THETA (IX) METAPHYSICS

                          Introductory

I am going to do something different than I have done before, to
introduce Book Theta. Heretofore I have launched directly into the
text, and let matters develop as they might. I have paid very
little attention to what I wrote some years ago in a previous
Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics (1981), beginning all over
again with the raw evidence, letting (so to speak) the chips fall
where they might. But we have passed the first and most important
climax of the Metaphysics, with the completion of Zeta and Eta, and
our main need is to keep this mass of evidence, that is our text,
in mind in a somewhat orderly fashion. Therefore, as a bit of
review, I am going to depart from my usual practice, and to lift
two sections from that prior commentary and bodily set them down
here. I think they will provide the needed review of what we have
recently covered and a preview of the manner in which Theta fits
nicely into that.

An summary outline of Book Eta looks something like this:

  I. Two classes of ousia                                  i

     A. Those everyone agrees on: physicals
     B. Individual theories

 II. Other considerations

     A. Parts of definition of ousia need to be examined
     B. Universal and genus eliminated

III. The agreed on class: the sensibles

     A. ousia is
        1. matter, hE hulE
        2. form, hE morphE (kai ho logos)
        3. the combination, to ek toutOn
     B. ousia as matter
        1. statement
        2. reasons
     C. ousia as actuality                                ii
        1. what is ousia actually?
        2. difference
        3. analogy of ousia to difference
        4. examples
        5. componential and differential accounts compared
        6. recap: the three constituents of ousia 
           (as in A. above)
     D. ousia as form                                    iii
     E. Analogy of ousia, numbers, definitions. They
        are all indivisible and divisible, like form
     F. Causes of material substances. All four, and      iv
        the most proximate should be sought
     G. Becoming and perishing, change are best            v
        explained by matter and form
     H. What lends unity to a definition? Matter          vi
        and form provide a satisfactory answer.

Even a cursory glance at this outline reveals several
characteristics of Eta that are similar to Zeta, and that indicate
that the two books are mutually confirming. Eta uses the concepts,
to hupokeimenon, to ti En einai, to genos, to katholou, used by
Zeta, and also matter (hulE) and form (morphE). Like Zeta, Eta
drops universal and genus. The examination of sensibles, which
occupies a prominent place in Eta, is the equivalent of the inquiry
into ta gignomena in Zeta, vi - xi. Both inquiries produce the same
hylomorphic doctrine. This seems to confirm our opinion that Zeta,
vi - xi, is not an "interruption" in the sense of being an
extraneous element. 

An examination of the parts of the account of ousia was a
prominent feature of Zeta (chapter x). The same is explicitly
recommended in Eta, i, 1042a18-21, although it is not carried out
so extensively. Also notice in Eta the alternation between what
have been termed the componential and differential accounts. What
is more, in Eta, ii, there is an explicit reference to these two
kinds of account: eoike gar ho men dia tOn diaphorOn logos tou
eidos kai tEs energeias einai, ho d' ek tOn enuparchontOn tEs hulEs
mallon (1043a19-21). 

Finally there seems to be some sort of similarity between Eta, ii,
iii and vi, and Zeta, xii - xvi, in that definition and difference
play a prominent part in both. Yet what are the parts that they
play? This is more difficult to say. Does Eta help to explain Zeta
in these parallel chapters? 

This brings us to the other side of the comparison of the two
books, to the differences between them. Eta has some distinct new
departures. One is the much greater emphasis given to matter and
form, on the whole, than to substrate and essence. But most
noticeable is the introduction of the pair of concepts,
potentiality and actuality, as a new dimension of matter
(substrate) and form (essence). For this is just what this new
pair is. Chapter ii commences: epei d' hE men hOs hupokeimenE kai
hOs hulE ousia homolegeitai, hautE d' estin hE dunamei . . .
(1042b9-10), and ends: hE d' hOs morphE kai energeia . . .
(1043a27-28). Along the way, phaneron dE ek toutOn hoti hE energeia
allE allEs hulEs kai ho logos (1043a12-13). Later passages in
chapters iii (1043a37-b4) and vi (1045a30-33) reconfirm this
equivalence. 

Matter = potentiality. Form = actuality.

This deserves inspection. There is much more to it than these
simple formulas. We have already seen the ambiguity of, say,
matter: hulE aisthEtE and hulE noEtE. We may expect something like
that here. Regardless of its association with matter in
Aristotle's hylomorphic theory, potentiality is also an idea, a
product of the mind, identifiable by or in the mind. The world of
bodies and sensation is the actual world, unless you are a
complete mystic. It may be that the real world consists of both,
actual and potential, if by the "actual" and the "real" we mean
something different. 

These linkages, of potential with the mental (Aristotle had
implied this before in his solution of Zeno's paradoxes, in
Physics, VIII) and of potential with matter (no more a
contradiction than the hulE noEtE) add quite a new dimension to
the doctrine of the Metaphysics. It is true that ousia is found
by Aristotle in the individual (to kath' hekaston), and in form as
the component of the combination that gives it its individuality
and this-ness, but this is true only in actuality. That is not
the whole story. Potentially it is not true at all. Potentially
ousia is either or both matter or/and form, and is not a "this"
or an individual. Furthermore it is also an abstraction, being by
itself (being as truth, and accidental being set aside), on hE on,
or at any rate its equivalent. What is the status of this
potentiality? Has Aristotle introduced it for nothing? If so,
then abstraction is nothing, and the mind is nothing. Then of
course the question becomes, what do we mean by nothing? and we
are back in the grip of the old and original dichotomy. And we
can ask also, do we think that our thoughts do not exist -
somehow? 

