LAMBDA (XII) METAPHYSICS [Lambda Metaphysics is clearly divided into two parts. The first part continues more or less the review of Epsilon through Theta Metaphysics, taking up where it left off near the beginning of the ninth chapter of Kappa to launch instead into a discussion of motion. Thus the beginning of Lambda treats of ousia, of its kinds (sensible and immovable), of sensible ousia at some length in chapters ii and iii, then of matter, form, potency and act in iv and v, and of immovable and separate ousia in chapter vi. These are themes you will recall in Books Zeta, Eta and Theta, Aristotle's metaphysics of being. But early in chapter vi the accent is back on motion again, in a shift of emphasis similar to that which took place in Book Kappa. The immovable separate ousia he is searching for has a different kind of immobility and separateness than the ousia of the early Books, insofar as it is derived from a study of motion. Chapters vi through x, then, have a different tone, and a different end. These are the so-called theology, so-called because of remarks he makes here and elsewhere, but they are really a metaphysics of motion. A prime mover in those early days seemed to have a divine character. After all in a time when all sorts of natural objects were attributed divinity, sun, planets, even trees, why should it surprise us that such an exalted entity as a prime mover should be held in special awe. But its real distinction is that this is a metaphysics of moving things, a physical metaphysics, and so Lambda, like Kappa, is divided in two, between a true and a physical metaphysics [Summary overview of Lambda: Chapter i ousia ii sensible ousia iii matter and form iv-v causes, principles, elements: are they same or not? vi motionless ousia, ousia akinEtos vii the first heaven, and the Unmoved Mover viii is the Unmoved Mover one or many? ix the Divine Mind x other explanations fail Chapter i, Ousia 1. ousia is the object of our search, not the other categories. Qualities and quantities exist, to be sure, but not separately from other things, legOmen goun einai kai tauta . . . eti ouden tOn allOn chOriston, 1069a18-a24 2. witness the ancients and the Academy, hoi archaioi, hoi nun, a25-a30 3. three kinds of ousia: 1. sensible, which is two a. eternal, and b. perishable, and 2. motionless and separate, akinEtos, kai . . . chOristEn. Some [Plato] divided this into two [Ideas and mathematicals]; some [Speusippus] combined these into one phusis; some [Xenocrates] acknowledged only the mathematicals, a30-b2 4. [the last four and a half lines of this chapter belong topically with the next, and will be treated so here] Chapter ii Sensible ousia, three principles [Aristotle calls these causes and principles, aitia kai archai, but the scheme is different from the four causes we are accustomed to associate with him. Do not confuse them. We will see how they fit below] 1. sensible ousia is changeable, between contraries or their intermediates, but there must be some third thing underlying the contraries [or intermediates], something enduring, matter, estin ara ti triton para ta enantia, hE hulE. All four kinds of change, substantial, qualitative, quantitative, of place, are into contraries [or intermediates]; there must be matter that can potentially be both, anagkE dE metaballein tEn hulEn dunamenEn amphO, 1069b3-b15 2. change/motion is from potential to actual, metaballei pan ek tou dunamei ontos eis to energeiai on, b15-b20 3. this [substrate] is Anaxagoras' one, Empedocles' mixture and Anaximandros', as Democritus said, [all] potential not actual [existents], so all are changing matter, including the eternals, b20-b26 [see Ross' note, II, 350-352, unscrambling this passage] 4. one might wonder from what kind of not-being coming-to-be [takes place]. For there are three kinds of not-being, [1] potential being, [2] what happens not to be, and [3] something different from something else. It is not enough to say [with Anaxagoras] that all things are together (homou panta chrEmata). They are matter, potentiality, b26-b32 [Tredennick follows Ross here. I do not, preferring to emphasize the potential as not-being- actually, one of the three kinds of not-being. The second is simple or absolute not-being, and the third is the same "difference" as Plato's in Sophist, 256C. This develops the thought of the prior section, and seems a simpler exlanation than Ross', II, 352, ad loc.] 5. so there are three causes and principles: the two contraries, which are form and privation, and the third, matter, tria dE ta aitia kai treis hai archai, duo men hE enantiOsis, hEs to men logos kai eidos to de sterEsis, to de triton hE hulE, b32-b34 Chapter iii, matter and form [The manner in which the three causes fit the four is fairly obvious. They are the two, matter and form, accompanied by the negative of one of them, namely privation in the third place. And they are the "static" pair (the substrate and the termini of change), and the ontological pair, states of ousia and being, subjects of the earlier Books of the Metaphysics, Zeta, Eta and Theta. Left out in such a scheme are the "dynamic" pair, the pair that do the pushing and pulling that cause change and motion: the hothen hE archE or huph' hou (moving, "efficient"), and the hou heneka (for sake of which, purpose, "final"). These of course will get their innings again later in this Book. Meanwhile:] 1. matter and form, in individual things, do not [themselves] change, ou gignetai oute hE hulE oute to eidos, legO de ta eschata. All change