KAPPA (XI) METAPHYSICS Introductory If Book Iota struck you as strange at first (what have the one and contraries to do with metaphysics?), until you saw it as a review of some traditional early speculation that could not be ignored, then Book Kappa (XI) may strike you as still stranger yet. Why does it repeat extensive tracts of the early Books (Beta, Gamma and Epsilon), and then suddenly break into a reprise of parts of the Physics? What is the connection? Much has been written about this by various scholars over the last couple of centuries, attesting its challenge to our curiosity. Perhaps Werner Jaeger's account in the second and third chapters of his Entstehungsgeschichte, and in the seventh and eighth chapters of his 1948 Aristotle (OUP), will introduce you to some of the various explanations, not least of all his (that it belongs to an early version). But I propose to pass all that by here, on the supposition that where this bit of text came from is a matter that we cannot be certain about, and we must deal with the text we have. Whoever put it together had some reason for doing so, and his arrangement has been accepted since ancient times. Does Book Kappa perform any function in the Metaphysics as we have it? There is evidence that it does, and I aim to show it to you. Kappa clearly seems like two pieces of cloth sewn together: the first, the reprise of A through E; the second, the quotations from the Physics. The seam is cleverly veiled. What these two parts do is, the first, to sum up a large part (though not all) of the prior ground covered, and the second, to take off upon a new venture, what we will call (for reasons we will eventually make clear) a physical metaphysics. It might be a good idea at this point to reproduce the outline of the whole posted at our start. I. Introductory and propaedeutic books A. The nature and value of knowledge Alpha (I) B. The four causes Alpha, Little alpha (II) C. Problems Beta (III) D. Language, logic and metaphysics Gamma (IV) E. Definitions Delta (V) F. What kind of science do we seek? Epsilon (VI), i II. The three ontologies A. The conceptual ontology, or internal ontology of matter and form 1. four kinds of pure being Epsilon, ii 2. accidental being and being as ii, iii, iv truth, dismissed 3. being of the categories: ousia Zeta (VII), Eta (VIII) 4. being as potentiality and actuality Theta (IX) B. The ontology of the One Iota (X) C. The quasi-physical ontology, or external ontology of the Unmoved Prime Mover 1. recap of A-E, and extracts from Kappa (XI) the Physics 2. recap of the conceptual ontology, Lambda (XII), 1-5 and the introduction of motion 3. motion and the Unmoved Prime Mover Lambda, 6-10 III. Appendices on numbers A. Numbers and abstractions, the M (XIII) theory of Ideas B. Numbers and opposites; the physical N (XIV world; Plato's lectures Will this continue to stand up under increased scrutiny? Let us see. To begin with here is the overall structure of Book K (XI): I. Recap of parts of Books A - E, Metaphysics K, i A. Very brief reference to A. B. The problems of Book B. C. Book Gamma iii 1. on hE on pollachOs legetai 2. philosophy contrasted with mathematics and physics iv 3. the law of contradiction v D. Book E vii 1. physics, math and theology distinguished, E, i 2. the accidental and chance, truth, E, ii - iv II. Extracts from the Physics viii A. Chance and the accidental, potentiality and actuality, Physics, Beta B. Change and motion, Gamma, i - iii C. The unlimited, Gamma, iv, v, vii x D. Change and motion, Epsilon, i - iii xi The switch from the early Metaphysics to the Physics, from Part I to Part II above, occurs at line 1065a26 in the midst of chapter viii. The Book ends with chapter xii. Chapter i Recap of Book B, Metaphysics, the first seven problems This Book opens with a very brief reference to ta hupo tOn allOn eirEmena peri tOn archOn, what has been said by others about the principles (this would be Book A), before quickly turning to the problems of Book B, 1059a18-a20 1. [problem no. 1:] whether we ought to presume one science or many, aporEseie d' an tis poteron mian hupolabein dei tEn sophian epistEmEn E pollas. If it is one, and one of contraries, the principles are not contrary; if not one, which are they then? a20-a23 [this does appear not as focussed (on the four causes) as the treatment of it was in B, ii, 995a18-b26, but is that because it is earlier, or because it is summarily briefer? Who can say for sure?] 2. [problem no. 2:] one or more sciences to consider the principles of demonstrations [and of ousia]? If one, why this more than some other? If many, of which sort? a23-a26 [again the text is extremely brief, and one has to look back at B, ii, 996b26- 997a15, to see that it is the science of ousia that he also has in mind] 3. [problem no. 3:] one science of all ousiai, or not? If not of all, it is hard to say of which. If of all, it is not clear how there can be the same of all, a26-a29 [again, the prototype in B, ii, 997a15-a25, makes it much clearer: he has the properties and attributes, ta sumbebEkota, in mind. Yet here these are a subject of the next, where they are distinguished from ousia] 4. [problem no. 5 in the short list and no. 4 in the long list in Beta] one science of ousia only, or also of its properties and attributes, kai ta sumbebEkota? If demonstrative of attributes, it is not of ousia; if these are different, which is the science we seek? a29-a38 [In B, ii, 997a25-a34 he makes it clear that he has mathematical entities, solids, lines, surfaces in mind as the properties in question here. Even Ross, II, 308, bottom, notes the confusion here] 5. [problem no. 4 in the short list and no. 5 in the long list in B] is it of sensible ousia, or not, but of some other like Forms or mathematicals? a38-b21 [this section is much briefer than the corresponding section in B, ii, 997a34-998a19, less emphatic] 6. [problem no. 6 in all lists] is it of elements inherent in compounds, or of universals? b21-b25 [B, iii, 998a20-b14, gives examples of elements and of universals (genera), and expatiates with greater detail and clarity] 7. [problem no. 7 in all lists] is it of universals or individuals, ta eschata? b25-1060a2 [this problem is distinguished from the preceding one only by reference to its parallel in B, iii, 998b14-999a23. The possibilities for confusion are such that Ross does not distinguish it in his notes under a separate head] [What I find interesting here is not so much these problems per se (we have plowed through them once before) as their comparison with Book Beta. They are briefer here, and not nearly as clear. In fact there is occasionally some confusion which requires a reference to Beta to straighten out. What is the significance of this? Early authorship, as Jaeger concludes? One of his evidences (Aristotle, p. 209) is the character of the transition in chapter viii, but, when we get there, we are going to see that he is wrong about that.] EFL, 3/1/97 KAPPA (XI) METAPHYSICS Chapter ii Reprise of Book B, the last six problems 8. [problem no. 8 in all lists] whether there should be posited something other than individual things, ta kath' hekasta, or not? Whether there should be assumed a separate ousia beside the sensible and the here and now, poteron dei tina hupolabein ousian einai chOristEn para tas aisthEtas ousias kai tas deuro? 