Book B (III), chapter one Problems, the summary list The place of Book B in the structure of the treatise as a whole is explained in the first seventeen lines (995a24-b4). The structure of the book itself is made plain by the serial listing of the problems in brief (995b4-996a17) in the remainder of the first chapter, and the serial discussion of each in detail in the remaining five chapters. There is a slight discrepancy of order, and an addition of one problem in the detailed discussion. None of this poses any difficulty. The several individual problems are clearly marked by introductory tag phrases, such as poteron, esti d' aporia, aporEseien an tis, etc., and the internal structure of most of the problems is marked by recurrent tags, such as mias men . . . alla mEn ei, ei men . . . ei de, etc. We should take care not to lose sight of the forest because of the trees. It is not only the particulars of each problem that should concern us, but the underlying causes of perplexity. Often the problems differ chiefly in their linguistic dress. So it is with the dilemma about substance: is it or is it not sensible, material, perishable, individual (4, 8, 10, 12, using the summary list in the first chapter, and the extra, fifteenth problem in the detailed list at the end of chapter vi)? Is there some relation between the second problem and those that deal with the relation of sensibles (etc.) and non-sensibles? Are the questions dealing with genera and elements (6, 7, 9) or with kind and number (9, 11) related? The eleventh and the fourteenth problems are derived from well-known doctrines of Parmenides, the Pythagoreans and Plato about the nature of being, the One and mathematicals: what are their relations with Ideas and the others? These problems are like facets of an underlying general difficulty, or like particular difficulties of actual experience that Aristotle is about to gather up into one investigation: what is the relation of the things we reach with our minds and the things we can touch with our hands? The first, second and thirteenth (potentiality) problems seem especially Aristotelian. The causes, the foundations of logic, and the "other meanings" of potentiality are Aristotle's inventions. The causes mean of course the two pairs, matter and form, and moving and final. They will provide us keys to the structure of the Metaphysics. It was around them that Aristotle formed a comprehensive solution to all the superficially heterogeneous problems. He doesn't set about answering them systematically one by one . Rather he answers them implicitly as he pursues the nature of ousia, mostly, you will notice, in Book Z (VII). To recapitulate, Book B is not just a collection of particular problems. It is an exploration of the facets of one big problem. It was Aristotle's genius that he was able to see them as such. Here is an outline of B (III), i, 995a24-996a17: I. Introduction: the need to state the problems, 995a24-a27 A. Solutions imply problems, a27-a33 B. To know the aim, a33-b2 C. To judge contending arguments, b2-b4 II. Short list of fourteen problems, 995b4-996a15 Since the detailed discussion of the problems is in a slightly different order than in this short list, the order of the problem in the detailed discussion is placed in parentheses at the right. Descriptions here are intentionally brief. 1. one science of the [four] causes, or many? b4-b6, (1) 2. is it the science of the principles of substance only, or also of the principles of demonstration? b6-10, (2) 3. one, or more sciences of all substances? b10-b13 (3) 4. of sensible substances only, or of others? b13-b18 (5) 5. about ousia only, or about its properties? b18-b27 (4) 6. are principles & elements genera, or inherent parts? (6) b27-b29 7. if genera, the last or the first? b29-b31 (7) 8. is there any cause beside matter, or not? etc., b31-36 (8) 9. are principles defined by number or kind? b36-996a2 (9) 10. are they same for perishables & imperishables? a2-a4 (10) 11. are one and being the same, or not? a4-a9 (11) 12. are principles universals, or like individuals, a9-10 (15) 13. are they potential or actual? a10-a12 (14) 14. are numbers and geometricals ousia, or not? a12-a15 (12) a15-a17, completing this first chapter, is a simple end comment, "Not only is it difficult to find the truth of all these, but it isn't easy to state them well." Although abbreviated, this short list follows closely the text, 995b4-996a15. But when we go through the detailed list, do not be surprised to find some discrepancies. Let us deal with them when we come to them. Likewise comment on each problem is reserved until we take it up on the long list. With one very interesting exception: B, i, 995b20-27, etc., pros de toutois peri tautou kai heterou kai enantiotEtos, kai peri proterou kai husterou kai tOn allOn hapantOn tOn toioutOn, etc.: what are these lines talking about? What is their relation to sumbebEkota kath' hauta? And what are these latter? To begin with the second question, Ross in his note to these lines (Aristotle's Metaphysics, Oxford, 1924, p. 224) distinguishes "same, other, like, unlike," etc. from the sumbebEkota kath' hauta. I disagree. Just the contrary. These are examples of sumbebEkota kath' hauta, as the term is used here. The issue comes down to this: what does pros mean here in line 20? Does it mean "beside, in addition to" or something separative like that, as Ross seems to read it? Or does it mean "along with, among" (these) or something inclusive like that? Perhaps the answer is suggested by our first question above. What are these lines talking about? What are these "like, unlike" etc.? They are some of the tanantia of Plato's Parmenides, the list of opposites. The inclusion of enantiotEtos (line 21) simply sums it up, after mention of two particular pairs from that list. Lines 25-27 add a comment: these predicates are not just individual members of a list, but are part of the list of contraries (hen heni enantion), i.e. the tanantia of the Parmenides, and no doubt also of active tradition (peri hosOn hoi dialektikoi, etc.). In short the properties here include this list of tanantia that Plato refers to in the Parmenides and elsewhere, and these are what Aristotle is talking about in these lines, giving some examples, though not the complete list. Who expected to run into these old friends here? The extra problem not appearing in the short list above is no.13 in the long list, at the beginning of chapter vi, 1002b12-b32: why is it necessary to seek