has an immediate mover, a substrate and a form, pan gar metaballei ti kai upo tinos kai eis ti, huph hou men, tou prOtou [immediate, proximate] kinountos, ho de, hE hulE, eis ho de, to eidos, 1069b35-1070a4 [he brings the moving cause into the picture there, but not for long] 2. ousia comes into being, each individual from the same genus, hekastE ek sunOnumou gignetai ousia, a4-a9 3. there are three [modes] of [sensible] ousia: matter, form and the combination, ousiai de treis, hE men hulE tode ti ousa tOi phainesthai, hE de phusis tode ti kai hexis tis eis hEn, eti tritE hE ek toutOn hE kath' hekasta, a9-a13 [the language of that is interesting: it looks to me more like that of a student, struggling to grasp the matter, than that of an early Aristotle. Even Ross is puzzled, II, 356, top] 4. there are no particular things other than the combined [matter and form], epi men oun tinOn to tode ti ouk esti para tEn sunthetEn ousian [then follow some difficult lines including some which Ross notes that Alexander thought belonged in line 11. Jaeger ignores that, obviously not thinking much of it. But, if we are going to play this game, rather than moving the starred lines (in Ross' text) around, I would suggest merely putting parentheses around the prior line, dio . . . toutOn, isolating that thought. The result makes more sense to me, but of course this is a dangerous game to play, and it can quickly get out of hand. It may be moot anyway], a13-a20 5. moving causes are pre-existent, while the defining cause [i.e. form] is simultaneous [with things], ta men oun kinounta aitia hOs progegenEmena onta, ta d' hOs ho logos hama. Examples. (Some endure, like soul, but not all.) Ideas are not necessary, ouden dei dia ge taut' einai tas ideas, a20-a30 EFL, 5/3/97 Chapter iv Causes, principles, elements: are they same, or not? 1. in a way causes and principles are different for different things; in a way, the same for all things, ta d' aitia kai hai archai alla allOn estin hOs, esti d' hOs, an katholou legEi tis kai kat' analogon, tauta pantOn. One might ask whether they are the same for ousiai and for the other categories, 1070a31-a35 2. but it would be strange if they were the same for all things. Beside ousia and the categories there is nothing like them. Elements are prior to the things of which they are elements, a35-b4 3. furthermore, how can the same elements be of all? Not one of the elements can be the same as what is compounded out of them (nor an element of intelligibles, like being and the one, which are in each of the compounds). So there are not the same elements of all, b4-b10 4. but in an analogical and general sense, they are [same for all]: form, privation, and matter. It is specifically that they differ, toutOn men oun tauta stoicheia kai archai pantOn de houtO men eipein ouk estin, tOi analogon de, hOsper ei tis eipoi hoti archai eisi treis, to eidos kai hE sterEsis kai hE hulE. all' hekaston toutOn heteron peri hekaston genos estin, b10-b21 5. there are external as well as internal causes, like the mover, to kinoun. The internal causes are three, matter, form and privation; the external, four, including to kinoun [ notice that he omits mention of purpose, hou heneka, and substitutes privation in this scheme. This appears a bit clumsy. Is it early or careless?], b22-b34 6. there is a First Mover besides, eti para tauta to hOs proton pantOn kinoun panta, b34-b35 [First mention of this, and a prescient one] Chapter v Are causes, etc., the same or not? (cont.) 1. ousiai exist independently; other things (properties, motion), on account of it, so ousiai are the causes of all things, epei d' esti ta men chOrista, ta d' ou chOrista, ousia ekeina. kai dia touto pantOn aitia tauta, b36-1071a3 2. causes are generally same, and specifically different [as in previous chapter], like potency and act differ in different ways, allOs, a3-a6 3. For example (gar), the same thing is actually, sometimes, and is potentially, sometimes, but potency and act differ, a6-a7 a. in some things as form and matter, a6-a11 b. otherwise as something coming into being (moving), a11-a17 4. some causes are universal; some, not. Immediate causes are not universal, a17-a24 5. the causes and elements of different kinds, tOn mE en tautOi genei, and different species, kai tOn en tautOi eidei hetera, and different individuals, ouk eidei all' hoti tOn kath' hekaston allo, are different except by analogy, a24-a29 6. in seeking which principles are same, and which different, clearly they are designated differently, and not defined the same but differently, except when they are the same, or by analogy, or [are] the causes of ousiai, or the first in actuality, or the first [causes], a29-1071b2 [I said last week that Lambda, the first half, is more or less a continuation of E - Z Metaphysics. I am glad I used the qualifier, more or less, because I invite you to consider what has been dawning slowly upon me: that there is also alot of the early part of the Physics, the first two Books to be more precise, in these early chapters of Lambda. There are for example the treatments of the three and the four causes, not omit the mention of the Pluralist Philosophers (the latter in the middle of chapter ii). All this is food for thought. Does it reveal a back-and-forth upon the part of the writer, between the metaphysical and physical metaphysics? The question is not out of line, and deserves pondering] EFL, 6/7/97 Chapter vi Ousia akinEtos, motionless ousia 1. since there are three ousiai, two physical and one motionless, the