1060a3-a27 [Very like no. 4. Here individual, sensible and present things are treated as equivalent, and contrasted to ousian chOristEn, separate ousia. Also notice reference here to the "men and horses," which were a feature of no. 4 in B, 997b8- b9. Both of these (4 & 8) probably express the heart of his problems in briefest way] 9. [problem no. 10 in both other lists] if the principle of imperishables and perishables is the same, why are some of its consequences eternal; others, not? If they are different, and if there is an eternal principle of perishables, we are likewise "stumped," for perishables should have their own principles, different from others, a27-a36 [stated at greater length, and somewhat more clearly in B, iv, 1000a5-1001a3] 10. [problems nos. 11 and 12 in the long, nos. 11 and 14 in the short list in B] if one posits being and the one as the most unchangeable principles, and not particular ousiai, how will they be separate and by themselves [absolutes]? But if each of them means a particular ousia, all being will be [such] ousiai, which is false, a36-b19 [much longer and more detailed in B, iv, 1001a4-b35] How do you derive extended ousiai [megetha] from ones? [this runs into no. 12 in B, v, 1001b26-1002b11, which expands upon no. 14 in the short] 11. [problem no. 12 in the short list in B, no. 15 in the long] how can ousia be a principle, if knowledge is of universals, and ousia is not a unversal, but particular? b19-b23 [more briefly expressed in the short list, b, i, 996a1-a10, but more clearly in the long, B, vi, 1003a5-a17. In both those places, for tode ti kai chOriston, read ta kath' hekasta (chOriston, by the way, here has the contrary of its usual use by Aristotle as in sect. 8. above)] 12. [separate here, this is part of no. 8 in both lists in B, where to sunolon is mentioned, 995b35 and 999a33] whether there is any thing beside the combined [matter and form], to sunolon, or not? b23-b28 [to sunolon = ta kath' hekasta, ta aisthEta, ta deuro] 13. [no. 9 in both lists in B] are the principles the same in form and number? If they are one in number, they are all the same, b28-b30 [this is so terse that it is almost impossible to be sure what is meant without referring to B, esp. 999b24-1004a4] [Problem no. 13 in the short list in B, i, 996a10-a12, whether the principles are potential or actual, or other than about change, is not mentioned in either the long list in B, or here in K] [Problem no. 13 in the long list in B,, vi, 1002b12-b32, why should one seek other things beside sensibles and intermedieates (maths), (things) such as we call Ideas, is not mentioned in the short list in B, or here in K, although it is implied in other problems] [Notice that in the course of these first two chapters of K, Aristotle uses the word, chOristos, and its inflexions ten times, in v, viii (5x), x (2x), xi and xiii, while in all of B he does not use it once (he uses kechOrismenE tis phusis once, iv, 1001b25, and chOrizomenoEn once, iii, 999a19). This nuance is striking. What, if anything, is to be made of it? [For anyone who wishes to study further the comparison of the lists in B and K, I append the following index: Identifying phrase order in order in order in line no.'s B, i B, ii-vi K, i-ii in K one science/4 causes? 1 1 1 1059a20-a23 archai/demonstration? 2 2 2 a23-a26 one science/all ousiai? 3 3 3 a26-a29 sensible ousiai only? 4 5 5 a38-b21 essential properties? 5 4 4 a29-a38 genera or elements? 6 6 6 b21-b25 first or last genera? 7 7 7 b25-1060a2 immaterials? 8 8 8 a3-a27 archai one in no. & form? 9 9 13 b28-b30 perishables or imper-? 10 10 9 a27-a36 are one and being ousiai? 11 11 10 a36-b19 universals or individuals? 12 15 11 b19-b23 potential or actual? 13 no mention no mention are numbers ousiai? 14 12 10 see above - no mention - 13 (Forms?) no mention (to sunolon mentioned) 8 8 12 b23-b28 [It seems that the statement of the problems at length in B, ii-vi, is the clearest statement of them, but since the list in B, i, was the first, it is used as the initial basis for numbering them, with the informal captions at the left. Thereafter each column gives the order in its own list, but ranked with the equivalent original] EFL, 3/8/97 KAPPA (XI) METAPHYSICS Chapters iii and iv The meanings of being, and objects of the sciences [These two chapters are a recapitulation of the first two chapters of Book Gamma (IV), restating in seventy six lines what was stated in a hundred and thirty eight lines in Gamma, little more than half the space. They confirm what we read in Gamma] 1. it is the task of the philosopher to investigate being qua being, on hE on, in general, not in part, katholou kai ou kata meros. There must be some "common denominator" of the various meanings of being, 1060b31-b36 a. examples, medical and health, b36-1061a7 b. it is the same with all being, a7-a10 2. this includes the primary contraries, the one and the many, equality and inequality, etc., epei de pantos tou ontos pros hen ti kai koinon hE anagOgE gignetai, kai tOn enantiOseOn hekastE pros tas prOtas diaphoras kai enantiOseis anachthEsetai tou ontos, etc., estOsan gar hautai tetheOrEmenai, a10-a15 [this is another justification for Book I] 3. diapherei d' ouden tEn tou ontos anagOgEn pros to on E pros to hen gignesthai. kai gar ei mE tauton allo d' estin, antistrephei ge, to te gar hen kai on pOs, to te on hen, no difference in the approach to being by way of being or by way of the one, because if they are not the same, they are convertible, the one and being somehow, and being and the one. All contraries are the subject of one and the same [first] science, even if in a privative way, epei d' esti ta enantia panta tEs autEs kai mias epistEmEs theOrEsai, legetai d' hekaston autOn kata sterEsin, a15-a20 [echoes of Plato's Parmenides, too, wherein Plato examined the ambiguity of the one, partly perhaps because his title character in the dialogue, Parmenides, was notorious for saying everything is one, but really what both Parmenides and Plato were probing was the nature of being. Small difference] a. problems with privation of contraries that have a middle term. The privation is of the extreme. Example of the just and the unjust, a20-a28 4. as the mathematician investigates abstractions, so it is with being, kathaper d' ho mathEmatikos peri ta ex aphaireseOs tEn theOrian poietai, ton auton dE tropon echai kai peri to on. Its properties qua being, and its contrarieties qua being are of no other science than [this] philosophy to examine, ta gar toutOi sumbebEkota kath' hoson estin on, kai tas enantiOseis autou hE on, ouk allEs epistEmEs E philosophias theOrEsai, a28-b6 [with a long example in parentheses, perielOn gar panta ta aisthEta theOrei . . .] 