If it was not for nothing that the concept of potentiality was
introduced here, and if we seek to know what substance (ousia)
and being (on) are potentially as well as actually, abstract as
well as concrete, then the usual and the scholastic understanding
of Aristotle's Metaphysics is insufficient, and Parmenides and
Plato were not on a wild goose chase in their search for estin
and ontOs on. These were abstractions and potentialities,
whatever names those thinkers had (or didn't have) for them.
Whatever the historical relationship of Zeta and Eta is (and I will
leave that for others to discuss), it seems clear that these two
books are complementary. They cover enough common ground to
confirm one another, while each contributes something of its very
own: Zeta, the unknowability of matter and the transcendence of
form; H, the concepts of potentiality and actuality.

And now a preview of Theta:

Having introduced in Book Eta a new pair of concepts, potentiality
and actuality (these parallel matter and form and assist our
understanding of them), it is appropriate that Aristotle next
addresses himself directly to these two new concepts. That is just
what he does in Book Theta.

It seems clear from the tenor of Theta that Aristotle does not draw
the conclusions which we have drawn above in the discussion of Eta,
about the significance of potentiality. Thus we are forced to
distinguish between (1) what appear to us to be the compelling
implications of Aristotle's text (potentiality, recognized by the
mind, thus a mental existent, is deserving of inquiry in its own
right), and (2) his explicit doctrine (something more limited).  


The first part of Theta, chapters i and ii, is largely devoted to
the common meaning of dunamis, what we usually call "power," the
physical force that makes things move. This is followed in
chapters iii - v by a discussion of a question, said to have been
raised by the Megarians: does power only exist when it is acting
(or active)? This may easily be transformed into the questions:
is there any other kind of "power" (dunamis)? Is there a "power"
that exists, let us say, in a quiescent state? At first this
seems like a contradiction in terms, especially if you forget or
put out of your mind such modern, sophisticated terms as
"potential energy," but it is just the purpose of this chapter to
suggest that there is such a novel sort of power. The Megarian
discussion is a foil for introducing this. 

For this new sort we usually use the word, "potentiality," to
distinguish it from "power." Aristotle often distinguishes it by
the use of the dative, dunamei, as opposed to dunamis. Likewise
we often make a parallel distinction between "activity" (and
perhaps "action") and "actuality," whereas Aristotle himself in
this instance uses his terms more indistinctly (Bonitz, Index, p.
251). But does he see that here the dichotomies are reproducing
themselves in the same way that they did in form and matter?

Aristotle directly addresses the nature of this new potentiality
in chapter vi. And what happens? He does not attempt to define
it. In fact he emphatically states that not everything needs to
be defined. Examples will do. And he gives them, adequately. In
short it looks as though we have some sort of an assumption here.
The two chapters, vi and vii, are given over to additional
discussion: that potentiality and actuality are correlatives,
kinds of potentiality (haplOs, gnOsei), potentiality and matter,
etc. 

Chapter viii is the second climax of the book. Chapter viii
declares the priority of actuality, and gives the reasons
therefore. It is the explicit basis of Aristotle's belief in the
priority of form and the individual as ousia. If actuality is
prior to potentiality, then it seems to follow that ousia in its
actual mode is prior to ousia in its potential mode. 

Aristotle's arguments for the priority of actuality, in chapter
viii, are addressed to priority (1) logOi, (2) chronOi, and (3)
ousiai, that is logically, temporally and substantially. The
arguments for the priority in substance, which of course are of
the most interest to us here, are four or five: (a) a mere
statement that the posterior in becoming are prior in form and
substance; (b) the argument based on purpose (activity is the
purpose of substance); (c) the argument from eternals (these must
be actualities, since potentialities are potentialities to be or
not to be, 1050b6-1051a3); (d) the argument from opposites in
value in chapter ix (similar to the argument from eternals, but
from value opposites instead of existential opposites); (e) the
argument that geometry is an activity. This last is not quite so
sure (1051a20-33; see Ross' notes, vol. II, 268-73). 

Whatever one thinks of these arguments - and they are certainly
open to objections - they express nevertheless clearly
Aristotle's position. In chapters viii and ix there is no doubt
how he answers the question raised (implicitly) in Book Eta. Given
the priority of actuality, it must be the actual mode of ousia
that he considers primary, and on the basis of this preference
his ontology is rightly seen as an ontology of form and the
individual. On this basis also the Scholastic interpretation of
the Aristotlelian text is quite fair and correct. But is it the
whole story?          

                A summary outline of Book Theta:

Introduction of actuality and potentiality,            chapter i
     the common meaning of "power"

Non-rational and rational potencies                           ii

Does power exist only when it is acting?                   iii-v

     the Megarian doctrine
     refutation
     
Potentiality (the other meaning of dunamis)               vi-vii

The priority of actuality                                viii-ix

Being as truth and falsity (extraneous to the rest             x
     of Theta, but completing the fourfold list of
     kinds of pure being in E,ii)


With this in mind let us take up the first two chapters of Book
Theta next week.