anything beside the sensibles and numbers, such as what we call Forms? Here it is as if Aristotle sums up his questions in the context of his relation to Plato. Is this an interpolation of some copyist? Or is it possibly Aristotle's subconscious breaking out with the underlying motivation and doubt behind all these particular questions? - EFL, 12/28/95 (The treatment of genera and use of epi tois atomois in No. 7 would seem to bear out Gerald Harnett's correction of my comment of December 7 on 994b20-b21.) BOOK B (III), chap. ii, to 997a34 The first four problems, in detail 1. are there one or more sciences of the four causes? a18-a20 a. if one, a20-b1 (1) how so, of things that are not opposites? a20-a21 (2) all causes are not present in all things, a21-b1 (a) no cause of motion in the motionless, a22-a23 (b) nor final cause of the motionless, a23-a29 (c) illustration from mathematics, a29-996b1 b. if more, b1-b26 (1) which is the one we seek? b1-b6 (2) example of a house, b6-b8 (3) knowledge of each of several causes has a claim to wisdom, b8-b10 (a) final, hE men . . . , b9-b13 (b) formal, hE de . . . , b13-b22 (c) moving, peri de . . . , b22-b26 [the material cause is not included because there is no knowledge of it by itself, in Aristotle's scheme, as we shall see later. Something that is shapeless & formless does not lend itself to knowledge.] So we are left with a dilemma. Our editors often leave us with suggestions: where in the later text solutions can be found. I would rather ignore those suggestions, and think about these problems and their solutions globally. I don't think Aristotle made a special point of answering these questions systematically, but rather within a larger context. However, if you wish to follow these suggestions, Tredennick and Ross will give you the clues. 2. one or more sciences of demonstration, and of ousia, b26-b33 a. one: not reasonable, ouk eulogon, b33-997a15 (1) why should it be the business of any one science to study the principles of demonstration (like excluded middle and non-contradiction), when these apply to all, b33-997a2 (2) there would be one science of everything, a2-11 b. if different, which is prior? a11-15 3. one or more sciences of all ousiai? a15-a16 a. if not one of all, of which ousia is ours? a16-a17 b. if one, there would be one science of everything, including properties, sumbebEkota kath' hauta, a17-a25 4. one science of ousia only, or also its attributes? a25-a30 [this is no. 5 in the short list] a. if one of both, there'd be demonstration of ousia, here identified with essence (ti estin), a30-a32 b. if different, which studies the attributes? a32-a34 For Aristotle there is no demonstration of ousia (like phusis). Notice a discrepancy here. In the short list (where it is the fifth) this problem asks whether there is one or more sciences of ousia and of sumbebEkota kath' hauta, which were referred to tanantia, opposites, such as we met in Plato's Parmenides, while here in chapter ii, these have been abandoned in favor of sumbebEkota, attributes, without that specific restriction, but rather exemplified quite differently: solids, lines, surfaces and other kinds of mathematical objects. What is the explanation for that discrepancy? There seems to be some confusion, or at least redundancy of this fourth problem and the preceding third. Yet they appear in some respects distinct. But are they? This redundancy, the change in order of the two lists, and the close association of the two may be evidence that three and four should be treated as one single problem. All these first four problems (1, 2, 3 & 5 in the short list), you will notice, revolve around the question, how many sciences are there that we must consider? How many sciences of the four causes, of ontology and logic (epistemology), of various meanings of ousia, of ousia and its attributes? We, the subjects, and our knowledge are the point of reference. It is not the objects of our knowledge that are being inquired into here. They come next. Is there one science of many causes, or of many substances (ousiai), or of many attributes, or of many modes (ontological and logical)? Is there one science of many parts? What is one science? What is ONE? Those of you who have been with us most all this past year will recognize where that takes us: back to the second hypothesis of the Parmenides! A one that is not one. A one with many parts. What is the use of arguing about a one that may turn out to be one, and not one at all? Aristotle himself considers that later in Book I (X). The Metaphysics itself treats all four causes, although, as we have remarked, it looks to some like two metaphysics of two different pairs of the four causes. Anyway the causes may be considered collectively or separately. So much for those. A science of being (here ousia) is a science of all beings, even if it is a science of just being. So much for that. Likewise the attributes. And the modes. The answer to all these questions is yes and no, sic et non. Being by itself, ousia by itself - well - it never comes by itself, excepting only when you think of it that way, as an abstraction. Undeniably we do think - and speak - of it. The system I have been using to identify these problems by number is Ross' system. But there is nothing sacred about that. In fact, some of you will find out, if you have not done so yet, that Tredennick uses a slightly different system. Aquinas used yet a different one. I will continue to use Ross' for consistency's sake, after this warning, while retaining a grain of skepticism about taking these divisions too seriously and rigidly anyway. Many of them flow together with one another, indicating more general underlying problems. If some of you want to investigate all this in greater detail someday, it will be a service, but for now it seems best not to linger, but to get eventually to those underlying problems. Upcoming schedule of my commentary: next week I plan to address the fifth problem. The following week, the sixth and seventh, but that comment, which you might expect in the normal course of affairs to be put on the wire on the eighteenth of January, will be sent a day or two early. From the seventeenth of January until the sixth of February, this shop will be closed. I will be on vacation, thank you, skiing in the Austrian Tirol. Let's hope I return with my shield, not on it. Comment is intended to be resumed on the eighth of February, with problems eight and nine. EFL, 1/4/96 BOOK B (III), chap. ii, 997a34 to