5. physics [on the other hand] investigates beings not as beings, but as they partake of motion; and dialectic and sophistic, attributes, but not as being. So it is left to the philosopher to be the investigator of being, b6-b11 6. recap. Our [third] problem [in book Beta] is solved, b11-b17 [this ends chapter iii] [The word, epistEmE, is used nine times in chapter iii. It is usually translated "science," as in "first science" and "the science we seek," or (as here) "the science of being," etc. This is something quite different from what we usually mean by "science" in our time, and have meant for several centuries. For Aristotle it means certain knowledge, meaning II., 2., in Liddell and Scott, where it is opposed to doxa, opinion, and where several references to Plato's and Aristotle's use of the word are given. Also look at the entry for epistamai, the verb from which this noun is derived, "to know as a fact, to know for certain," etc. This usage is attributed as early as Homer. Alot has been written about these words, which I won't even begin to cite here. It is only my aim to remind us to disabuse ourselves of modern notions of science. Aristotle is simply asking, what can we know for sure? perhaps organizing his thoughts somewhat, and it is best for us to take it at that. It is something very new] 7. [chapter iv repeats the foregoing discussion, but emphasizing the distinction of mathematics and the first philosophy, rather than what they have in common] a. although mathematics uses common [notions] in its own way, it is a part of first philosophy to investigate it. Example of the equals axiom, common to all quantities. But mathematics treats its objects not as beings, but as quantities, b17-b25 b. philosophy does not treat its objects as sumbebEkota, but as being qua being, b25-b27 c. it's the same with physics as with mathematics. Physics treats properties and principles of beings qua in motion, and not as being. So physics and mathematics are assigned as [just] parts of wisdom, b27-b33 [The parallels with Gamma, i - ii, are obvious, even down to one interesting detail, a reference to dialectic and sophistic in both places (1004b17, 1061b8), but then these two references themselves are at odds with one another. [But consider once more the last section above (b27-b33): the principles of beings in motion are the province of physics, not metaphysics. Yet the very next book, Lambda (XII), turns out to be a physical metaphysics, about motion, as you will see. These chapters become somewhat more comprehensible, if understood as part of an effort to change the subject, so to speak] EFL, 3/15/97 KAPPA (XI) METAPHYSICS Chapter v The law of non-contradiction [This chapter and the following recapitulate the balance of Book Gamma (IV). Five pages of Ross' text here recapitulate nineteen pages there, where matters are spelled out in much greater detail. The shorter, simple summary of K is easier to comprehend, while the longer discussion of Gamma explains more. In any case their parallelism is evident. Much of the discussion in both is devoted to some Sophists and Presocratics and various of their arguments. Here most of these appear in chapter vi, which I will take up next. This chapter v states the law of non-contradiction itself, and his chief argument against those who would deny it] 1. ouk endechetai to auto kath' hena kai ton auton chronon einai kai mE einai, there cannot be and not be the same at one and the same time, and other self-contradictions of this kind, kai talla ta touton autois antikeimena ton tropon, 1061b34-1062a2 [e.g., Eubulides' Liar. Ta autois antikeimena is the key to his ad hominem argument following] 2. there is no proof, a2-a5 3. but against someone who maintains contrary assertions, to show that this is false one must use some such argument as is the same, although it doesn't seem like it [what he is saying in effect is that the denier of the law contradicts himself], only thus is there proof against one who says opposite statements can be truthful, a5-a11 4. for community of speech there must be understanding: each name must be understood and must mean something clear, some one thing. If to be THIS means something, it is impossible to affirm its contradiction, a11-a19 5. [again] if a name means something and this is true, it must be this. What must be cannot not be. You can't make contradictory assertions and denials of the same thing. Example: a man is a man; he cannot be a horse or not a man, a19-a30 6. there is no simple proof of this [law], but only proof against one who maintains such things. Even Heraclitus arguing in this manner would have been forced to agree that contrary statements cannot be true. If what he says is true, it can't be true. I mean that the same could be and not be. This is as true of compound and complex statements as it is of simple ones, a30-b7 [Heraclitus, the great exponent of change, would of course be seen as arguing that things can be and not be, since they are always changing: panta rei, ouden menei, etc.] 7. [recap] if nothing is truly affirmed, then even this statement would be false. If something is, then their claim is dissolved, and discussion is altogether done away with, b7-b11 Chapter vi Possible origins of denials of the law 1. similar to what has been said is Protagoras' dictum, that man is the measure of all things, pantOn chrEmatOn metron anthrOpos, meaning that what is true depends upon the beholder, and may differ for different persons, 1062b12-b19 2. where did this notion come from? For some it seems to have come from the opinions of the physicists; for others, from [the fact that] our perceptions are not the same. What is pleasant to some is the opposite to others, b20-b24 [one might expect that he means the variety of the opinions of the physicists as to the basic stuff of the world, but that does not fit what follows: it seems to be their opinions about change] 3. [opinions of the physicists about change] a. it is a common opinion of nearly all physicists that nothing comes from not-being, but everything from being. If then the white does not come into being where it already exists, then the white would come from the not-white, so according to them, there would be coming into being from not-being, if the white is not the same as the not-white, b24-b30 b. it's not difficult to solve that problem. It was pointed out in the Physics [A, vii-ix] how what comes into being comes from not-being, and how from being [Aristotle's doctrines of the hupokeimenon substrate which persists through change, and of potentiality/actuality] To adhere to the opinions and fantasies of those who argue this, is foolish, b30-b35 4. [changes of perception] a. the same will not taste different, if other flavors have not affected the perception and judgement [e.g., a sweet orange will taste sour, after a piece of candy, or, as Xenophanes of Colophon had said, "if God had not created yellow honey, man would regard figs as sweeter than now, ei mE chlOron ephuse theos meli, pollon ephaskon glussona suka pelesthai - DK38]. But if this is the case, take another