latter [the motionless] must be an eternal motionless ousia. The ousiai are the first [of all kinds of] being, and if they are perishable, everything is perishable. But it is impossible for motion and time to come into being or perish. There would be no before and after, if there were no time. Motion and time are continuous [uninterrupted], but motion is not continuous unless in place, and circular, 1071b3-b11 [Chapter vi begins with a reference to the three kinds of ousia in the first chapter of Lambda (1069a30-b2): (1) perishable sensible, (2) eternal sensible, and (3) motionless and separate. There this third, motionless and separate ousia, was associated with Plato's Ideas and mathematicals, with Xenocrates' Ideas and mathematicals (same entity, 1028b24), and with Speusippus' mathematicals only. The chapters following thereafter, ii - v, discuss sensible ousia, but in abstract terms for the most part, matter and form, Aristotle's abstractions. That is generally how ousia is discussed in Books Zeta and Eta. All this is motionless in the sense of having nothing whatsoever to do with motion or with Physics. But now Aristotle in vi abruptly launches upon a discussion of physical motion: it is eternal (aei gar En, b7), anything eternal must be moving with a very special kind of motion, namely circular motion. This leads in the sequel to the Unmoved Prime Mover, a physical entity that is cause of all motion, itself separate and unmoved in a physical sense. This is another kind of metaphysics from the metaphysics of Zeta and Eta. Separate and unmoved now are another kind of choristos and akinEtos than those of the earlier Books. It is precisely here that the change becomes explicit. This is the reason that I said in the beginning that the Metaphysics is really two metaphysics, (1) a metaphysics of abstractions, form, matter and all that, in the early Books, especially Zeta and Eta, and (2) a physical metaphysics, a metaphysics of motion, ending with the Unmoved Prime Mover here in Lambda] 2. [he takes a swipe at Plato (or the Platonists), and contends that eternal ousiai are actual movers] eternal ousiai, like Ideas, are worthless if they do not have an active principle of movement (change) in them, and this principle must be active, alla mEn ei esti kinEtikon E poiEtikon, mE energoun de ti, ouk estai kinEsis. endechetai gar to dunamin echon mE energein. outhen ara ophelos oud' ean ousias poiEsOmen aidious, hOsper hoi ta eidE, ei mE tis dunamenE enesti archE metaballein. ou toinun oud' hautE hikanE, oud' allE ousia para ta eidE. ei gar me energEsei, ouk estai kinEsis, b12-b17 3. if it doesn't actualize, its ousia is a potentiality. It is possible for potential being not to be, so there must be such a principle whose ousia is actuality, [or:] potential being can not be [but it is] so the principle, being, must be actuality, endechetai gar to dunamei on mE einai. dei ara einai archEn toiautEn hEs hE ousia energeia, b17-b20 4. such ousiai must be without matter, because they are eternal. So it is actuality, autas dei tas ousias einai aneu hulEs, [matter of course in Aristotle's system is a potentiality], b20b22 5. YET THERE IS A PROBLEM, kaitoi aporia, b22-b23 [emphasis mine] a. it seems that everything actual [is] possible, but the possible is not all actualized, so potentiality seems prior [to actuality], but if this is so, there could be nothing, because it is possible that [things] could be or no way be, dokei gar to men energoun pan dunasthai to de dunamenon ou pan energein, hOste proteron einai tEn dunamin. alla mEn ei touto, outhen estai tOn ontOn. endechetai gar dunasthai men einai mEpO d'einai, b23-b26 b. and yet, as the theologoi create [the all] out of night, and natural philosophers [Anaxagoras] say all things were together, that is impossible, for how will [anything] have moved, if there was no actual cause. Matter cannot move itself . . . , b26-b31 c. some suggested eternal actuality, like Leucippus and Plato: they said there was always motion, but how and of what sort they did not say. Nothing moves haphazardly, but there is always something [moving it], growth or force or mind this way or that, . . . b31-1072a3 d. TO THINK POTENTIALITY PRIOR TO ACTUALITY IS RIGHT AND WRONG, [emphasis mine], to men dE dunamin oiesthai energeias proteron esti men hOs kalOs esti d' hOs ou, a3-a4 e. Anaxagoras (mind), Empedocles (love and hate) and Leucippus and others (eternal motion) thought that actuality is prior, so chaos and night were not unlimited in time, but periodic or some other way, if actuality is prior, a4-a9 f. if the same always goes in cycles, there must always remain something energizing it. If there is coming into being and passing away, there must be something else always pushing it this way or that, a9-a12 [Aristotle's version of our "What came before the Big Bang?"] g. a12-a18 [as Ross explains in his notes, II, 371-72, Aristotle here illustrates his contention with his astronomical conceptions] [Let us not be sidetracked by Aristotle's astronomy or references to other philosophers. The important point of this chapter is that "there is a problem," kaitoi aporia: "potentiality seems prior," dokei proteron einai tEn dunamin; but "That is impossible," to auto adunaton. Aristotle does not blink. He chooses actuality. But that is a choice, not a solution. The "problem" has never been solved by choice. It never will be, because, as he says himself, "to think potentiality prior to actuality is right and wrong," to men dE dunamin oiesthai energeias proteron