end The fifth problem: sensible substance only? With this problem, the fifth here, the fourth in the short list, we enter a group of problems with a different orientation than the first four. These now ask about substance, principles and causes, ousiai, archai and aitiai. I find no obvious reason in their order, other than some cases in which one seems to suggest a next by way of word or thought association. The first to come, number five, may be suggested by the key word, ousia, of the fourth, or it may have been the other way around in the short list. In any case this fifth raises one of the more important questions of all philosophy, and one that has been a defining criterion of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy (whether correctly or incorrectly): are there only sensible substances (ousiai), or others besides these; and whether there happens to be one or more kinds of ousiai, like who say [there are] Ideas and Intermedieates. Aristotle there is really asking the same question twice, except for adding "those who who speak of ideas and intermediates," the second time around. The reference of course is to the platonists, to Plato's school, hoi legontes (997b1). Shortly thereafter Aristotle identifies himself as one of them, with the verb, legomen (b3); then again he seems to dissociate himself, with the verb, phasin (b8). What he does not do, is ascribe the notions that follow to Plato himself, as has been done by others since. What follows in lines b3-b12 is a remarkably emphatic statement of what he is opposed to, and what is often considered the litmus test of Aristotle and Plato himself, not Aristotle and the platonic doctrine as Plato's followers understood it. Aristotle, so far as we can see, is very careful about this. As I have already said elsewhere, he mentions Plato by name fifty six times in his works (Fragmenta excluded), not once exhibiting either opposition to him or an interpretation of his doctrine such as is shown here. But elsewhere he did exhibit strong opposition to the doctrine of Plato's school, which he refers to in many different ways, by individual names (Speusippus, Xenocrates, et al.) and collectively ("those who speak of Ideas," etc.). This is a prime example, right here. To what extent is he criticizing Plato, and to what extent Plato's followers? It is impossible to say with certainty, but is clearly suggested. One reason for the ascription of Plato himself as the object of such criticisms might of course be the doctrine of the Phaedo, which was sometimes preferred to other parts of the Platonic corpus. Another is the natural dichotomy of the two stereotypes of "idealist" and "realist", which call for labels. PLato and Aristotle supplied such labels. Yet there is in these lines here no reference to Plato himself. They are important lines, and I frequently like to refer to them (the "men and horses" passage), since they so clearly raise the issues of the nature of Ideas: what are they? What do various people think they are? (In today's context, what is mind?) When we call them something other than sensibles, do we just mean another kind of the same? Do we anthropomorphise them? Hypostasize them? Certainly we are always tempted to, and many succumb to just that temptation. Aristotle was not, as is here shown. Hoi legontes and hoi phaskousin clearly were. Whether Plato was, is an open question, as we saw while reading his Parmenides. Whereas Aristotle disposes of the claim of Forms, at least as the hoi legontes see them, fairly quickly (997b3-b12), he takes a bit longer to dispose of the intermediates, ta metaxu (b12998a19), and the text is a bit more complicated. Here is the outline of the whole problem: 5. are there sensible ousiai only, or others besides? 997a34-b3 a. forms, b3-b12, the "men and horses," discussed above, b3-b12 b. the intermediates, ta metaxu, like geometricals, have many problems, b12-b14 (1) they create a new class of entities beside forms (tinas phuseis para tas en tOi ouranOi) and sensibles: lines, and so forth, b14-b15 (a) in astronomy, another heaven beside the sensible, b15 (b) in optics and harmony, the same objection, b20-b25 (2) other sciences, like intermediate medicine, surveying. There are no such things, b25-b35 (3) sensible lines & points not what geometers use, b35-998a6 (4) some would put the intermediates IN the sensibles, but this is impossible for these reasons, a7-a11 (a) they'd have to say the same about forms, a11-a13 (b) they'd double up solids, a13-a14 (c) there can be no motionless in movables, a14-a15 (d) for what purpose do they posit intermediates, and then put them in sensibles, a15-a19 Aristotle takes as dim a view of the intermediates as he does of the separate forms, but he takes a little longer to make his points. Yet we may ask, what did it mean to be "beside", para, 997a35, b12, etc., or "outside", chOris, 998a8, or "in", a9, etc., things? If Aristotle and his contemporaries had any idea what it meant, it was at best ambiguous. That this had not yet been thought out was shown to us in that passage in Plato's Parmenides wherein Parmenides rejected Socrates' "thought", noEma, 132B. Aristotle has passed this point in practice, - but in theory? He thought of form for Forms, but did he recognize that form was a thought? It would be centuries before anyone would. Are there sensible substances only, or are there others besides? Consider the question in its utmost simplicity. It is a key question. What does "other" mean? EFL, 1/11/96 BOOK B (III), chap. iii Problems six and seven 6. are the principles & elements genera, or the primary inherent constituents, ta genE E mallon ex hOn enuparchontOn . . . prOtOn? 998a20-a23 iii a. examples of the constituents (1) elements of speech, a23-a25 (2) elements of propositions of geometry, a25-a27 (3) elements, one or more, of bodies, a27-b4 b. genera are principles of definition, thus of what we know by definition, b4-b8. Some use the One and Being and the Great and the Small as the origin, b9-b11 c. but you can't have it both ways, b11-b14 As you are going to see, Book Z (VII) pursues both of the horns of this dilemma, and Aristotle DOES have it both ways, examining what ousia is, by its consituent parts and by division. But we will get to that later. Meanwhile, this dichotomy (constituents v. genera) seems somehow related to the dichotomy of the preceding problem (sensible and non-sensible ousia), in as much as constituents are sensibles and genera are non-sensibles. 