EFL, 11/9/96



                     THETA (IX) METAPHYSICS 

                   Potentiality and Actuality

             Chapter i - The common meaning of power

1. [introductory] having dealt with primary being, ousia, we will 
   take up potentiality and actuality next, 1045b27-b35:

2. potency as power in respect to motion, kata kinEsin, the 
   proper but not the most useful meaning of the term, which we
   will clarify below (chapter vi, ff.) 1045b35-1046a4 [a word is
   in order here about the Greek words, kinein, kinEsis. A look at
   Liddell & Scott will show you that the words mean move, motion,
   movement, and the like. The only references given there to     
   Aristotle's use of them as change are to his Politics. But     
   reading here and especially in the early books of the Physics it

   is easy to see that his notion of motion includes what we call 
   change. Several times he links kinein and metaballein (change), 
   using them together, and his lists of kinds of motion include  
   qualitative motion, which we would think of as change. This    
   inclusion of change in the idea of motion is generally         
   recognized]

   a. we will overlook equivocals related to this meaning. They are
      all related to this one primary meaning, the principle of
      change in(to) something else, pros prOtEn mian legontai, hE
      estin archE metabolEs en allOi E hEi allO, a4-a11 
   b. because there is a power to be changed [literally, to suffer
      change, tou pathein]. There is in all these definitions the
      primary meaning of power, a11-a16 
   c. other kinds of potencies, e.g., to do something well, a16-a19
   d. a power to effect and a power to be effected, poiein kai
      paschein, in the same or different things,a19-a29
   e. an impotency is a privation of a potency, a29-a31
   f. aside on privation, a31-a35

                           Chapter ii

                Rational and non-rational powers

3. non-rational and rational powers, hai men alogoi hai de meta
   logou, a36-1046b4

   a. their characters: rational may produce opposite effects; non-
      rational, only one single effect, b4-b7
   b. explanation of this difference, b7-b24
   c. to be able to do something well means one can do it, but not
      vice versa, b24-b28

[What is important in these two chapters? The suggestion near the
beginning that there are two main meanings of dunamis and energeia,
(1) the obvious physical one, and (2) another, "most useful," which
will be explored later, in chapters vi and after. The rest is the
typical expatiation of an inquiring mind, indeed of one of the most
inquiring minds of all time, that is not content to rest without
going into more details. Fine, but don't let that take your
attention away from the main point: there are two meanings for
these terms.]

EFL, 11/16/96

                     THETA (IX) METAPHYSICS

                           chapter iii

                      The Megarian doctrine

4. some, such as the Megarians, say that only when [something] is
   actual it has power, hotan energE monon dunasthai [clearly this
   still refers to the first meaning of power]. Examples. It is not
   hard to see that the result is absurd, 1046b29-b33

   a. he is not a builder who is not [actually] building, but 
      [Aristotle's rebuttal] he still has the power, or he would
      utterly lose it between jobs [we might say in modern English
      he has the potential, but this is still related to the  first
      meaning, power, as potential energy is] b33-1047a4
   b. the same applies to apsucha, non-rational things: [they would
      say that] there is no sensation of something you don't feel
      [this sounds like Berkeley's tree; but in any case Aristotle
      is clearly skeptical of the proposition] a4-a10
   c. such views do away with change and coming into existence,
      houtoi hoi logoi exairountai kai kinEsin kai genesin, a10-a17
   d. if this is not so [i.e. if there IS change, etc.] clearly 
      power and actuality are different, but they [the Megarians,
      et al.] try to make them the same, so something can be and
      not be, etc., a17-a24
   e. but that is powerful whose actuality will not be impossible,
      a24-a29
   f. the word, energeia, which is associated with entelechy, is
      derived chiefly from motions [or changes], because it seems
      chiefly to be motion, so they [the Megarians] do not allow
      change to non-existents. [They allow] other things, yes, but
      not movement or change, because things that are not actual
      would become actual. Some non-existents exist potentially,
      but do not exist because not actually, allas de tinas
      katEgorias, hoion dianoEta kai epithumEta einai ta mE onta,
      kinoumena de ou, touto de hoti ouk onta energeiai esontai
      energeia. tOn gar mE ontOn enia dunamei estin, ouk esti de,
      hoti ouk entelecheiai estin, a30-1047b2

                           Chapter iv

           Continued rebuttal of the Megarian doctrine

5. [further reflections]

   a. elimination of the (Megarian) equivocation: which says that
      something is possible but will not be [a substitute for
      impossibility], phaneron oti ouk endechetai alEthes einai to
      eipein hoti dunaton men todi, ouk estai de, hOste ta adunata
      einai tautEi diapheugein, b3-b12
   b. the false and the impossible are not the same, ou gar dE esti
      tauto to pseudos kai to adunaton, b12-b14
   c. exemplary syllogisms [I render these into schemata that sound
      somewhat "proto-Stoic"], b14-b30

      (1) IF: if A is, then B must be; THEN if A can be, B must be
          able to be [two nested hypotheses]; BECAUSE, if not [the
          above], not being can be, b14-b17
      (2) let A be possible. If A is posited, it is not impossible,
          and B must be [the last assumed in (1)]. But let it be
          impossible. If B cannot be, and A must be, if the first
          is impossible, so is the second, b17-b22
      (3) if A is possible, then B is possible, if B must be if A
          is [(1) above]. If A and B are so [related] that B is not
          possible thus, then they are not related as supposed,
          b22-b26
      (4) And if A being possible, B must be possible [(1) above
          again], if A must be, B must be. Because it must be
          possible for B to be, if A is possible, if A is it is
          possible. That must be so, b26-b30