esti men hOs kalOs esti d' hOs ou. How is this so? He doesn't say it, but it is not difficult to see. The dualism is fundamental: actually the actual is always prior, but potentially the potential is prior too. Potentiality and actuality are irreducibly primary. Why? Because we can always think. We have minds as well as bodies. Potentiality is a product of our thought. It is not itself an actuality. With this of course we have arrived at what is lately called the mind-body question. In this we all make choices, as Aristotle did. It is the context of these choices that is fundamental. We have minds and bodies.] EFL, 6/14/97 Chapter vii The First Heaven and the Unmoved Prime Mover [Chapter vi brought us up to the First Heaven and the Unmoved Prime Mover, ei dE to auto aei periodO, dei ti aei menein hOsautOs energoun, if [the First Heaven] is always going around in a circle, there must always remain something to energize it, 1072a9-a10. Now he examines these:] 1. the First Heaven: our problem is solved: there is some ever moved, unceasing motion, and this is circular, so the First Heaven is eternal, luoit' an tauta, kai esti ti aei kinoumenon kinEsin apauston, hautE d' hE kuklOi . . . hOst' aidios an eiE ho prOtos ouranos, 1072a10-a23 2. the Unmoved Mover: there is something that moves [the First Heaven], esti toinun ti kai ho kinei, that moves without being moved, esti ti ho ou kinoumenon kinei, eternal and ousia and actual, aidion kai ousia kai energeia ousa, a23-a26 3. objects of desire and thought move [things] thus. They move [things] without [themselves] being moved, kinei de hOde to horekton kai to noEton, kinei ou kinoumena. The beautiful is yearned for, epithumEton men gar to phainomenon kalon, boulEton de prOton to on kalon. Intelligence is a principle, archE gar hE noEsis. Mind is moved by the mental, nous de hupo tou noEtou kineitai. This ousia is first, simple and actual . . . , a26-b1 [There is alot of Plato in that!] 4. [again:] purpose is among the unmoved, and it moves others, as the object of [their] desire, hoti d' esti to hou heneka en tois akinEtois, hE diairesis dEloi . . . kinei dE hOs erOmenon, kinoumena de talla kinei, b1-b4 5. [recapitulating] this actual Unmoved Mover cannot be otherwise than it is. Because motion is the first kind of change, and this [the first is] circular. It is necessary, and as necessary, beautiful, and thus a principle, epei de esti ti kinoun auto akinEton on, energeiai on, touto ouk endechetai allOs echein oudamOs. Phora gar hE prOtE tOn metabolOn, tautEs de hE kuklOi . . . ex anagkEs ara estin on, kai hEi anagkE, kalOs, kai houtOs archE, b4-b13 6. the heaven and nature depend on such a principle. It is the best existence, since activity is a pleasure . . . and for this reason wakefulness, sensation and thought are pleasantest, and hopes and memories, ek toiautEs ara archEs ErtEtai ho ouranos kai hE phusis. diagOgE d' estin hoia hE aristE . . . epei kai hEdonE hE energeia toutou, kai dia touto egrEgorsis aisthEsis noEsis hEdiston, elpides de kai mnEmai dia tauta, b13-b18 7. Thought itself is of the best of all. It is receptive, active, self-conscious, alive and divine. Thought and activity are our sweetest and best possessions. How much greater the divine mind and activity, hE de noEsis hE kath' hautEn tou kath' auto aristou, kai hE malista tou malista. auton de noei ho nous kata metalEpsin tou noEtou. noEtos gar gignetai thigganOn kai noOn, hOste tauton nous kai noEton. to gar dektikon tou noEtou kai tEs ousias nous, energei de echOn, hOst' ekeinou mallon touto ho dokei ho nous theion exein, kai hE theORia to hEdiston kai ariston. ei oun houtOs eu echei, hOs hEmeis pote, ho theos aei, thaumaston. ei de mallon eti thaumasiOteron. echei de hOde. kai zOE de ge huparchei. hE gar nou energeia zOE, ekeinos de he energeia. Energeia de hE kath' hautEn ekeinou zOE aristE kai aidios. phamen dE ton theon einai zOon aidion ariston, hOste zOE kai aiOn suneches kai aidios huparchei toi theOi. touto gar ho theos, b18-b30 [The phrase, hOst' ekeinou mallon touto ho dokei ho nous theion echein (line 23), is difficult. See Ross, II, 380-81. Alexander, Bonitz, Ross, Tredennick all read it differently. Nevertheless, this passage of course contains all that is needed to qualify this part of the Metaphysics as a "theology," and one that prioritizes actuality. It did much to establish Aristotle as a support for Christian theology in the Middle Ages. But if this is theology, strictly speaking it is "natural theology," and is more metaphysics than what we usually associate with "theology." From the very beginning of the Metaphysics we have witnessed Aristotle's dedication to and celebration of the life of the mind as the highest activity] 8. the Pythagoreans and Speusippus erred in thinking that the most beautiful and best were not in the beginning, but in the end products, mE en archE einai . . . [all'] en tois ek toutOn, b30- 1073a3 9. [summary] an eternal and motionless and separate ousia, it can not have magnitude, megethos ouden echein endechetai tautEn tEn ousian all' amerEs kai adairetos estin . . . apathes kai analloiOton, a3-a13 [And so we come full circle too: first we moved from the unphysical to the physical. Then the ultimate first principle that drives the whole physical universe turns out to be an entity that looks very unphysical after all. But it derives nevertheless from a physical context, and accordingly is a very different sort of abstraction than the ousia of the earlier Metaphysics. This is a physical seperation. Negatives