7. if they are genera, the first [highest] or the last [lowest], ta eschata katEgoroumena epi tOn atomOn? 998b14-b17 a. if archai are universals, the highest, ta anOtatO, b17-b20 (1) like one and being, b20-b21 (2) difficulty [which I will address below], b22-b28 b. if intermediate genera, eti kai ta metaxu, the differentiae would be more the principles than the genera, and, if so, the principles would be infinite, b28-999a1 c. if the one is of the nature of a principle, undivided, in form, and genera are divisible into forms, the one is the last [lowest], a1-a6 d. there cannot be some genus outside its species, para tauta en hois to proteron kai husteron, a6-a12 e. the lowest, en tois atomois, are not intermediate, nor where better or worse. From these arguments it would seem the lowest of the genera were the archai, but this is not easy to say, because they ought to be outside their effects. The more universal and highest should be the archai, a12-a23 Much of this is not easy to translate, and I invite improvements. But of section 7. a. above (lines 998b22-b28) I feel confident: Aristotle has just suggested that being and one (on and hen) are the first genera, and most of all are predicated of all things. Continuing, he then says ouk hoion te de tOn ontOn hen einai genos oute to hen oute to on, there cannot be one (highest, or first) genus of beings, either One or Being. anagkE men gar tas diaphoras hekastou genous kai einai kai mian einai hekastEn, because on the one hand it is necessary that the differences of each genus (i.e. of those just named, One and Being) are and are one, each of them. adunaton de katEgoreisthai E ta eidE tou genous epi tOn oikeiOn diaphorOn E to genos aneu tOn autou eidOn, but on the other hand it is impossible either for the species to be predicated of the genus on its own differences (i.e. you can't predicate unity of being, if you are going to predicate being of unity), or the genus [to be predicated] without its own species (i.e. being without unity, unity without being, etc.). hOst' eiper to hen genos E to on, oudemia diaphora oute on oute hen estai, so whether the One is a genus, or Being, neither will be a difference, neither Being nor One. If this passage is difficult to understand, not to mention translate, perhaps the situation that Aristotle is describing here can be illuminated by the following diagram: genera hen on / \ / \ differences hen on hen on One both is and is one, and Being both is and is one. Neither can be the highest genus alone, without the other. This is Aristotle's way of showing, reversed, what Plato had shown us in the first hypothesis of the Parmenides: an Absolute One doesn't exist, i.e. if it has being, it is not one (it is two). With that much clarified, you can go on to puzzle over b., c., d. and e. In spite of my awkward rendering, it would seem that the gist of them is that if the principles and causes are genera, there is something to be desired in any level of such. In view of what is to come, these two problems, six and seven, are of the utmost importance. You will see them very influential in the shaping of Book Zeta (VII). You may have noticed that Tredennick takes these two problems together as one. So does Aquinas. EFL, 1/18/96 BOOK B (III), chap. iv, to 1000a4 Problems eight and nine The problems now continue to circle around the core problem of metaphysics and ontology: whether being is only sensible, particular, material, perishable, and concrete; or something else to boot. Those adjectives are all equivalent, whatever differences in their meaning, but Aristotle asks about each. In the fifth, are there sensible substances only, or not? In the sixth, are they constituent, as opposed to abstract classes (genE)? After a slight digression with nevertheless similar implications in the seventh, here in the eighth: are they particular or not? And this gets mixed up with the question of matter. In the tenth: perishables, or not. Whether being is sensible, particular, material, perishable, or not, amounts practically to the same question, merely stated in different ways. It is of course Plato's question, too, only in a new dress. And ours: are there only concrete things, or do abstractions also exist, and if so how? For Aristotle here in the Metaphysics the question will be, what is the contribution of matter and form to ousia? Matter surrounds particular, sensible, perishable things, while form, although it makes this thing this, and may be combined with matter, is not itself material or sensible so much as intellectible. Nor is it perishable the way matter is. For one who is supposed to have preferred the world of the here and now and the particular, you are going to see Aristotle show an unusual interest in the general, in form. Here in the eighth problem the names get a bit mixed up. At first the wording is different from the short list. Then, beginning with particulars, ta kath' hekasta, Aristotle shortly gets around to the material, hE hulE. Niether can be known without some added element: to the particulars, the general (to katholou); to the material, form. Note the association of form with the universal, ignoring the universal presence of matter. It is indeed a puzzle, but we will get a closer look at this in Book Z. In this eighth problem, for all its mixing things up, we are at the core of Aristotle's questioning. Aristotle calls it the most difficult of all. However, he says the same thing of another problem, the eleventh at 996a4-a5 and 1001a4, but who can blame the man? 8. Is there anything other than particulars? 999a24-a26 a. [Yes] we know things from their unity and universality, hE gar hen ti kai tauton, kai hE katholou ti, a27-a29 b. [No] but this would require genera, and we just showed that those are impossible, a29-a32 [in the seventh problem] c. is there something beside the combination of matter and form? If not, there is no knowledge, only sensation, a32-b4 d. to account for both knowledge and change, two terms and a substrate are needed, ti to gignomenon kai ex hou gignetai kai toutOn to eschaton agenEton, b4-b8 e. and there must be limit [viz. the substrate], b8-b12 f. matter, form and the combination (to sunolon) of matter and form, b12-b16 g. but to what does this apply, and to what does it not? Not everything. WE would not hold that there is a house beside the house [back to the old separation problem], b17-b20 h. Further: is there one ousia of all things? That is absurd. Everything of which there is one ousia, would be one. But are[n't] there many different things? All this is illogical. At the same time, how does matter become each of these different things, and how is the combination both? b20-b24 The mention of matter, form, and their combination (to sunolon) here foreshadows Book Z (VII). You can also see that Aristotle is coming around to two of his causes. But remember: Aristotle is raising problems here, not solutions. And the old problem of Parmenides is haunting him still. 