                            Chapter v

            More on rational and non-rational powers

6. rational (tOn de ethei, tOn de mathEsi . . . kai logOi) and 
   irrational (mE toiautas kai tas epi tou paschein) distinguished
   [picking up where chapter ii left off], b31-b35

7. given this division, b35-1048a5, the non-rational powers are
   automatic (necessary, anagkE); the rational, not,a5-a8

8. Because the non-rational powers work one on one, mia henos
   poiEtikE. The rational could choose opposites, although [in
   fact] they cannot. They need some guide. I mean desire or
   choice, a8-a11

9. whichever [of the opposites] is desired, this it [the rational
   power] effects, a11-a24


(Re Daniel Hoffman's msg of Nov 19: 

(A fair question, this deserves a deliberate answer, but you must
allow me to deliberate. I just returned from a four day trip, and
found this in my "mailbox." You know the curent popular saying,
"I'll get back to you as soon as I can." Meanwhile, thank you, Dan,
for speaking up. - Ed L.)

EFL, 11/23/96


                     THETA (IX) METAPHYSICS

               Chapter vi, first half, 1048a25-b17

                 Potentiality (the new meaning)

[This chapter is so important, that I am going to walk through at
least the first half of it line by line, and give the Greek text
along with a translation]:

Since we have talked about power in relation to motion (change),
we shall define what activity is, epei de peri tEs kata kinEsin
legomenEs dunameOs eirEtai, peri energeias diorisOmen ti te estin
hE energeia kai poion ti, 1048a25-a27 [it sounds as though he is
going to discuss the activity correlative to power in the first
sense here, but that will not be the case at all. It is the new
meaning, potentiality, that will be the end of all this]

Because at the same time it will be clear to those who distinguish
[them] that not only do we call potent what can move (change)
something else, or be moved, either simply or in some way, but [we
use the term] differently, so let us inquirers go through these
[meanings] in detail, a27-a30, kai gar to dunaton hama dElon estai
diairousin, hoti ou monon touto legomen dunaton ho pephuke kinein
allo E kineisthai hup' allou E haplOs E tropon tina, ALLA KAI
HETEROS [emphasis mine, EFL], dio zEtountes kai peri toutOn
diElthomen

There is an actuality of another kind that we call potential, esti
dE energeia to huparchein to pragma mE houtOs hOsper legomen
dunamei, a30-a32 

We call potential [something] like the Hermes in the [block of]
wood [a sculpture before it is sculpted out of the material] and
the half that is in the whole, and a knowledgeable person who does
not yet know although he can know actually, legOmen de dunamei
hoion en tOi xulOi HermEn kai en tEi holEi tEn hEmiseian, hoti
aphairetheiE an, kai epistEmona kai ton mE theOrounta, an dunatos
Ei theOrEsai, to de energeiai, a32-a35 [these are very good and
explicit examples.]

What we mean is clear from these examples, and it is not necessary 
to find a definition of everything, but to see the equivalent, like
building in relation to the skill of building, and being awake
relative to sleeping, and seeing, to having the eyes shut, and what
is separate from  matter in relation to matter [an especially
significant relation of the potential with the mental], and the
finished to the unfinished, dElon d'epi tOn kath' hekasta tEi
epagOgE [he means the examples he has just given] ho boulometha
legein, kai ou dei pantos horon zEtein alla kai to analogon
sunoran, hoti hOs to oikodomoun pros to oikodomonikon, kai to
egrEgoros pros to katheudon, kai to horOn pros to muon men opsin de
echon, kai to apokekrimenon ek tEs hulEs pros tEn hUlEn, kai to
apeirgasmenon pros to anergaston, a35-b4 

Of this distinction let the actuality be one part, the potentiality
the other, tautEs de tEs diaphoras thaterOi moriOi estO hE energeia
aphOrismenE thaterOi de to dunaton, b4-b6

Everything is not called actual alike but as is proper to it, as
this to this, that to that, some like power to change (move),
others like ousia to some matter, legetai de energeiai ou panta
homoiOs all' E tOi analogon, hOs touto en toutOi E pros touto, tod'
en tOide E pros tode, ta men gar hOs kinEsis pros dunamin ta d' hOs
ousia pros tina hulEn, b6-b9

The infinite (endless) and the empty, and others like them, are 
called potential and actual differently from many things, as from
seeing and moving and being seen [or generally, it seems to me,
verbs with active and passive moods], allOs de kai to apeiron kai
to kenon, kai hosa toiauta, legetai dunamei kai energeiai H pollois
tOn ontOn, hoion tOi horOnti kai badizonti kai horOmenOi, b9-b12

Because these [latter] can be truly said, the seen that it is seen
and that it can be seen. The infinite is not potential in this
[same] way, as if it will actually be something separate, but only
in knowledge, tauta men gar endechetai kai haplOs alEtheuesthai
pote (to men gar horOmenon hoti horatai, to de hoti horasthai
dunaton), to d'apeiron ouch houtO dunamei estin hOs energeiai
esomenon chOriston, alla gnOsei, b12-b15

[Don't ask me why Aristotle takes off on the Infinite here, unless
simply because it is a topic that was often on his mind, and that
attracted the attention of those old Greek thinkers often (think of
Anaximenes). And there is a very real distinction here: the
infinite is not actual in the sense that anyone can ever reach it
or even point to it (only toward it). One can only imagine or
conceive it, and even that is difficult. If it is a potentiality
rather than something actual, it is not a potentiality that can
ever be actualized. Other potentialities, although (as will be
pointed out below) they cannot QUA potentialities be anything but
conceptions, and thus in such a sense are in the mind (gnOsei), can
often be actualized. The sculptor CAN bring Hermes out of the block
of wood or of marble. The potential housebuilder CAN get to work,
etc. But the infinite cannot be reached (although ironically it can
be exceeded - according to Georg Cantor - and yet there are those
who will not accept that). It never be actualized. So it is gnOsei
twice over.]