are defined in terms of that which they are negative of (just the point made in 1072a30-31). How much was Aristotle aware of this? As said before, he never mentions the ambiguity of these terms, separate and motionless (although he mentions others). Nobody else has either for twenty three hundred years, but there it is, plain as can be: separate can mean beyond, or can mean utterly unconcerned with; motionless can mean beyond as the Unmoved Prime Mover is beyond, or it can mean having nothing to do with motion, like the two static causes, matter and form. Something not moving is motionless. So is a concept. Michelangelo's David is motionless. So is the square root of two. The one is a piece of marble; the other, an idea. There are two kinds of abstraction, physical and mental. There are two irreducible ways of looking at it. Aristotle uses them, but he does not explicitly identify them. [As for the astronomy above, it is easy to laugh at old Aristotle and his circles and his heavens, but perhaps we had better stifle our mirth, and consider the context of all this paraphernalia which Claudius Ptolemy later worked up in an even more elaborate fashion. Nicholas Copernicus had not shown up yet, and it was not so far- fetched for Aristotle to consider Earth as the center of the cosmos. Johannes Kepler had not shown up, to suggest the ellipse for an orbit, so it was not far-fetched to consider the circle as his paradigm for endless motion. Hence the astronomy that we have just seen in this chapter. As for what caused it all, quite possibly our latest theories will someday look quaint too. At least Aristotle was not illogical, if mistaken, and his cosmology was an improvement over what preceded him. The work of understanding is long and slow. [This is not a casual observation, but a long considered opinion. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, early modern natural science (a.k.a. natural philosophy) had a struggle to make for itself a place in the culture of mainstream European civilization. The story is well-known: Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and other leading lights. Those men were founders, pioneers, struggling to gain a hearing, not to mention acceptance, against the theological preoccupation of their and preceding centuries. The theology of the era was deeply permeated by Aristotelian ideas. The Church lent its authority to Ptolemean cosmology. Clearly the stuggling young science had to devote much energy to discrediting, indeed sometimes ridiculing those ideas of the prior era. Modern "classical" philosophy (Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Kant and others) took up this task with gusto. But natural science has by now established its rightful place in our culture.That struggle is now an anachronism. Even the Vatican has recognized this. If we do not get over that old syndrome and take a fresh look at the likes of Aristotle, we will forfeit the opportunity for some new thought on what they said and what they meant and what they did, a chance to inquire what real connection they might have to the problems of our day. To simply continue plowing the old outdated furrows would, to put it mildly, be a shame.] EFL, 6/21/97 Chapter viii Is there one Prime Mover, or many? [The reference to Callipus of Cyzicus (fl. 330 B.C.) is evidence that this chapter at least was a late composition in our text. Ross' note, II, 384 discusses briefly the possible sigificance of this. The chapter at any rate does take off in an astronomical discussion that may strike you as a bit of an aberration, and mostly of interest to an historian of science. Yet it reinforces our impression of the physical-mindedness of the writer at this point. "The physical and the metaphysical cojoin in Aristotle" (Kalev Pehme)] 1. The question, whether there is one such entity [as in chap. vii] or more, and how many, should not escape us, poteron de mian theteon tEn toiautEn ousian E pleious, kai posas, dei mE lanthanein, but we should take note of what others have said, alla memnEsthai kai tas tOn allOn apophaseis, 1073a14-a17 2. the theory of the Platonists is of no help, hE men gar peri tas ideas hupolEpsis oudemian echei skepsin idian, a17-a22 3. we begin with the assumptions and distinctions above [in chap. vii]. The beginning and the first of things is motionless, moving the first and single motion, hEmin d' ek tOn hupokeimenOn kai diOrismenOn lekteon. hE men gar archE kai to prOton tOn ontOn akinEton kai kath' hauto kai kata sumbebEkos, kinoun de tEn aidion kai mian kinEsin, a22-a25 4. since the moved must be moved by something, and the First Mover is unmoved, by itself, and eternal motion moved by an eternal, and one by one, we see a simple motion of the universe, which we say the first motionless entity moves [sets in motion], epei de to kinoumenon anagkE upo tinos kineisthai, kai to prOton kinoun akinEton einai kath' hauto, kai tEn aidion kinEsin hupo aidiou kineisthai kai mian uph' henos, horOmen de para tEn tou pantos tEn haplEn phoran, hEn kinein phamen tEn prOtEn ousian kai akinEton [thus far recapitulating chapter vii again], a26-a30 5. [returning to his astronomy and cosmology] the eternal motion of the planets are other motions, and each of these must be moved by an eternal unmoved entity, allas phoras ousas tas tOn planEtOn aidious . . . anagkE kai toutOn hekastEn tOn phorOn hup' akinEtou te kinesthai kath' hautEn kai aidiou ousias. The nature of the stars being some eternal ousia, and the eternal mover being prior to the moved, there must be