia. They appear in chapters iii and iv respectively, looming larger yet in chapters vii through xi as opposed to chapters xii through xvi. These are componential and differential approaches. Materially, ousia is a composition of elements. Sensibles are compounds. Intellectually we do the opposite: we start with a large class, and divide it repeatedly until we get down to the very thing itself: being - living being - man - individual, you or me. This procedure seizes upon the differences between genera, species and single essences. We come to the "thing," as it were, from opposite directions. Both matter and form are themselves each subject to the same division: there is palpable and intellectual matter, namely matter as the four elements, and matter as a substrate in the conceptual world, such as the universal in a definition. There is also material and intellectual form: that lovely "face that launch'd a thousand ships, and burnt the topless towers of Ilium" was a material form, while most of the form we have been talking about here is a concept. So Book Zeta is permeated with these replicating dichotomies: compounds-differences, sensibles-conceptuals, substrate-essence, matter-form, THAT ARE ALL THE SAME DICHOTOMY, physical-mental. The fourfold scheme of ousia in chapter iii is realized in Zeta as a whole. Chapters iii and iv deal with the first two, as do also chapters vii through xi, in the world of ta gignomena. Chaps. xii through xvi deal with universals and genera. The universals that are the substrate of division and definition are also genera. Zeta is all of one piece of cloth in two colors, even though the threads sometimes seem tangled. We asked in our comment (8/3) on chapter v, what is left when you strip off all the attributes, accidental and essential, leaving only the substrate? The answer is simple: substrate ousia. But what is that? It is the estin of Parmenides, the ontOs on of Plato. It is pure Being alone. What do we mean when we or Parmenides or Plato or Aristotle speak of pure Being? There is no such thing. It is a concept, and Idea, an abstraction, in fact the ultimate abstraction. This was something new to those old boys, not to mention their contemporaries. This is why Parmenides himself and Plato's Parmenides were misunderstood. What Aristotle accomplished was to "tame" this auto to on, or (as he calls it) ousia with his own theories of form and matter, substrate and attribute, predication, ambiguity (pollachOs legetai). But he is still puzzled sometimes here. He is still caught sometimes in the ambiguities, and he does not fully grasp the significance of his hupokeimenon. I have suggested an approach to the understanding of Aristotle's Metaphysics that differs from that of the scholastic philosophers (Thomas Aquinas, for example). Why did it happen that they treated the Metaphysics as they did? They were drawn to a controversy over the question of the "reality" of forms, Ideas and universals. This was the famous universals controversy that inaugurated the scholastic period in the early twelfth century. Roscelin and Abelard were the reputed initiators of this, responding to Porphyry's famous recusal. The importance of this controversy lay in the substantiation of spiritual phenomena by the Realist position that universals are real, as opposed to the Nominalist position that they are mere names, or figments of the mind. The authority of the Church was bound up with the Realist position, and challenged by the other. Because of this the controversy pre-empted the philosophical discussion of the age. It is reflected again in the preocuppations of the revival of scholasticism in the XIX and XX centuries. But these are not the agenda of Aristotle's metaphysics, or again of our metaphysics. This is not to deny their importance and their value for neo-scholastics, or more generally for the affirmation of the spiritual and intellectual life of mankind, matters of no small importance, but we have additional problems. What problems? What is the most important problem facing us now? It is not theological, not physical or biological or mathematical or engineering. It is a social problem, if we are not all to kill ourselves while addressing the others. But there are so many social problems! Where are we to begin? Which is the most important? Surely it is this: how do we even THINK about social and human problems? What is the logic and the method to be used in creating a valid independent and useful social science? It is not the logic and method of theology or the natural sciences, of Aquinas, Descartes, Bacon and such, with their different aims amd different kinds of problem. What logic and what method do we seek now? What is there in this text that will help us answer such a question? The Metaphysics, along with some other texts, contains a record of efforts to grapple with a basic fact of the human situation, a dichotomy leading to an ambiguity in human affairs, that is reflected in nearly all human activities, a division even deeper than sex. All existence and all existents may be approached in either of two ways. They may be perceived or conceived. Our lives may be considered in either of two ways. To see that clearly, and to grant this dividedness and the dichotomy of the human situation, is the main value to us of the Metaphysics. This has nothing to do with the controversies of the scholastics, but it has much to do with all human situtations. To be sure, only morality will make better behaviour, but this metaphysics will help us understand ourselves and one another. How is it that it has taken two thousand four hundred years to see these ambiguities, especially when Aristotle warns us of them? How is it that Aristotle did not himself see that they provided the answer to many of his problems, and the keys to his Metaphysics? The reason is not far to seek. Those old Greeks were intensely dialectical thinkers (as you can see just in their frequently balanced syntax!). But Aristotle and his contemporaries and followers understood dialectic in just one mode: as an either-or proposition. This is how Plato's Socrates and sophists use it in his dialogues. As late as Proclus this was the classical view, as is evident in the latter's Elements of Theology. But by the twelfth century of our era there were some who were able to see that diverse and adverse opinions could be held side by side, and who undertook to explain these "dicta non solum ab invicem diversa verum etiam invicem adversa." The either-or of ancient dialectic was beginning to yield to a sic et non (Abelard) in which the alternatives were allowed and explained. This became the method of medieval theology. Centuries later Hegel would give this another nudge with his dialectic of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. These are successive enlargements of our conception of dialectic (leaving aside the parody that is dialectical materialism). It is a short step further: what began as either-or can in some areas be and-and: both sides of the dilemma are insisted on. It was this development of dialectic that has made this possible, and has provided the key to the Metaphysics that even Aristotle did not have. It is of course a contradiction of the Law of Non- contradiction. It goes against the way we have been taught to think, and against the way what Aristotle himself thought was the way to think. So be it. EFL, 10/12/96