That such an activity is a potentiality, explains why the division
does not cease, not that it can be separated [as something in its
own right], to gar mE hupoleipein tEn diairesin apodidOsi to einai
dunamei tautEn tEn energeian, to de chOrizesthai ou, b15-b17 [these
lines, b9-b17, plainly refer to Zeno's puzzles in Physics, VIII,
viii, and express Aristotle's answer to them. They also confirm my
explanation of Aristotle's position in the section on Zeno in
"Berkeley's Tree": the potentiality of such things is in the mind,
ouch houtO dunamei estin hOs energeiai esomenon chOriston, alla
gnOsei]

[As a matter of fact all potentiality, or dunamis in this second or
existential not motive meaning, is in the mind, an invention of the
mind, a concept, an idea, an abstraction, gnOsei. You can't see or
touch the potential qua potential, but only the actual. If I am
potentially a house-builder, you can touch me, but not the
potentiality. The potential house-builder, in this case me, is
visible and touchable, but not the potentiality. This you can only
imagine or conceive. Put another way, that in which the potentialty
resides or inheres is actual, but not the potentiality itself.
Further, the potentiality may or may not become actualized; the
actuality IS.

[Aristotle not only equates potentiality and mind, but potentiality
and matter, i.e. matter as a concept (inthe mind) that only becomes
actualized when combined with form (another concept) to produce the
actual sunolon. He has repeatedly made that point. He does not
explicitly emphasize this distinction beyond this almost casual
mention of gnOsei. Instead he goes on to the distinction of
actuality and motion.]

                    Second half, 1048b18-b36

                     Motion v. actualization

[If you take the time to consult Jaeger's apparatus criticus (p.
184) and Ross' apparatus and notes (vol. II, ad loc. and p. 253),
you will see that this is an exceedingly corrupt and difficult
passage. Jaeger: "The language is quite difficult and obscure and
corrupt, even though this addition seems to have originated from
Aristotle himself." Ross: "It is omitted by [three of the earliest
and one later mss.] and Bessarion. But it contains sound
Aristotelian doctrine and terminology, and is quite appropriate to
the context . . . " If Jeager and Ross find it corrupt and such,
and Hermann Bonitz had to resort to so much emendation, what are we
to make of it? Well, let's give it a try:

[The first lines read something like this:] Since no limited
actions are ends, but means to an end, like reducing [dieting],
learning, living well, walking, building [some later examples added
there] (when one is reducing, one changes, but this is not the
purpose of the change) those are not complete actions [or goals],
but the goal of the action is in them [i.e. achieved by them],
1049b18-b23 [an inelegant but close approximation of the text]

Thus one sees and has seen, feels and has felt, thinks and has

thought [incomplete actions], but not learns and has learned or
gets well and has gotten well, lives well and has lived well, lives
prosperously and has lived prosperously [complete actions].
Otherwise it would be necessary at some point to stop [doing those
things], but this is not [the way it is]; one lives and has lived,
b23-b27

Some of these must be called motions (changes, kinEseis); some,
actualities. Because all motions are incomplete: reducing, and
learning, walking, building, these are motions and incomplete [but
here must be a corruption, because this is a gross error: these are
examples of completeable actions. You finally thin down, you do
learn, you do get where you are going, and the house gets built
finally. And the next sentence confirms this], b28-b30

One doesn't walk and have been walking, build and have been
building, be becoming and have become, be moving and have been
moving, but otherwise [you either the one or the other; the action
is completed at some point]. But you have seen and do [still] see,
do think and have thought [these are the incomplete actions. And
the next sentence repeats the mis-labelling] These [seeing,
thinking] are activities; those [reducing, walking, building, etc.]
are motions [thus the error is repeated; that is not the case, but
just the opposite: activities like reducing, walking, etc. come to
an end in an actuality. They are then energeiai, completed
activities. Seeing and thinking continue as long as we live], b30-
b35

The last line, b35-b36, is a brief closure.

[This is all rather confusing, but perhaps it will help to supply
a chart, such as this:


                    activities, praxeis (b18)

                    /                        \

               limited                       unlimited
               (means)                  (ends in themselves)
               complete                    incomplete

               reducing                      seeing
               learning                      feeling
               walking                       thinking
               getting well
               building
               living well
               living prosperously

               energeiai                     kinEseis
               actions                       motions


[Actions have a specific purpose. They are a means to an end, peri
to telos (b19). You build a house, and when you're done, it's
built, and you stop. But seeing, thinking, feeling (even better:
breathing!) go on indefinitely. You don't stop. Aristotle calls
these motions, to distinguish them from the others. So actions
bring something new into being, actualizing potentialities. Motions
like the above just go on all the time. This is the distinction
Aristotle is seeking here.]