an ousia prior to [their] ousia, hE te gar tOn astrOn phusis aidios ousia tis ousa, kai to kinoun aidion kai proteron tou kinoumenon, kai to proteron ousias ousian anagkaion einai. It is clear that there must be as many ousiai, eternal and unmoved in nature, and without bulk, for the aforementioned reason, phaneron toinun hoti tosautas te ousias anagkaion einai tEn phusin aidious kai akinEtous kath' hautas, kai aneu megethos dia tEn eirEmenEn aitian proteron. That they are ousiai, and [that] there is a first and a second among them, according to the same order as the motions of the stars, is [also] clear, hoti men oun eisin ousiai, kai toutOn tis protE kai deutera kata tEn autEn taxin tais phorais tOn astrOn, phaneron, a30-b3 6. it is for the mathematical sciences to study the number of [these] motions in conformity with philosophy, namely astronomy, to de plEthos EdE tOn phorOn ek tEs oikeotatEs philosophiai tOn mathematikOn epistEmOn dei skopein, ek tEs astrologias, for this [astronomy] has to do with the theory of sensible eternal ousiai, but the others [arithmetic, geometry], with no ousia at all, but with numbers and geometry, hautE gar peri ousias aisthEtEs men aidiou de poieitai tEn theOrian, hai d' allai peri oudemias ousias, hoion hE te peri tous arithmous kai tEn geOmetrian, b3-b8 7. that there are more motions than there are moved [objects] is clear to those who observe and measure, hoti men oun pleious tOn pheromenOn hai phorai, phaneron tois kai metriOs hEmmenois, and now, for the sake of understanding, we will recount how many some of the learned say there are, posai d' hautai tugchanousin ousiai, nun men hEmeis ha legousi tOn mathEmatikOn tines ennoias charin legomen. [What follows belongs more to the history of science than to metaphysics perhaps, but it exhibits Aristotle's interest in the concrete details as well as the over-arching theory. The "more motions" gave rise to the epicycles], b8-b17 8. Eudoxus' theory: three motions each for the sun and the moon, and four for each of the planets, b17-b32 9. Callippus' theory of spheres is the same as Eudoxus' except that he added two for the sun and the moon, ta painomena ei mellei tis apodosin, if one wishes to explain the phenomena, b32-b38 10. But it is necessary to add more spheres, making fifty five altogether, ei mellousi suntetheisai pasai ta phainomena apodOsein, if all the phenomena are to be explained, b38-1074a14 [bizarre from our viewpoint, but at least they were trying to "save the phenomena" (sozein ta phainomena), as later writers put it, e.g. Simplicius, De caelo, ii, 12, p. 497, ll. 17-24] 11. such is the number of the spheres, and of motionless entities and principles, if there are no others, to men oun plEthos tOn sphairOn estO tosouton, hOste kai tas ousias kai tas archas tas akinEtous tosautas eulogon hupolabein . . . oudemia an eiE para tautas hetera phusis, alla touton anagkE ton arithmon einai tOn ousiOn, there is not one other nature beside these, but this must be the number of entities, a14-a31 [for this seeming inconsistency with the single Unmoved Prime Mover, see Ross' notes, II, 394 f., and his Introduction, I, cxxxix, ff.] 12. But it is clear that there is one heaven . . . the Unmoved Prime Mover is one in definition and number . . . only one, hoti de heis ouranos, phaneron . . . hen ara kai logOi kai arithmOi to prOton kinoun akinEton on . . . heis ara ouranos monos, a31- a38 [In spite of his complex of circles, there is clearly here one universe and one Unmoved Prime Mover motivating it all. He is explicit (if brief) about that.] 13. the divinity of the whole of nature was transmitted to us by the myths of the ancients [it is not inappropiate that he finally mentions the myths that he replaces here]. Although there were accretions for the persuasion of the many, and to accomodate the law, if you separate these out, and take the original, it must be considered divinely inspired, a38-b14 [Be very careful not to confuse final with efficient cause, pull with push, hou heneka with hothen. The Unmoved Prime Mover moves the First Heaven by exerting a pull on it. kinei hOs erOmenon (1072b3), etc. It is easy to forget this. Especially easy for us moderns who are so machine-minded (where motive forces are all push), who are so captivated by the "big bang" theory of setting the universe a-going, and for whom nature knows no purpose (at least for scientists by profession). For Aristotle, on the other hand, purpose (hou heneka) played a major role in metphysics, physics and cosmology, evidenced right here. It is one of his "trade-marks"] EFL, 6/28/97 Chapter ix The Divine Nous 1. [We saw Aristotle, in chapter vii, 1072b4-b30, associate the Unmoved Prime Mover with nous (mind, intellect) and noEsis (intelligence, thought)] but there are some problems about the Mind, ta de peri ton noun exei tinas aporias, it seems the most divine of phenomena, but how it can be such has some difficulties, dokei men gar einai tOn phainomenOn theiotaton, pOs d' echOn toioutos an eiE, echei tinas duskolias, 1074b15-b17 2. what does it think? a. if it thinks nothing, what is so worthy about it? eite gar mEden noei, ti an eiE to semnon, b17-b18 b. if it thinks, but something else directs it, thought is not what is its essence, but only a potentiality, and it would not be the best ousia, eite noei, toutou d' allo kurion, ou gar esti touto ho estin autou hE ousia noesis, alla dunamis, ouk an hE aristE ousia eiE, b18-b21 c. if it is mind and thought, what does it think? Either itself or something else, either