man's judgement. So also with other such. It is no different from the illusion of doubleness brought on by pressing under the eye with the finger, b35-1063a10 b. generally it is absurd to base the judgement of the truth on changing sensible objects. We must look for truth where things always remain the same and there is no change, such as in the universe (kosmos), a10-a17 c. change has a substrate (kimoumenon ti) and not contradiction, eti d' ei kinEsis esti, kai kinoumenon ti, kineitai de pan ek tinos eis ti, dei ara to kinoumenon einai en ekeinOi ex hou kinEsetai kai ouk einai en autOi, kai eis todi kineisthai kai gignesthai en toutOi, to de kata tEn antiphasin mE sunalEtheuesthai kat autous, a17-a21 d. If you suppose a changing quantity is and is not, because it is of something infinite, why should this apply to change in quality, which is well defined? The ousia is in the quality, a22-a28 e. why follow the doctor's prescription, if it is not what it is? a28-a35 f. If the change is in ourselves, it is not in the object of our sensation. But if we do not change, something remains [stable], a35-1063b7 5. it isn't easy to solve these problems, since there is no premiss to appeal to, but it is easy to meet them, and resolve them, in the manner above, b7-b15 6. [recap] so it appears that contrary statements about the same thing at the same time cannot be affirmed, because all contrariety is privation, b15-b19 7. likewise there is no middle term (ana meson), b19-b24 8. appeal to other prior and contemporary doctrines is wrong a. Heraclitus' [mentioned in chapter v, 1062a32, ff.], b24-b25 b. Anaxagoras' doctrine of mixture, that there is a share of everything in everything, en panti pantos einai moiran, if he means actually and separately [is wrong], b25-b30 c. Likewise, all statements cannot be false or all true. There are contradictory conclusions like this: to say that everything is false is self-contradictory; and he who speaks truly that everything is false does not speak falsely, homoiOs de oude pasas pseudeis oud' alEtheis tas phaseis dunaton einai, di' alla te polla tOn sunachthentOn an duscherOn dia tautEn tEn thesin, kai dioti pseudOn men ousOn pasOn oud' auto touto tis phaskOn alEtheusei, alEthOn de pseudeis einai pasas legOn ou pseusetai, b30-b35 [another allusion to Eubulides of Miletus, and the Liar Paradox, about which see comment on Book Gamma, April 11, 1996. By the way, in that comment I failed to mention a couple of important references to self-contradiction: Plato, Theaetetus, 171A-C, and Alexander Aphrodisias' comment on Gamma, Metaphysics, 1012b13-b18, in ed. Hayduck, 1891, p.340 (Alexander mentions the Theaetetus). How did we overlook these? EFL, 3/22/97 KAPPA (XI) METAPHYSICS Chapter vii "Separate and unmoved" [Whatever the provenance of Book K, it is clear that the writer is working themes here in K, vii, that were worked in E, i: the role of physics in relation to the investigation of on hE on, being qua being, and the role of chOrismos, separation. Whatever he says here, the facts of the matter are that physics plays two roles in the Metaphysics. (1) In Books Zeta, Eta, Theta, it plays little or no role at all. These Books are about abstractions, ousia, matter, form, universals, genera, and such, even when discussing "things that become," ta gignomena. These are truly metaphysical. (2) In Kappa we will see the Physics quoted at length in upcoming chapters. In Lambda it plays a main role, as we move through the spheres of the heavens to arrive at the First, ho prOtos ouranos, and then at the Unmoved Prime Mover, to prOton kinoun akinEton. This is metaphysical in a very different sense. So there are two distinct metaphysics, and they parallel two kinds of chOrismos. What is "separate?" Separation from body, from matter, is what he is talking about here, of course. But what is that? It can be either one of two things: (1) in Zeta it means immaterial, not material, in the sense that a thought or a concept or an abstraction, like courage or justice or the square root of two is immaterial and separate, or (2) in Lambda it will mean physically separate, beyond the outermost heaven, a place where the prOton kinoun akinEton is to be found by way of physical extrapolation. (I am anticipating our reading to come here, but you should know this, in order to appreciate what we are reading right now). Here in K, vii, Aristotle is preoccupied with separation, chOrismos. He will find two answers, but will he be fully aware of that? He never comes up with his standard remark, pollachOs legetai to chOrismos! [It is unfortunate that so many readers have gotten sidetracked here by Aristotle's comparison of the various sciences. It is an easy topic to play with, but it is not the point of the discussion here. The point is the distinction of metaphysics ("the first science," "the science we seek," etc.) and physics, and their rapprochement in what follows, in Lambda.] 1. each branch of knowledge seeks principles and causes of its objects, like medical, athletic, or any of the rest of the constructive and intellectual (poiEtikOn kai mathEmatikOn) sciences. Each of these concerns a defined class of existents, but [does] not [concern] being by itself (hOs huparchon kai on, ouch hE de on). That is another science beside those. They operate through perception or deduction, but there is no demonstration of ousia, or of to ti estin, 1063b36-1064a10 2. if there is a physical science, it is not practical or constructive. It must be theoretical, contemplative, a10-a19 3. since it must be determined what kind of a subject each science has: is it material or separate? like the snub [in a nose] or the concave? One of these is in matter (meta tEs hulEs), the other separate from matter (chOris tEs hulEs), a19-a28 [Notice that not only is Aristotle distinguishing the material and the non-material, but he does it in material and non-material way. We usually content ourselves with the latter] 4. and since there is a separate science of being qua being, it should be asked, whether it is the same or different from physics, epei d' esti tis epistEmE tou ontos hE on kai chOriston, skepteon poteron pote tEi phusikEi ten autEn theteon einai tautEn E mallon heteran [then follows the remark contrasting physics and mathematics with our first science, in respect to separation and motion of their objects, finally segregating the first science:] peri to chOriston ara on kai akinEton hetera toutOn amphoterOn tOn epistEmOn esti tis, eiper huparchei tis ousia toiautE, legO de chOristE kai akinEtos, hoper peirasometha deiknunai, there is a science of the separate and immovable, different from both those sciences [physics and mathematics], if there is some such separate and immovable ousia, as we will endeavor to show. [And he goes on:] if there is such a nature in things, it is divine, a first and highest principle. So there are three kinds of speculative science, physical, mathematical and theological, a28-b6. [It would be a mistake to make too much of this word, "theological" here. The