               SIDEBAR ON ARISTOTLE AND ERNST MAYR

But there is a sense, you might object, in which seeing,
perceiving, breathing, and such activities DO have a purpose. They
keep us alive and alert. True, but this is not what Aristotle means
here. However let us accept your objection for a moment. It will
help us clarify some aspects of both Aristotle and current thinking
about purpose. Ernst Mayr, the Harvard zoologist, finds a sense in
which even evolution has a "seeming purpose." So might Aristotle.
Could he just forget his eternal circles, he could have been, like
Mayr, a good Darwinian. But this is not purpose as a house-builder
or a learner or a dieter or a walker, etc. has a purpose. Aristotle
makes this distinction here. One might take this a bit further,
with profit for our understanding of questions of purpose. If one
accepts your objection that motions (to use Aristotle's term) like
seeing, feeling, thinking, and breathing do in a sense have a
purpose, and carries that a bit further to include, say, autonomic
physiological functions, and after that reflex actions, one begins
to see (granting your presumed objection above, I say) that there
is purpose and purpose. There are two kinds of purpose (dichOs
legetai!). One kind may be included in the process of natural
selection, while the other kind absolutely cannot. This is may
explain Mayr's "seeming purpose," and what I mean by saying that
Aristotle could have been a good Darwinian, if he just could have
gotten beyond his circles. The criterion of course is
consciousness. "Seeming purpose" and conscious purpose are two
different things. 

EFL, 11/30/96


                     THETA (IX) METAPHYSICS

         Chapter vii, When is something a potentiality?

1. When is a particular thing a potentiality, when not? e.g., can
   earth [one of the traditional four elements] become a man? or
   not, but only when a seed, and even then not always? Like:
   everything cannot be cured by a medicine, or by chance, but it
   has to be something that has the potentiality to be cured,
   1048b37-1049a5

2. [they are potentialities:] that are the product of our thought 
   (intention), when we intend them, and nothing external stands in
   the way, or in the case of a convalescent, nothing internal
   [meaning of course nothing physically internal probably, unless 
   Aristotle was into psycho-somatic medicine - but that may be
   cutting the issues pretty fine]. Example of a house. And
   similarly with other things, whose principle of genesis is
   external to them, a5-a12

3. things that have it within themselves, when nothing external 
   prevents it, such as the seed (which must fall and change) in no
   way [otherwise], a13-a18

4. when we call something ekeininon, "of such a   kind," this is
   its potential constituent, like when we call a box not wood but
   wooden, and wood not earth but earthen [i.e. made of the element
   earth, for Aristotle the appropriate one of the four elements].
   The "such a kind" would be the proximate. The box is not
   earthen, but wooden, a18-a24

5. if something is what can't be called of such a kind, it is prime
   matter, a24-a27

6. in such a manner a subject differs from a substrate, in being a
   "this" [ekeinos] or not [ekeininos], as man and flesh and soul
   are the subject of properties like musical or white (he is
   called musical, not music, etc.). The first [man, flesh, soul,
   etc.] are thus [tode ti, ekeinos, subjects]. Those that are not,
   are form and substrate tode ti [ekeininos], ultimate matter and
   material form [awkward as this sounds, there is a real
   distinction here, as Ross notes, vol. II, bottom of p. 256 and
   top of p. 257], toutO gar diapherei to kath' hou kai to
   hupokeimenon, tOi einai tode ti E mE einai, hoion tois pathesi
   to hupokeimenon anthrOpos kai sOma kai psuchE, pathos de to
   mousikon kai leukon (legetai de tEs mousikEs eggenomenEs ekeino
   ou mousikE alla mousikon, kai ou leukotEs ho anthrOpos alla
   leukon, oude badisis E kinEsis alla badizon E kinoumenon, hOs to
   ekeininon) -    hosa men oun houtO, to eschaton ousia, hOsa de
   mE houtOs all eidos ti kai tode ti to katEgoroumenon, to
   eschaton hulE kai ousia hulikE, a27-a36. 

   [it seems to me that that section of the text is more clearly
   understood, if we highlight its strong dialectical form, thus: 

               this                     of such a kind
              ekeinos                      ekeininos

           to kath'  hou                to hupokeimenon

           einai tode ti               mE einai [tode ti]
                                      [but rather toiosde]

      to mousikon kai leukon      anthrOpos [etc.] tois pathesi
          [tOi anthrOpOi]

         to eschaton ousia      to eschaton hule kai ousia hulikE

   [Ross in his note, cited above, detects some such dialectic, but
   I have carried it further here. Recall that we did the same sort
   of dialectical analysis of a passage last week. No surprise. It
   is entirely in keeping with the Greek habit of mind. Perhaps we
   are learning a modus operandi here]

   [When you see that the left-hand column represents actualities,
   and the right-hand, potentialities, you see how this chapter
   hangs together and fits in with the rest of Theta]

7. And it is proper to speak of the "such a kind of thing," 
   ekeininos, in connection with matter and qualities. Both are
   unlimited, kai orthOs dE sumbainei to  ekeininon legesthai kata
   tEn hulEn kai ta pathE, amphO gar aorista, a36-b2

8. where [something] is to be called potential, and where not, has
   been stated, b2-b3

   [Twice in these past two weeks, not to mention other occasions,
   we have engaged in a gloss ad litteram of the text, like those
   old medieval scholars whom we often look down upon as benighted
   clerics in search of angels on the head of a pin. Perhaps it may
   serve to remind us that their method was not out of place in
   certain kinds of investigation. The Baconian agenda fits well
   the purposes of natural science, but when one is investigating
   matters human, either in their individual or social context, it
   is man's record that deserves attention. This often means texts,
   and we are in much the same position as those old scholars, who
   studied texts for a different reason but still knew how to study
   texts.] 