the same [thing] always, or something different, eti de eite nous hE ousia autou eite noEsis esti, ti noei; E gar autos auton E heteron ti, E to auto aei E allo, b21-b23 d. Does it make any difference or not whether it thinks fine thoughts or any whatsoever? Wouldn't some thoughts be absurd? Clearly it thinks the most divine and worthiest, and does not change, because change would be for the worse, poteron oun diapherei ti E ouden to noein to kalon E to tuchon; E kai atopon to dianoeisthai peri eniOn; dElon toinun hoti to theiotaton kai timiOtaton noei, kai ou metaballei, eis cheiron gar hE metabolE, b23-b27 e. above all, if it is not thought, but a potentiality, it would be an effort to keep on thinking, prOton men oun ei mE noEsis estin alla dunamis, eulogon epiponon einai to suneches autOi tEs noEseOs, b28-b29 3. it is clear that there would be something else more valued than mind, [that is] the object of thought. Thinking and thought can be of the worst [things]. If this is to be avoided, thinking [by itself] would not be the best, epeita dElon hoti allo ti an eiE to timiOteron E ho nous, to nooumenon. kai gar to noein kai hE noEsis huparxei kai to cheiriston noounti, hOst' ei pheukton touto, ouk an eiE to ariston hE noEsis, b29-b33 4. It must think itself, if it is the mightiest, and [this] thought is the thought of thought. Knowledge and sensation and opinion and [directed] thought seem to be always of something else subordinate, auton ara noei, eiper esti to kratiston, kai estin hE noEsis noEseOs noEsis. phainetai d' aei allou he epistEmE kai hE aisthEsis kai he doxa kai hE dianoia, autEs d' en parergO, b33-b36 5. but if to think and be thought of are different, with which lies the Good? For the essence of thinking and of the object of thought are not the same. In some cases the object is knowledge, while in immaterial productive arts it is the ousia and the essence, or in the speculative it is the reasoning and the thought, isn't it? The thought and its object not being different [in the divine Nous] since they are immaterial, they will be one and the same, eti ei allo to noein kai to noeisthai, kata poteron autOi to eu huparxei; oude gar tauto to einai noEsei kai nooumenOi. E ep' eniOn hE epistEmE to pragma, epi men tOn poiEtikOn aneu hulEs hE ousia kai to ti En einai, epi de tOn theOrEtikOn ho logos to pragma kai hE noEsis; ouch heterou oun ontos tou nooumenou kai tou nou, hosa mE hulEn echei, to auto estai, kai hE noEsis tOi noomenOi mia, b36-1075a5 6. there remains a problem, if the object of thought is composite, because it could change into its parts [matter and form]. Either all immaterials must be indivisible (like the human mind), or what is composite is gained after a certain time [Tredennick explains this in a footnote, p. 166]. Thus the thought [of the divine Nous] is of itself for all time, eti dE leipetai aporia, ei suntheton to nooumenon, metaballoi gar an en tois meresi tou holou. E adaireton pan to mE echon hulEn - hOsper ho anthrOpinos nous E ho ge tOn sunthetOn echei en tini chronOi - houtOs d' echei autE autEs hE noEsis ton hapanta aiOna; a5-a10 EFL, 7/5/97 Chapter x Other explanations fail 1. we should ask, in which way the Good and the Best is the nature of the universe, whether it is separate and by itself, or in the rank and file, or both, like an army? episkepteon de kai poterOs exei hE tou holou phusis to agathon kai to ariston, poteron kechOrismenon ti kai auto kath' auto, E tEn taxin. E amphoterOs hOsper strateuma; 1075a11-a13 a. the victory is in the hands of both rank and file, and of the general, perhaps more of the latter, since he is the one who commands, a14-a15 b. everything is organized somehow, but not all alike (fish, fowl and flower, for example), and yet not unlike so that there is no relation between them. Everything is organized toward one [end], but like in a household the freemen have the least freedom, and the slaves and animals the most. I am talking about how decisions are made, and who makes what contributions to the whole, a15-a25 2. we should not overlook the impossible and absurd things others say, nor what the more elegant speakers have to say, and what give the least problems, hosa de adunata sumbainei E atopa tois allOs legousi, kai poia hoi chariesterOs legontes, kai epi poiOn elachistai aporiai, dei mE lanthanein, a25-a27 a. they all make everything out of opposites, pantes gar ex enantiOn poiousi panta, . . . but they do not say how, pOs ek tOn enantiOn estai, ou legousin. Opposites are impassive to oneanother, apathE gar ta enantia hup' allElOn, a28-a31 b. we solve this reasonably with [our doctrine of ] the third thing [i.e. the substrate], hEmin de luetai touto eulogOs tOi triton ti einai. Some make the other of the opposites [i.e. the right hand column of the sustoicheia] matter, but that is refuted the same way: matter alone is not the opposite of anything, hoi de to heteron tOn enantiOn hulEn poiousin, . . . luetai de kai touto ton auton tropon, hE gar hulE hE mia oudeni enantion . . . , a31-a36 c. others say the good and the bad are not principles, but mostly the good, but they don't explain how, whether as an end or as a moving cause or as form, pOs to agathon archE ou legousin, poteron hOs telos E hOs kinEsan E hOs eidos, a36-b1 (1) Empedocles' Love and Mixture are absurd: Love is both mover and matter [in it], and Strife is eternal, b1-b7 (2) Anaxagoras' Good and Mind: Mind moves, but [we say] aimed at a purpose, so it is different, b8-b11 (3) all who say there are contraries don't make use of the