theological character of Aristotle's Unmoved Prime Mover is not its important aspect. Furthermore, it was far from the sort of character you and I associate with "theological." We could be easily misled] 5. the science of being qua being, on hE on, has to do with universals, and is prior to physics and mathematics, katholou dei theinai . . . ei d' estin hetera phusis kai ousia chOristE kai akinEtos, heteran anagkE kai tEn epistEmEn autEs einai kai proteran tEs physikEs kai katholou tOi prOteran, b6-b14 Chapter viii Other meanings of being: accident and truth [Continuing with the recapitulation of the early Books of the Metaphysics, Kappa viii begins by taking up the remaining chapters of E, chapters ii, iii and iv, about the various other kinds of being that were dismissed earlier, and are dismissed again here: accidental being, and (barely mentioned) being as truth. Accidental reminds him (perhaps accidentally) of the Physics. And Aristotle does begin to think in physical terms in the next chapter. That is an abrupt change in his program, which otherwise has been following the topics of Alpha through Epsilon Metaphysics (excepting Delta)] 1. none of the traditional sciences treats of the accidental, neither can there be a science of the accidental [examples in a long parenthesis], 1064b15-b32 2. definition of the accidental: what occurs not always or necessarily, nor much of the time, but by chance, ouk aei d' oud' ex anagkEs oud' hOs epi to polu. There is no science of it, dioto d' ouk estin epistEmE tou toioutou, b32-1065a6 3. there are no causes or principles of accidental being, such as there are for real being, hoti de tou kata sumbebEkos ontos ouk eisin aitiai kai archai, toiautai hoisaiper tou kath' hauto ontos, dElon. estai gar hapant' ex anagkEs. If this must be this; and that, that; not by chance but necessarily, this will reach down to the last effect, and everything will be necessary, and chance is done away with, a6-a14 4. same with events: everything will happen necessarily, a14-a21 5. truth and the accidental: truth is in combination of thought, and is a property of thought, to men estin en sumplokEi dianoias kai pathos en tautEi (so we do not seek its principles, but only those of the externally separate). The accidental is not necessary, but undefined; its causes are irregular and infinite, a21-a26 [There is no sharp transition here to extracts from Physics, B (II), as Ross might lead us to think (see note to 1065a26, vol. II, page 363). There are to be sure intermittent parapharases from Physics, but the structure of the text shows that Aristotle is following the plan laid out in Metphysics, E, ii, as we shall see next week. The break comes not at 1065a26, but at 1065b8] 6. purpose is in physical things or of thought, but chance is when one of these happens by accident. As there is being itself and accidental being, so there is cause and accidental cause, hOsper gar kai on esti to men kath' hauto to de kata sumbebEkos, houtO kai aition, a26-b30. Chance is an accidental cause in matters of choice and purpose. Its causes are indefinite, thus inscrutable to human calculation, a30-a35. There is good luck and bad. Success and misfortune accompany alot of these. Since nothing accidental is prior the essential, it is no cause. If chance or accident are cause in the world, mind and nature are prior cause, a35-1065b4 EFL, 3/29/97 KAPPA (XI) METAPHYSICS Chapter ix Motion and change [You may recall that Book E, after drawing our attention to pure being, on hE on, on haplOs, in its opening chapter, went on in chapter ii, to subdivide this, and to summarize four kinds of pure being. There are, it said, (1) accidental being, (2) being as truth, (3) being of the categories, and (4) being as potential and actual. Kappa takes note of all of these at the end of chapter viii AND in the first three lines of chapter ix. Accident, truth and potentiality/actuality are given summary notice, and being of the categories (eventually narrowed down to ousia) is left hanging here, after the briefest mention in 1065b6-b7. It will reappear in the first five chapters of the next Book, Lambda, where he will recapitulate Zeta, Eta and Theta, before returning to his "physical metaphysics." Meanwhile, commencing at 1065b7, he digresses on the physicals, motion and change] 1. esti de to men energeiai monon, to de dunamei to de dunamei kai energeiai, to men on to de poson to de tOn loipOn, there is just actuality, [just] potentiality, and potentiality and actuality, [and there is] being, quantity and the rest [of the categories], 1065b5-b7 [Ross' translation (vol. II, p. 324) and explanation (p. 326) overlooks the import of these words. Look again at these lines, 1065a21-b7, a section of text that straddles the break between chapters viii and ix. They constitute a unit that refers serially to all four of the divisions of on hE on mentioned in E, ii, 1026a33-b2, albeit in different order. You will remember that those constituted an important step in Aristotle's scheme, in the slow and deliberate narrowing down of his inquiry from all being, first to being qua being, then to the four kinds of this, then to the being of the categories, and finally to ousia alone. This passage, 1065a21-b7, refers to the climax of that concentration of inquiry. It is a significant development in the architecture of the Metaphysics, that he seems to want to recapitulate now. But he hesitates, and from this point on he becomes very physical in the rest of Book Kappa. Why? Because the potency- actuality gradient reminds him of motion? Perhaps, perhaps not. Perhaps we had better simply content ourselves with the facts: he digresses on motion, and then returns to his recapitulation in Lambda, i - v, and then returns again to motion in Lambda, vi - x. Whatever Aristotle's motives here, the fact is that these alternations add up to two metaphysics] 2. change and motion: there is no change other than in things, ouk esti de tis kinEsis para ta pragmata. Change occurs in the categories of being. In each [category] it occurs in two ways, [1] as in form-steresis, and [2] from opposite to opposite, as white-black, up-down, etc. There are as many kinds [of change and motion] as there are of being [e.g. categories], hOste kinEseOs kai metabolEs tosaut' eidE hosa tou ontos, b7-b14 3. in each kind, I call change [motion] the actualization of the potential as such [i.e., itself], tEn tou dunamei hEi toiouton estin energeian legO kinEsin. [Examples] Then when the potential is actualized, not qua itself but qua movable, that is motion, hE dE tou dunamei ontos, hotan entelecheiai on energEi, ouch hEi auto all hEi kinEton, kinEsis estin. I mean qua thus, legO de to hEi hOde: bronze is potentially a statue. But the realization of the bronze qua bronze is not change. The essence of bronze and the potentiality for something are not the same. If they were, the reality of the bronze would be some motion. But they are not the same. [As] to be able to fall sick and to get well are not the same - because [if they were] to be well and to