9. are the principles one in form or number? 999b24-1000a4 a. form? b25-b27 b. number? b27-1000a4 Problem nine is short. The difficulty lies with the technical terms used, hen eidei, hen arithmOi, epi toutOn, epi pantOn. It asks whether the principles are one in form, or one in number. If they are one in form, hen eidei, none will be one in number, arithmOi hen, not even the absolute one and being. And how will there be any certain knowledge, if there is no universal, hen epi pantOn? b25- b27. But if they are one in number, hen arithmOi, and each of the principles is one, there will be nothing else beside the elements, b27-b33. Because there is no difference between one in number and the individual, b33-1000a1. If the elements of speech [for example] are one in number, all the letters would have to be just as many as the elements, not two or more, a1-a4. What does Aristotle mean by one in number, arithmOi hen, and one in form, eidei hen? He plainly says, b33-b34, that there is no difference between one in number and the individual, to kath' hekaston. It is a single thing. But what about the other, hen eidei? This must be what we call a collective one, a single collection of many individuals having some common characteristic epi toutOn. And as he also says, to epi toutOn = katholou, universal. Cf. also Book I (X), i, 1052a29-a34. The reference to the absolute one and being some of you may recognize as a passing reference to Parmenides and possibly Plato's Parmenides. Although it is redundant, I am going to repeat here what I wrote fifteen years ago about this problem, on the chance that the different way of expressing this might be helpful. B, i and iv, 996a1-2 and 999b24-1000a4 (ninth problem): this is at first puzzling. What is meant? It has nothing to do with a, ii. The question is: are the unities of the [first] causes unities (1) of kind, or (2) of number? (1) If they are unities of kind, then they are not numerical unities, and there will be no knowledge of them (hen epi pantOn = hen epi pollOn). (2) But if they are numerical unities (alla mEn ei arithmOi hen) and each of the principles is one (kai mia hekastE tOn archOn), there will be nothing beside the elements (ouk estai para ta stoicheia outhen heteron). Because unity in number is no different from individuality, so to speak (to gar arithmOi hen E to kath' hekaston legein diapherei outhen). Further elucidation is given by way of analogy to the elements of sound, in the middle of this passage, lines 28-32, kai mE hOsper . . . arithmOi hen eisin: they would be like the elements of sound. These being the same in kind differ in number. If they were not thus, but were one in number, there would be nothing else beside the elements. (Notice the confusion here of principles or causes, and elements.) That is to say, there would be no repetition of the original list, and no variety of them in words, etc. What are at stake here are the competing claims of (1) eidetic unity (hen eidei), which allowed for repetition of elements of causes, but no knowledge, and (2) numerical unity (hen arithmOi), which yielded knowledge, but no repetition. Form (eidos) and number emphasize respectively mental and bodily aspects of whatever they are applied to. Formal unity indicates an abstract or conceptual unity of many things. Numerical unity indicates a concrete, physical or quasi-physical singleness. The "nature" and relation of those kinds of unity had not been thoroughly worked out, and they constituted the problem that is expressed here. Likewise the notions of principle and element, which are confused here in this problem (hoion tEsde tEs sullabEs . . . ouk estai para ta stoicheia outhen heteron), emphasize respectively mental and bodily aspects of the inquiry. "Element" has a bodily connotation and usage (and not just for us, but also for Aristotle) that "principle" does not have. The substitution of one for the other in this passage indicates a confusion in the writer's and possibly his readers' minds. EL, 2/8/96 BOOK B (III), chap. iv, 1000a5 to end (1001b25) Problems ten and eleven Problem ten is somewhat different in character, in that it touches on the question of anthropomorphism again, the sort of question that Xenophanes had raised in his fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth (DK) fragments, and that we saw Aristotle himself raise a short while ago in the fifth problem here (997b5-b12). Hesiod and other like theologoi are faulted for making the immortal gods the cause of all things, yet ascribing to them mortal habits. All this to illustrate his question, how can there be the same causes of perishables and imperishables (1000a6-7)? After these theologoi, Aristotle takes up the philosophers, "those who speak deductively," a20, asking the same question of them, a20- a24. He takes Empedocles at length as his prime example (a25-b22) of the faults of this position, that the causes of perishables and imperishables can be the same. Then he takes the other side of the dilemma, to show the difficulties, if they are NOT the same, b23- 1001a3: (1) if they were perishable, they would have to have prior causes themselves, and so forth. On the other hand, (2) if imperishable, how come perishables from some, imperishables from others? Let us state this in outline: 10. whether the same or different principles, of perishables and imperishables? 