EFL, 12/7/96


                     THETA (IX) METAPHYSICS

             Chapter viii, The priority of actuality

1. [preamble] 

   a. clearly actuality is prior to potentiality, 1049b4-b5       
   b. I mean not just power as defined as the beginning of motion 
      [the first definition of chap. i] but generally as the archE
      of all change or rest. Nature comes into being by a power
      within itself, a moving principle not external, b5-b10
   c. it is prior in definition, logOi, in being, ousiai, and is
      and is not prior in time, chronOI, b10-b12

2. priority in definition, logOi: 

   the definition of power requires the definition of actuality 
   [there is a possibility of ambiguity here. Ross, in his note,
   top of p. 260, thinks dunaton means power in its first sense
   rather than potentiality in its second, or derived, sense.
   Maybe. But the possibility of ambiguity persists here, and I
   prefer to look at the examples, to see what Aristotle means: in
   these it is potentiality that is defined by the act, legO
   oikodomikon to dunamenon oikodomein, etc., and that seems to me
   to be what line 13 says, tOi gar endechesthai, etc.], b12-b17

3. priority in time, chronOi:

   a. the same in form that actuates [a thing] is prior, although
      different in number. Examples, b17-b29
   b. the sophistical puzzle [cf. Plato, Euthydemus, 276D and Meno,
      80E, etc.], and Aristotle's reply. Recap, b29-1050a3

4. priority in ousia, ousiai

   a. what is later in becoming [development] is prior in form and
      being. Actuality and activity are the end [of ousia].
      Examples, a4-a14
   b. matter, hulE, is potential. It aims for form, and likewise
      with other things whose end is movement [change]. The work is
      the aim, and it is activity, to gar ergon telos, hE de
      energeia to ergon. The words, ergon > energeia > entelecheia,
      are related, a15-a23
   c. use v. tangibles as ends of activities, tOn men eschaton hE
      kinEsis . . . eniOn de gignetai ti [recall the bit on motions
      v. actions in chapter vi]. Their ends compared. In both
      cases, actuality = hE ousia kai to eidos. Proteron tEi ousiai
      energeia dunameOs, a23-b6

5. a stronger argument:

   a. eternals, aidia, are prior to perishables, and no eternal is
      a potentiality, because then it could not be, actually, That
      is so absolutely, haplOs, but nothing prevents their being
      potentially kata ti, in respect to something (like where they
      are going, etc.), b6-b22
   b. examples: heaven and the heavenly bodies, sun, stars, b22-b28
   c. elements imitate them; other potentialities do not, b28-b34
   d. [against Ideas] if there are Ideas, as some say, the knowing
      one will be more something than absolute knowledge; the
      moving, than motion. These are more actual; the others are
      their potentialities, b34-1051a2
   e. [recap] that actuality is prior to potentiality and every 
      beginning of motion, is clear, a2-a3

[Surely you and I are glad we are actually here, and there is no
question that Aristotle too prefers actuality. But is this the
whole story? Let us get right down to earth here. When it came to
making love, I always preferred the actuality, but there is a time
and place for everything, and human life is not a one track affair.
That is the difference between ourselves and animals. There is even
a time for anticipation and recollection, and these are modes of
potentiality.

[The history of Greek philosophy is the discovery of potentiality,
in the form of abstraction, the "discovery of the mind."The Greeks
had a bellyful of actuality, as any reader of the poets and the
historians and the dramatists can see. But with Parmenides and
Plato they transcended that. Aristotle, in spite of himself here,
does so too.

[We are dealing with two primary principles here. They are clear
from our experience. The priority of actuality follows from a
priority of what is here now. Potentiality is not here now. Except
in our thoughts, in our minds. Do you wish to dismiss these? I do
not.]

EFL, 12/14/96


[All of the study sessions of the slow-reading lists for Plato's
Parmenides and for Aristotle's Metaphysics, the path we have trod
together for the past two or more years (!), have been, or in the
case of the Metaphysics are being posted on the World Wide Web at
the following address: 

                      http://www.morec.com

thanks to the interest and cooperation of Chris Morrissey. Also
Francisco Chorao has called attention to our Aristotle-Metaphysics
list, along with other interesting matters about Aristotle, at

   http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Acropolis/1099/aristotle.html

That address is case sensitive as shown: capital "A"-s for Athens
and Acropolis]


           THETA, (IX) METAPHYSICS, chapters ix and x

          Chapter ix, Superiority of actuality in value

1. the actuality is better and more valued than the potentiality  
   for the good, beltiOn kai timiOtera tEs spoudaiOs dunameOs hE  
   energeia. What is potential can become contrary things.        
   Examples, 1051a4-a15

2. the actuality must be worse than a potentiality for the bad, 
   anagkE de kai epi tOn kakOn to telos kai tEn energeian einai
   cheiron tEs dunameOs, because potentiality can [also] go either
   of two opposite ways [the potentially bad can turn out good].
   But it is clear that there is no bad outside of things, because
   [although] in nature the [actual] bad comes behind [is worse
   than] the potential [bad], yet there is no bad or fault or
   corruption in the beginning or in eternal things (destruction is
   bad), dElon ara hoti ouk esti to kakon para ta pragmata,
   husteron gar tEi phusei to kakon tEs dunameOs. ouk ara oud' en
   tois ex archEs kai tois aidiois outhen estin oute kakon oute
   hamartEma oute diephtharmenon, 15-a21 [this is an attempt to
   repair the fault in his argument. A good actuality is better
   than a potentiality to be either good or bad, but the latter is
   better than a bad actuality. The potentiality to be healthy is
   better than actual sickness. Yet if there is no bad in the
   beginning or in eternals, does that nullify the possibility of
   potentiality thereafter? Are we concerned with eternals?
   Aristotle was, but that is a belief on his part. The
   metaphysician is giving way to the theologian.]