be sick would be the same [which of course they are not] - it is the substrate that gets well or sick [i.e. changes. Likewise in the case of the bronze]. So if they are not the same, like color is not the same as visible, motion is the realization of the potential qua potential, b14-b35 [this is summed up in what immediately follows:] 4. actualization is the movement, not the product: actualization of the buildable is the act of building, not the house, 1066a1- a7 [thus energeia has two meanings: [1] a motion, and [2] the actuality that results. Bonitz has documented these thoroughly in his Index, page 251, col. 1, lines 21 ff. That Aristotle does not call our attention to this ambiguity as such, is a fact of significance] 5. the error of other thinkers [Pythagoreans and Plato] who explain change in terms of the sustoicheia and tanantia, because one side (the right) of these lists is negative and privative, therefore indefinite, like motion, a7-a17 6. motion (change) seems indefinite (boundless, aoriston) because it is reckoned neither among potential things nor among actual things. This is why it is difficult to understand, a17-a26 7. [recap] the actualization of the movable is motion, a26-a34 [Physics, Gamma, i and ii, is being referred to or loosely copied here. Commencing at 1065b14, about forty one of the remaining lines of the chapter follow closely but not exactly, with transpositions and omissions, about sixty three lines of Physics Gamma, i. [Is part of the difficulty here, that the verb, "move", is both transitive and intransitive, and Greek has a middle voice, while English does not? Cf. Smyth, Greek Grammar, sect. 1708] EFL, 4/5/97 KAPPA (XI) METAPHYSICS Chapter x To apeiron, the unlimited, is not actual [Since change/motion has been called indefinite, aoriston [1066a17- a26], he addresses this topic next. Except he calls it apeiron. The two terms are almost equivalent, both meaning "without end, or boundary," a + horos, a + peras. apeiron in the Physics appears to be used somewhat more specifically (cf. Ross' index, page 734). In the next chapter he returns to discussion of change/motion. Meanwhile, this digression:] 1. [definition] the unlimited is what cannot be traversed either [1] because it is not in its nature to be so (like unseen sound), or [2] it has no end either [a] utterly, or [b] having in its nature the possibility of a limit, it does not, to d' apeiron E [1] to adunaton dielthein tOi mE pephukenai diienai, kathaper hE phOnE aoratos, E [2] to diexodon echon ateleutEton, E [a] hO molis, E [b] hO pephukenos echein me echei diexodon E peras. And it is by addition or removal or both, eti prosthesei E aphairesei E ampho, 1066a35-1066b1 [cf. Physics, 204a3-a7] 2. it cannot be something separate, because if it is not a magnitude or a multitude, but an ousia, and not an attribute, it will be indivisible. If indivisible, it is not unlimited, b1-b7 [cf. Physics, 204a8-a14] 3. how can it be something by itself, not a number or magnitude? Furthermore, if it is an attribute, it is not an element of beings, qua unlimited, b7-b11 [cf. Physics, 204a14-a20] 4. and clearly the unlimited is not actual, ouk estin energeiai einai to apeiron, because any part of it will be infinite, estai gar hotioun autou apeiron meros to lambanomenon, so either it is indivisible, or, if divisible, infinitely so. But it cannot be many infinities (like air is part of air, so infinite part of infinite, if it is an ousia and a principle), hOste E adiaireton, E eis apeira diaireton, ei meriston, polla d'einai to auto adunaton apeira (hOsper gar aeros aEr meros, houtOs apeiron apeirou, ei estin ousia kai archE). So it is impartible and indivisible, ameriston ara kai adaireton. But that is impossible for an actual infinite, alla adunaton to entelecheiai on apeiron, because it must be a quantity, poson gar einai anagkE. Therefore it is an attribute, kata sumbebEkos ara huparchei. But if that is the case, we have pointed out that it cannot be a principle, but that of which it is predicated, like the air or the even number [is a principle], b11-b22 [this passage is his explicit objection to prior speculation that made the mysterious infinite something special in its own right, whether Anaximander or Plato or whoever] [cf. Physics, 204a20- a31, a34-a35] 5. that it is not in sensibles [rather, it is an attribute] is made clear as follows, hoti d' en tois aisthEtois ouk estin, enthende dElon, b22: a. logical: bodies are limited by plane surfaces, and numbers or the numbered are countable, b22-b26 [cf.Physics, 204b4-b8] b. physical, b26 [cf. Physics, 204b10-b11]: (1) neither a compound nor a simple body [can be infinite], b26-b27 [cf. Physics, 204b11] (a) an infinite body cannot be compound, if the elements are limited in number: these must equal their opposites, and none be unlimited. If any were greater, the finite would be overpowered by the infinite. And each cannot be infinite, b26-b34 [cf. Physics, 204b11-b15] (b) nor can [the infinite] be a single simple body, as some [Anaximander, et al.] say, beside the elements, or one of the elements, like fire (Heraclitus) or the one [Parmenides]. Everything is from contraries, b34- 1067a7 [cf. Physics, 204b22-b24, b33-205a7] (2) the sensible must be somewhere, with its own place, whether whole and part, a7-a8 [cf. Physics, 205a10-a12] (a) if it is same in kind, it will be motionless or always moving. Nothing will have its place, a8-a15 [cf. Physics, 205a12-a19] (b) if the whole is unlike, places are unlike, and the body of the whole is not one, except by contact; furthermore, it is bounded or infinite in form, a15-a18 [cf. Physics, a19-a22] 1) it can't be bounded, a18-a20 [Physics, a22-a29] 2) it can't be infinite, for its place would be infinite, and the elements. If the place is limited, so is the all, a20-a23 [cf. Physics, a29- a32] (c) [recap] unlimited body and place are incompatible, a23-a33 [cf. Physics, 205b24-b33, b35-206a7] (3) infinities of magnitude, motion and time are different. They are ordered, motion measured by magnitude, time by motion, a33-a37 [cf. Physics, 206a10-a12 mention time, magnitude and number, and differently. So did Physics, 202b30-b31. One may suspect that the Metaphysics is copying the Physics, and doing so rather clumsily! The end of the discussion in Metaphysics (above) apes the lines in Physics, 206a10-a12, but its details (magnitude, motion and time) are those of Physics, 202b30-b31] [The text of the Metaphysics is shorter than the text of the Physics. We may wonder, poteron proteron poteron husteron? My general impression is that the treatment in the Physics, fuller and clearer, is the more canonical one, and that the Metaphysics contains a rapid and not too careful reproduction of only as much of it as the writer finds useful here. For those of you who are curious about this, I append here a brief outline of the discussion of the infinite in the Physics, Book Gamma, chapters iv - viii: 1. prior doctrines made the infinite an archE chap. iv 2. five grounds for belief in the infinite 3. a problem: does it exist or not, and if it exists, as ousia, or as an attribute, or if neither, then of number? 