1000a5-a7 a. if the same, how are there perishables and imperishables? a7-a8 (1) the theologoi and their mythical inconsistencies, a9-a19 (2) the philosophers, a19-b22 (a) how from same, perishables & imperishables? a19-24 (b) Empedocles [for example], a24-b22 1 Strife divides the many from the divine One, fragments DK21 & DK36; a24-b3 2 God's knowledge is limited; He does not know strife, fragment DK109; b3-b9 3 there are two, Strife and Love, that cancel each other [what would their cause be?], b9-b12 4 he neglects the cause of change, fragment DK30; b12-b17 5 he makes everything but the elements perishable, but the question is why some are, some not, b17-22 b. if different, will they [the archai] be imperishable or perishable, b23-b24 (1) if perishable, they'd have other prior archai, b24-b28, and how would perishables exist, if the archai were removed? b28-b29 (2) if imperishable, why would perishables come from some of them, imperishables from others? b29-b32, and no one would suggest other causes, but use the same for all, b32-1001a3 Notice that in this section b. Aristotle has made a subtle change: in a. it is the archai that are the same, OF perishables and imperishables; here in b. the question is whether the archai themselves are perishable or imperishable, aporia poteron aphthartoi kai hautai esontai E phthartai. Problem eleven, B, iv, 1001a4-b25. In the short list at the beginning of this Book, it was asked "whether the one and being are not something different, but the ousia of beings, or not; but the substrate is something else, as Empedocles says . . . " 996a5-8. My prior translation of these lines (December 28) was somewhat terse. Here it is asked again, "whether to on and to hen are the ousia tOn ontOn, and each of them not being something different, the one is being, or must we ask what in the world are to on and to hen, if there is some other substrate nature?" 1001a5-8. These cryptic Greek lines too are difficult to translate, yet their thrust is clear if you have spent some time watching those old Greeks puzzle over the special status of one and being, as we did a short time ago in the seventh problem, and will again before we are done. Indeed, this problem is a prime example of the difficulties you may meet if you approach the Metaphysics in vacuo, that is by itself without reference to context. It is especially helpful to read it with Parmenides and Plato continually in mind. Those of you who were with us in the reading of Plato's Parmenides last year must agree that it is helpful for the Metaphysics this year. You have some feeling for the tradition of the great question (pollE aporia) about the One and Being. Let us outline this eleventh problem as it is presented here: A. Statement of the problem: are to hen kai to on (the One and Being) the substances of things (ousiai tOn ontOn), and not different? Or what are they (1001a4-8)? B. Some opinions (1001a8-19) 1. Plato and the Pythagoreans: substance (a9-a12) 2. the phusiologoi: various physical theories of the One and Being (love, fire, air, etc.) (a12-a19) C. Discussion of the problem (1001a19-1001b6) 1. if they are not substance (ousia) (a20-a29) a. there are no other universals (a21-a24) b. if the One is not substance, there is no number separate from things (a24-a27) 2. if One and Being are some same thing a. they must be substance, not something different but the same (a27-a29) b. but there is a big problem (a29-b6) 1 how is there any multiplicity of beings? As Parmenides said, everything is one (a31-b1) 2 again there is no number, whether one is not or is substance (to hen ousia = ti auto hen) (b1-6) a if it is not, we showed why above (see C. 1. b. above) (b3) b if it is, there is the same problem as with Being (i.e. the problem raised by Parmenides): how will there be any other one beside the One? It cannot be one (b3-6) 3 restatement: all things are one or many (b6) Up to this point Aristotle has offered a dilemma that is complete in itself. Now the discussion takes a new turn suggested by the Parmenidean proposition (C. 2. b. 1 above) that everything is one and there is no multiplicity or division, eti ei adiaireton auto to hen. Zeno was very closely linked to Parmenides, as we know from Plato's dialogue. The first part of this new discussion is clearly related to what has preceded. It grows out of it quite naturally. But because the prior discussion is self-sufficient and this one brings in such new material (Zeno, etc.) the latter is placed under a separate major heading in this outline, for the sake of emphasis. The second part of it also seems to follow naturally as an additional consideration of traditional material in the shape of some current Platonic doctrine that was closely linked with all this. D. New discussion 1. if the One is indivisible (as Parmenides had suggested), then according to Zeno nothing exists (1001b7-8) a. Zeno's doctrine 1 what, being added or taken away, makes not more or less, is not any being (b8-9) 2 as being has bulk, and hence body (b10-11) 3 other things sometimes make larger when added, sometimes not, like surface, line, point, monad (this argument of Zeno's was originally directed against the Pythagoreans, not against Parmenides, as might appear here, to refute their contention that points, etc. had bulk. It is here cited out of such a context by Aristotle.) (b11-13) b. but Zeno argues coarsely and there can be something indivisible (b13-14). There is an answer to Zeno (b15). Such things as points, lines, etc., don't make larger when more are added, but how from such immaterial units or such additions will there be bulk? It is like saying the line is [made] of points (b15-19). (i.e. Zeno's mistake is to suggest that things must have bulk to exist.) 2. but if one supposes on the other hand [as Plato did] that number is produced by the One and the Other, one must no less inquire why and how some- times number sometimes bulk is produced, if the not-One is the Unequal (i.e. ta mega kai to mikron, the Dyad, matter). Because it is clear that bulk would not come to be somehow from the One and the Same, somehow from some number and the Same (b19-25). Once more we must apologize for the awkwardness of our English. We are not just trying to translate. We are only trying to determine whether we understand the Greek, and the reader is referred to the Greek. There is here, we believe, a consistent and meaningful passage. It addresses questions that have already been raised before in the text, briefly. Attention has been called earlier to them (problem seven in B, iii, 998b22-27), and later a whole book, I, will be devoted to them. They are questions first about the nature of the One, or the notion of unity as we might put it, and its relations to Being and to their opposites, the Many and not- Being. These had been matters of perplexity for generations, when Aristotle was composing these lines. Parmenides, Zeno and Plato, referred to quite appropriately here, had been at the center of the controversies. It is impossible to understand these lines without understanding that context. The very language is inherited. Otherwise, as so often the case in Aristotle, it would seem silly. The force of this tradition also