   [Let me recapitulate the above section, using the conventional
   mathematical symbols for greater and less, here assigned to
   value:

          Things (tEi phusei)

               potential good  <  actual good
               potential bad   >  actual bad

          Eternals

               there is no absolute potentiality, only actuality

   [The implication being: whereas it is a "standoff" among 
   things, eternals are best of all, and there there is only
   actuality]

3. [the rest of this chapter is a misplaced fragment, an argument 
   for the priority of actuality in time, chronOi, using examples
   from geometry, an argument that belongs with the account in
   chapter viii, 1049b17-b29.]  The potential character of
   geometrical figures is shown by actual constructions [See Ross'
   long notes on this, vol. II, 268-273. Tredennick is also very
   clear on this, and briefer], a21-a33


                    Chapter x, Being as truth

1. [This chapter opens with a recall of the fourfold division of 
   being (on) in the summary list at the beginning of Book E (VI),
   chapter ii, 1026a33-b2:

                    accidental being
                    being as truth
                    being of the categories (especially ousia)
                    being as potentiality and actuality

   but he does not mention accidental being here, which he
   dismissed there. He also dismissed at that time being as truth
   (1027b33-b34), but he takes it up again here. Why?], 1051a34-b2

2. [truth in combinations]

   a. Truth is the connection of things that belong together, and
      the separation of things that do not. Falsehood is the
      opposite, the connection of things that belong apart, and the
      separation of things that belong together. When do we speak
      truly or falsely? You are not white because we say truly that
      you are white, but we say truly you are white because you are
      [the truth or falsity is in our speech and  thought, not in
      the object], b2-b9
   b. Since some things are always joined and cannot be separated,
      while others can be both (and being is a connection and a
      unity, but not-being, a disconnection and a plurality), truth
      and falsity have to do with things that can be both, b9-b17

3. [truth in uncombined things]

   a. But what is being and not being, truth and falsity for things
      that are not combined? Truth is existence; falsity, non-
      existence, b17-b23
   b. apprehension and assertion are true (they are not affirmation
      and denial); and non-apprehension is ignorance. There is no 
      being deceived about what something is, among uncombineds,
      except by accident. Everything is actual, not potential,
      because it comes to be and passes away. As matters stand,
      being itself does not come into being or pass away. It comes
      out of something. - Things that are, are something and are
      actualities. There is no being deceived about that. You
      perceive it or you don't. All you inquire about is what it
      is, whether it is such-and-such or not), b23-b33
   c. being as truth and not being as falsity: [we saw above that]
      truth is unity of combinations; falsity, if not combined.
      [Now we see:] a single being is thus; if not thus, it does
      not exist. Truth is [just] to perceive it. There is no
      falsity or deceit [Notice the uncertain ms. tradition and the
      disagreement between Jaeger and Ross about b34. The grammar
      is difficult], b33-1052a4
   d. [unchangeables:] there is no being deceived by "when" [now
      this, now that] among unchangeables. Mathematics provides
      examples. Truth and falsity are permanent, a4-a11

[Perhaps we can now answer the question, why does he take up being
as truth here, although he dismissed it when he first considered it
in E, ii? The truth of uncombined things is their actuality. Either
he felt he was now provided with the conceptual tool he needed or
he was simply reminded of this, by his inquiry into potentiality
and actuality.

[Aristotle's so-called hylemorphic theory, his theory of matter and
form, was a great improvement on Plato's "theory of Ideas," yet it
was not entirely original. It is a modification of Platonism. But
his theory of potentiality and actuality is original with him. It
is something wholly new. 

[The distinction of power and potentiality is parallel to the
distinction of doing and being. In their ordinary senses as we
usually use them, power is usually the power to DO something, such
as resides in water behind a dam, in steam, or in electrical
current, whether potential or kinetic, as we say. Aristotle's
potentiality is the capability to BE something, a boy to be a man,
a man to be a builder, and so forth. This is something quite new on
the scene in the mid- or late fourth century B.C. It is the
important contribution of Book Theta (IX). Aristotle brought it up
also in Physics, II, iii, 195b (reproduced in Delta, ii).

[Potentiality and actuality are also respectively related to mind
and body, as we have commented already. Potentiality deals with
what can be, with the future. Its opposite is memory, also a mental
function. Memory deals with the past, "la recherche du temps
perdu," with what no longer actually is, but has been. It is an
equally powerful mental function, as Marcel Proust demonstrated. It
gives meaning to human life. Although it far exceeds the scope of
our text, and of our study, to concern ourselves with this here, it
does indicate the vistas that Aristotle opened up.

EFL, 12/21/96