sustoicheia, not arranging them, pantes d' hoi tanantia legontes ou chrOntai tois enantiois, ean mE hruthmisEi tis. No one says why some things are perishable, some imperishables, kai dia ti ta men phtharta ta d' aphtharta, oudeis legei. Because they make everything come from the same principles, panta gar ta onta poiousin ek tOn autOn archOn, b11-b14 (4) some create things from not-being [Hesiod]; others, so that they they are not forced to do this, make everything one, eti hoi men ek tou mE ontos poiousi ta onta, hoi d' hina mE touto anagkasthOsin, hen panta poiousin [Parmenides], b14-b16 (5) no one explains why things will always come into being, or what is the cause, eti dia ti aei estai genesis kai ti aition geneseOs, oudeis legeib16-b17 (6) those who posit two principles [Empedocles, et al.] and those who posit Ideas [Plato and his school] need another superior principle, kai tois duo archas poiousin allEn anagkE archEn kuriOteran einai, kai tois ta eidE eti allE archE kuriOtera. Why did or do things participate, dia ti gar meteschen E metechei. Those who posit Wisdom and Higher Knowledge need an opposite; we do not. There is no opposite to the First [Principle]; everything opposite [to it] is matter, and potential, ou gar estin enantion tOi prOtOi ouden, panta gar ta enantia hulEn echei, kai dunamei tauta estin, b17-b24 (7) if there is nothing else beside the sensible, there will be no archE or order or becoming or heavenly things, but there will always be a beginning of beginning, as [there is] for all the theologoi and the physicists, ei te mE estai para ta aisthEta alla, ouk estai archE kai taxis kai genesis kai ta ourania, all' aei tEs archEs archE, hOsper tois theologois kai tois phusikois pasin, b24-b27 (8) no Idea or number is a cause: they don't move anything. And how can magnitude and extension come from the unextended? ei d' estai ta eidE, E hoi arithmoi, oudenos aitia. Ei de mE, outi kinEseOs ge. eti pOs estai ex amegethOn megethos kai sunexhes; . . . , b27-b30 (9) none of the opposites will be productive and moving, alla mEn ouden g' estai tOn enantiOn hoper kai poiEtikon kai kinEtikon, endechoito gar an mE einai. They could not exist, b30-b34 (10) and no one says, how numbers or soul and body and form and thing are one. It is impossible to say, if not the way we say, that the mover does it, eti tini hoi arithmoi hen E hE psuchE kai to sOma kai holOs to eidos kai to pragma, ouden legei oudeis, oud' endechetai eipein, ean nE hOs hEmeis eipEi, hOs to kinoun poiei, b34-b37 (11) Those who say that mathematical number is first, and thus always contains other ousia and other principles, adventitiously create the ousia of the universe and many archai, hoi de legontes ton arithmon prOton ton mathEmatikon kai houtOs aei allen echomenEn ousian kai archas hekastEs allas, epeisodiOdE tEn tou pantos ousian poiousin kai archas pollas. "The rule of many is not good. Let there be one ruler" [Iliad, II, 204], b34- 1076a4. [The Unmoved Prime Mover is One. It is pure mind. It thinks itself. It is an abstraction, but it is a physical abstraction in spite of its mental nature. It sits in a physical context. It is different from the matter and form and the ousia and the potentiality of Books Zeta, Eta and Theta. Those are mental abstractions. But Aristotle does not seem impressed by the difference. [With the end of Book Lambda we have come to the end of the Metphysics proper, the presentation of Aristotle's own theories of being qua being, on hE on, ousia and the ultimate primary archE. The two Books that follow however are not without relevance [What is missing here? What is it that Aristotle fails to see? Or at least fails to state? His objections to Hesiod, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, the Eleatics (as understood) and the rest of the old timers are perfectly well taken. Although bona fide initial and tentative steps, they left much unexplained or badly explained. Plato's Ideas a la Phaedo were a poetic but poorly articulated intuition of something that outlasts our transient and momentary sensations. As "science" they were fairly objected to by Aristotle. In their place he has given us two theories, (1) the form and matter (replacing the Forms and copies) that comprise the ousia that is separate from particular ousiai (in doing this he returned Ideas to where they belonged: in the mind), and (2) the Unmoved Prime Mover that is separate from the heavens and everything else. He fails to see that these are two kinds of separation (as we would now say: abstraction). He uses the mind, and its difference from the things it beholds, but he does not explicitly name it. He is aware of the universe and its motions, and we may dismiss his cosmology, but his failure to thoroughly and explicitly isolate the mind, and to see the paradox of its isolation-while-not-isolated, this failure is evident, and we may not dismiss it. Ideas are still special and privileged THINGS. We now have words that isolate them. They are concepts, as opposed to perceptions. They are abstractions, a separation that is clearly mental for us. What is beyond our galaxy or our universe at its farthest reach is not "abstract" in such a sense. The distant nebulae are separating themselves, but we perceive this "red shift." We distinguish these different kinds of separateness. Aristotle did not. Or why does he mix the two here in one treatise, the Metaphysics? Once we grant this mental separateness, we can go on to examine its nature. But that is an exercise for another day] EFL, 7/12/97