explains why Aristotle's constructive metaphysics (Books E - L) is divided into three ontologies instead of two. Two would answer his own original presuppositions: the structure of the four causes. His conceptual ontology of matter and form (E - Theta) and his quasi-physical ontology of the Unmoved Prime Mover and the Good (K - L) are the two parts of his one science of the causes. The third ontology (Book I) is really an excurse that was a necessary response to one of the most prominent questions of his time, just as the final books (M, N) are appendices addressed to similar, not unrelated, but newer questions of number. These questions of unity, number, geometricals, rise appropriately to the surface here in this discussion of problems in Book B. Along with Plato's Idea theory they comprise the important underlying problems of the list, and they foreshadow the scope and structure of the treatise from E to N. (Please excuse the delay in the transmission of this msg. I have spent the last six days in the hospital, accountable to a cecotomy and polypectomy. I can happily report that the excised polyp proved to be wholly benign. This had been planned last December. I am a very lucky guy. We herewith return to Aristotle) - EFL, 2/18/96 BOOK B (III), chap v, 1001b26 - 1002b11 Problem twelve Twelfth in the extended discussion in this Book, this problem was the fourteenth in the short list at the beginning of the Book. It is eleventh in Tredennick's discussion (Loeb ed.), and twelfth in Aquinas'. 12. Are numbers and geometricals ousiai, or not? 1001b26-b28 a. if they are not, what are? b28-b29 1. not properties, motions, relations, conditions. These are predicated of some subject, b29-1002a4 2. body (sOma) even less so, a4-a8 (a) common people and the ancients thought body is ousia, everything else its properties, a8-a11 (b) smarter and modern people chose number, a11-a12 (c) so we say, if numbers and geometricals are not ousia, nothing is, a12-a14 b. if they are, 1. of what sort of bodies? a15-a18 2. all these seem mere divisions of body, a18-a20 (a) why would one be any more substantial than another? a20-a28 3. they don't become or perish, like ousiai, a28-b5 4. comparison to time, b5-b11 The nature of numbers and geometricals (points, lines, planes, solids) was a major puzzle to ancient Greeks. Here the problem is barely introduced, and the argument in some places (e.g., a. 2.) seems a bit thin. In Book M (XIII), near the end of the Metaphysics, it will be taken up in fullness and detail. My own view is that it is hardly the major issue of the Metaphysics, which is primarily an investigation of being qua being, of matter and form, of sensibles and Ideas. Numbers and geometricals are sub- species of Idea. This was not seen clearly then, hence the confusion and these excursions from the main issues at hand. We would do well to keep this in mind, and not be sidetracked from the main issues. Mathematicians my indeed wonder why we bother with this at all. It is of historical interest. Progress is not achieved without false steps. * * * * * With regard to Gerald Harnett's three msgs of 16 February: I am not going to offer point by point replies to the matters that Gerald has so happily raised here, but I hope that each of you will look at those msgs carefully. See especially, for example, the phrases in the first msg: "the question of individual forms in Aristotle," "a thing's substance is in its form," and, most tellingly, "according to Aquinas." The main point here is that Gerald and I are coming to the text before us from two utterly different directions. He declares his here, and mine will become increasingly apparent to you, if it has not already done so. Thomas Aquinas' reading of Aristotle's Metaphysics, found mainly in his Commentaria (I use the 1935 Turin edition), is not in the least to be dismissed. But you must recognize that it is based upon some specific assumptions, those of thirteenth century Christian scholasticism. A very powerful and justifiable world view that, but Aristotle was neither Christian nor a twelfth century AD scholastic. And there are other ways to approach and understand his text, including a way which I find much more helpful. We should keep our eye out for all of them. A case in point. "Aquinas takes it for granted, here and throughout the Metaphysics that . . . a thing's substance is its form . . . " That statement is quite correct: he does take this for granted. Well, - I do not. For me, a thing (whatever thing, rock, pencil, MAN) and its form are two utterly different "things." But what about Aristotle? This is just what we are going to find out. In the Metaphysics Aristotle's main quest(ion) is: What is ousia? tis hE ousia; Placed thus on the qui vive, I hope you will continue to look for these differences between Gerald's approach and mine (and possibly others that may arise). And I hope that Gerald will continue to push his case as he sees fit. All of this should become clearer as we proceed. EFL, 2/22/96 BOOK B (III), chap. vi Problems thirteen, fourteen, fifteen 13. Why should we look for something else beside sensibles and mathematicals (ta metaxu), namely ideas? 1002b12-b14 a. they are necessary to limit ousia, b14-b30 (1) if the principles of mathematics will not be limited in number (like the principles of lines in our world are not limited, but in kind they will be), b14-b23 (2) there will be no substance one in number, but [only] in kind, and the principles of beings will be limited only in kind, b14-b25 [i.e. there will be unlimited principles] (3) so it is necessary to posit forms, b25-b26 (4) but even if they don't express themselves very well, but this is what they mean, they must concede this: that each thing is some substance of ideas, and nothing by accident, b27-b30 b. But if we posit ideas, and that the principles are one in number, but not in kind we saw what impossibilites must result, b30-b32 This is not one of the clearest passages we have encountered. What, in a nutshell, is he saying? Without forms, there will be nothing to limit the number of principles we would have to have recourse to, to explain every individual thing. (That should remind us of Parmenides'admonition to the young Socrates in Plato's Parmenides 135B-C, that without the Ideas all power of discussion would be destroyed.) With forms, on the other hand, if we do not use them, we are back in the same fix as we were in problem #9, 999b27- 1000a4. 