4. the many meanings of infinite 5. there is no separate infinite, chOriston tOn aisthEtOn v 6. it is not a body, ouk esti sOma apeiron 7. yet in some sense it exists vi what IS it? it is a potentiality 8. definition of it: that of which quantitatively there is always something more outside to take 9. it is unknowable, agnOston hE apeiron 10. number and magnitude compared vii 11. related to the material cause 12. residual considerations viii [A very brief recapitualation of the history of to apeiron, the unlimited, might be in order, as context for this chapter. No doubt it was addressed by numerous Greek thinkers at an early time in one way or another, but the first recorded is Anaximander of Miletus, sixth century B.C., who named it the archE of all things. Aristotle treated it in his Physics, as we have just seen. Yet it has always remained a bit of a puzzle, which is perhaps an important point to remember. Experts on our time have been deeply divided on this subject, especially after the great mathematicians, Cantor, Frege and Russell, were brought up short by that old favourite of Eubulides of Miletus, the "Liar," the self-contradictory statement, in this case the "set of all sets that are not members of themselves." Discussions of the infinite, whether in the fourth century B.C. or the twentieth A.D. seem to take us off the edge of reality. Perhaps we should not be surprised to find it difficult. Here it is but part of the discussion of motion, to which Aristotle returns in the next chapter. For him motion will turn out to be endless, unlimited, (or as we would say) infinite. That will create a problem] EFL, 4/12/97 KAPPA (XI) METAPHYSICS Chapter xi, Change and motion (again) [Chapter x, preceding this, was a digression on the nature of the infinite, to apeiron, brought about by the observation at the end of ix (1066a17-a26) that motion has an element of indefiniteness about it, tou de dokein aoriston einai tEn kinEsin aition, etc. Now in chapter xi Aristotle returns to the consideration of change and motion. Since he has been borrowing and continues to borrow from the Physics, it might be a good idea to look at that, to see just what he is borrowing and what he is not, and to see how the two texts fit each other. SUMMARY OUTLINE OF THE PHYSICS The search for principles, for archai Alpha introductory i how many are there? ii prior doctrines monists Eleatics iii Ionian physicists iv pluralists Anaximander, Empedocles, Anaxagoras v they all make the archai pairs of contraries Aristotle's account: there are three archai: two opposites vi and a third, the substrate (hupokeimenon) vii the old problem of being and not-being viii (nothing from nothing, etc.) is resolved by this substrate, and by the doctrines of attribute and of potentiality/actuality Basic definition and principles Beta what are ta phusei? i things having the principles of motion and rest substrate and form not separate physics distinguished from mathematics and metaphysics ii cause iii the four causes modes of cause luck, chance [= METAPH., K, viii] iv-vi recap of the causes; their relations vii-ix What is motion? Gamma preliminary remarks i associated concepts ouk esti tis kinEsis para ta pragmata kinds of change: being, quantity, quality, place definition of motion hE tou dunamei ontos entelecheia comparison with Pythagoreans & Plato ii concepts of potentiality and actuality [Gamma, i & ii = METAPH., K, ix] associated concepts infinite [= METAPH., K, x] iv-viii place Delta, i-v void vi-ix time x-xiv Further observations, definitions [= METAPH.,K, xi, xii] Epsilon The continuity of time, magnitude and motion Zeta the nature of continuity i demonstration: time and magnitude are continuous ii and divisible; Zeno's dilemma the now iii motion corresponding divisibility of all factors iv end and beginning of motion v the proper time of motion vi no limited motion in unlimited time, vii or unlimited motion in limited time rest viii motion and rest kata ti Zeno's four dilemmas of space, time & motion ix the indivisible cannot move; no unlimited motion x except circular Book Eta is omitted, as not belonging here Does motion begin and end? No, it is eternal Theta, i prior opinions arguments objections ii why some things rest, some move iii some things always move; some always rest iv all motion due to a mover the series of movers must terminate v the first self-moved mover the unmoved first mover eternal vi causes local motion vii causes rotary motion viii-ix Zeno reconsidered has no local parts or magnitude x [The particular points that Kappa touches upon are indicated. They comprise a very small part of the whole. But the Physics and the Metaphysics do not just touch each other at the points indicated in this outline. As you are going to see, they both end up at the same place, with the Unmoved First Mover. How do they get there? By quite different routes, it would seem. The Physics, after long preliminaries, a review of prior doctrines (as is Aristotle's habit), in Book A; basic definitions and principles, in Beta; and other preliminary remarks and discussions of associated concepts, Gamma through Epsilon; takes up an important and long-standing problem of motion (the centerpiece of the definition of ta phusei, 192b13-14): it is the question of the continuity of time, magnitude and motion raised in Zeta. This question had apparently been forced upon the attention of his contemporaries by Zeno the Eleatic, with his famous paradoxes of motion. It is not by accident that these are mentioned not once but three times in these final chapters of the Physics, in Books Zeta and Theta (Book Eta is alien). They lie at the heart of the motivation of this treatise. Aristotle's added task is to explain what kind of motion satisfies the requirements of the beginning of all motion, if motion is infinite. It has to have some kind of a beginning. This is another paradox underlying the whole story of motion. It leads him to the Unmoved Prime Mover, the same end as in his Metaphysics. But in the Metaphysics he is led there by a different road: by the question, what is the separate and unmoved being that is (not the beginning of motion, but) the first being of all, on hei on, or as he then goes on to call it, ousia? The first part of the Metaphysics (in our overall outline) does this after one manner, strictly ontological. Then the last part, at the end of Lambda, does it again, after another, a physical manner. How strange! [With this, let us return to chapter xi of Kappa] 1. three kinds of change: accidental, partial, and primarily per se [wholly], to men kata sumbebEkos, to de tOi toutou ti, hoion kata merE, [to] de ti ho kath' hauto prOton kineitai, 1067b1-b7 [cf. Physics, Epsilon, 224a21-a33. The primarily and wholly per se moved has to have something else that moves it, to kath' hauto kinEton, kat' allEn de kinEsin heteron, hoion alloiOton, kai alloiOseOs hugianton E thermanton heteron, the application of heat and the restoration of health are different changes, 224a29-a30. This line is missing in the Metaphysics, but the point is in both texts, 1067b8 and 224a34: there is a proximate mover, esti de ti to kinoun prOton] 2. [the several factors in change:] to kinoun prOton, the proximate mover; to kinoumenon, the moved; and time, and from what and into what, en hOi chronOi kai ex hou kai eis ho. The forms and the states and the place are unchanged [they are not in motion, rather are the termini and loci], b7-b12 [Physics, 224b11-b13] 3. change (not accidental) is between opposites, intermediates, and contradiction, hE de mE kata sumbebEkos metabolE ouk en hapasin huparchei all' en tois enantiois kai metaxu kai en antiphasei, b12-b14 [cf. Physics, 224b28-b30] 4. [four possibilities:] what is changed changes either [1] from something into something, [2] from not something into something, [3] from something into not something, or [4] from not something into not something. since there is no change from not something to not something, that leaves three, b14-b21 [cf. Physics, 225a3-a12] 5. from not something to something [2] is genesis; from something to not something [3], passing out of existence. Not being cannot move or rest, except accidentally. That leaves them out. Motion and change are only from something to something, anagkE tEn ex hupokeimenon eis hupokeimenon kinEsin einai monEn. These somethings are either contraries or their intermediates, b21- 1068a7 [cf. Physics, 225a12-b5] [What does this chapter accomplish? It focusses our attention upon motion itself, not accidental, not partial, but kath' hauto, and then it establishes various characteristics of it. The chief of these is that it is brought about by another motion, kat' allEn de kinEsin heteron. It adds that motion is between contraries or their intermediates. All of this foreshadows the direction this discussion will take in the sequel. One could almost predict at this point that the first of all motions must be circular, from pole to pole] EFL, 4/19/97 [For those of you who wanted consolidated summaries, Book by Book, http://www.morec.com now has them through Book Iota. Gamma has been revised, to supply the last two chapters and other stuff that I had left out by mistake. Kappa will be loaded sometime next month when we are finished with it. [For the next few weeks my schedule may be uneven, on account of extraneous interferences. I will put next week's comment late, and the following week's too. Thank you for your tolerance] KAPPA (XI) METAPHYSICS Chapter xii Change and motion (cont.) 1. there are three kinds of change: in quality, place and quantity, poiotEti, topOi, posOi, 1068a8-a14 [Physics, E, i, 225b5-b14] 2. there is no change of change, which would be of two kinds, a14- a17 [Physics, b14-b16] a. change as of substrate [i.e. the change itself is the substrate of a change], a17-a20 [Physics, b17-b21] [this of course was his great mistake, failing to note acceleration, as Galileo later did. The understanding of the identity of motion and rest, resulting from Newton's first and second Laws of Motion, mathematical though it is, tells us alot more about motion than Aristotle did] b. there is no change into another kind of change, a20-a22 [Physics, b21-b23] (1) except accidentally, kata sumbebEkos, a22-a33 [Physics, b23-b33] [I think he is referring to a succession of changes, which obviously can and do occur] (2) it would lead to infinite regress, a33-b6 [Physics, 225b33-226a6 (3) confusion of coming to be and perishing, b6-b10 [Physics, a6-a10] [for this difficult passage, see Ross, II, 343] (4) a substrate is required, b10-b15 [Physics, a10-a16 3. [recap] there is only change of quality, quantity, and place, b15-b20 [Physics, a23-a29] 4. the unchangeable and rest, b20-b25 [Physics, b10-b16] 5. [sundry definitions, b26-1069a12, Physics, 226b18-227a12] hama, together, b26 chOris, separate, b26-b27 haptesthai, to be touched, b27 metaxu, between, b27-b30 enantion, contrary, b30-b31 hexEs, next, b31-1069a1 echomenon, contiguous, a1-a2 change is between contraries [mss. vary on the placement of these lines. See Ross and Jaeger, app. crit. ad loc. In the Physics, Ross places them above with the prior reference to metaxu], a2-a5 suneches, continuous, a5-a8 ephexes, in order, one after another, a8-a12 6. difference between a point (hE stigmE) and a monad (hE monas), a12-a14 [omitted in Physics] [So we are done with Book K. It has recapitulated Books Alpha through Epsilon, and then taken a special look at the nature of motion, drawing upon the text of the Physics. It has also made me reconsider some of the remarks I made about Book Iota at the beginning of this study. True, Iota is something special as an examination of prominent doctrines that the world of Aristotle inherited. But that does not isolate it from the rest of the Metaphysics. Its doctrine of opposites has played a noticeable part in the course of Book K, and will further affect what follows, as suggested near the end of last week's comment. Our next aim should be to see how K relates to the following Book, Lambda. [How did these Books come to be in the order they are in, and have the text that they have? Consider the possibilities. Some parts, like K, could have been an early version, as Jaeger showed. They could also be a late extraction, or condensation by Aristotle, for who-knows-what purpose. Or they could have been a student's notes or abstract, as Little Alpha is generally thought to be. Or they could have been an editor's rearrangement. Or the rearrangements of more than one editor. Or corrupted by copyists. Or the victim of who knows what circumstances (the circumstances we do know are appalling enough: buried in a jar in the family cellar for one or two centuries - maybe). The possibilities are simply too many for us to ignore. The only thing we can count on is the consensus of the centuries of tradition. They seem to have put their imprimatur on the text that they have passed down to us. It has made sense to them. It little matters what happened, because what happened could be almost anything, and this is what we have. We must make the best ot it. Although words, phrases, even sentences may have been altered or corrupted, it seems probable that the overall structure and repeated themes have been stable. That is alot to work with. [Meanwhile keep in mind that outline of the Physics in last week's comment. You can't fail to see that there is alot of metaphysics in the Physics, and alot of physics in the Metphysics. What is it then that distinguishes their orientation. The Physics is primarily a study of motion that was prompted by Zeno and his problems of motion. The Metaphysics is in primis a study of being, of on hE on, prompted by Parmenides' One Being and Plato's Ideas. Both end with the Unmoved Prime Mover, which Aristotle seems to regard as an entity common to both studies. It fits more naturally in the Physics. In the Metaphysics it is perhaps not an aberration, but certainly some sort of change of course. This occurs in Kappa] EFL, 4/26/97