14. Are the elements potential, or in some other mode? 1002b32-b34 a. if some other [actual], there is something else prior, b34 b. if potential, there could be nothing, 1003a2-a5 This is the first mention of potentiality and actuality, which will be treated at greater length in Book Theta (IX). Here a temporal priority of potentiality is suggested. 15. Are the principles universal, or individuals, 1003a5-a7 a. if universals, they will not be ousiai, for universals apply to classes (toionde); but ousia, to particular this-things (tode ti), a7-a9. If common predicates are individuals, then Socrates [e.g.] will be many . . . a9-a13 b. if not, there will be no knowing them, unless there are other, prior principles, which are universal, if you wish knowledge of them, a13-a17 Shades of Parmenides 135B-C again! Notice especially that line 1003a8-a9, outhen gar tOn koinOn tode ti sEmainei alla toionde, hE d'ousia tode ti, none of the universals means a this [individual] but a such [a class or genus]; OUSIA MEANS A THIS [individual]. In light of recent remarks on my part (in particular on 22 February in a reply to Gerald Harnett that a thing's substance is not its form, Aquinas notwithstanding) this remark of Aristotle's here may require some explaining. There is no need to appeal to the excuse that this is "question period" in the Metaphysics, and the remark can be taken in that vein. No, - the problem is the old bugaboo of ambiguity that we are going to run into again and again. There is an important sense that ousia DOES mean a this. Being qua being is the object of Aristotle's search in the Metaphysics, and there is such a concept. But we never actually encounter being in other than in particular beings, in tode ti-s so to speak. Only, I say again, in our minds, as an abstraction. We can think of such a thing. And that gets pretty close to the dichotomous root of the matter. Ousia is not just a whole lot of tode ti-s. It is a toionde, too. Aquinas was not wrong: it's just that his view was limited. As we will shortly see (Gamma ii), to de on legetai pollachOs, being means many things. This concludes Book B (III). As a reminder of our location in this forest, I append part of the Short Outline that I posted at the beginning of our sessions: I. Introductory and propaedeutic books A. The nature and value of knowledge Alpha B. The causes Alpha, Little alpha C. Problems Beta* D. Language, logic and metaphysics Gamma E. Definitions Delta F. What kind of science do we seek? Epsilon, i II. The three ontologies A. The conceptual ontology, or internal ontology of matter and form B. The ontology of the One C. The quasi-physical ontology, or the external ontology of the Unmoved Prime Mover III. Appendices on numbers * - You are here! EFL, 2/29/96 ANOTHER VIEW OF THE METAPHYSICS Some old notes from the margin of my copy of Aquinas, reviewing the first three Books Causae dubitationum ex positionibus priorum oriuntur, et propter hoc opiniones priorum narrabuntur. Priores individualiter tetigunt diversa de substantia et principiis rerum, et ex hoc unusquisque partialiter, et cum aliis confligentur. Necessarium videtur quod partes veritatis videntur ante totam veritatem, quod visio partialis naturae rerum praecedit visionem totalem. Has visiones sicut confligentes restat alicui resolvere in unam. Et ita primo causa earum dubitat aliquis de rerum natura, sicut sic aut non circa aliquem theoriam, aut sicut haec aut illa inter duas theorias, et postea cogitur dubitationes resolvere. Et patet quod resolutio harum dubitationum est in ea consideratione quae ambas partes contradictionis aut conflictionis apparentis includere potest, scilicet sic et non. Haec est summa consideratio scientiae, removens omnes dubitationes. Sic primo summa scientiae fundatur in dubitationibus quae oriuntur ex opinionibus partialibus priorum. Et sic patet hic quoque, quia si dubitationes recapitulamus, videbimus eas ex positionibus priorum provenire. Recapitulatio dubitationum Aristotelis 1. Genera causarum spectant ad unam scientiam seu diversae? 2. Consideratio principiorum demonstrationis est huius scientiae an non? 3. Una scientia est omnium substantiarum an non? 4. Sunt aliquae aliae substantiae praeter sensibiles an non? 5. Principia sunt genera (et si genera, prima) an non? 6. Sunt aliqua universalia separata a sensibilibus singularibus an non? 7. Sunt aliqua universalia separata a compositis ex forma et materia an non? 8. Sunt una substantia, et eadem principia, omnium an non? 9. Sunt eadem principia corruptibilium et incorruptibilium an non? 10. Est unum et ens omnium rerum substantia et principium an non? 11. Sunt praeter mathematica et sensibilia aliquae rerum species separatae an non? 12. Sunt prima rerum principia universalia an singularia? 13. Sunt prima rerum principia in potentia vel actu? 14. Numquid numeri et magnitudines sint substantiae rerum et principia? Nos considerantes has dubitationes videbimus eas omnes versari circa dilemmata opinionum priorum. Naturales dividebantur tangendo ex una parte diversitatem et mobilitatem rerum, ex altera parte unitatem et immobilitatem. Ad hoc solvendum, Plato posuit causam formalem, de speciebus loquens, ratione cuius res immobiles (immutantes) erant et unum erat super omnia, et causam materialem, ratione cuius res mobiles (mutantes) et diversae erant. Dum priores ad causam materialem principaliter spectant, Plato principaliter ad causam formalem spectat. Ex hoc novum dilemma. Secundum hoc quod nosmetipsi ad unam spectamus, ad omnes quaestiones supra positas unomodo, sed secundum hoc quod ad alteram spectamus, altero modo respondemus. Et sic Aristotele multae dubitationes sunt, scilicet suprapositae, quae proveniunt ex hac, utrum res considerare debemus ex parte causae formalis, sicut Plato, an ex parte causae materialis, sicut Naturales. Necesse est eas considerare ex parte formalis autem, ad explicandum prius dilemma de movendo et permanendo. Sed si sola ex illa parte, insufficiens tamen, etiam ad eandem quaestionem. Nulla enim tunc realiter motio aut diversitas. Est autem aliud dilemma eodem modo, intelligibiliter et sensibiliter. Ex hoc videtur quod res et earum substantia et principia considerandae sunt simul ex parte causae formalis et ex parte causae materialis. Realiter existunt sic solum i.e. formaliter ET materialiter, non uno modo sine alio. In hoc sensu non est realiter species aut formae aut universalia seperatae existentiae, aut causa formalis. Sed ex alio sensu, cum facile scimus res sensibiliter quantum ad earum causam materialem, et habemus multas et diversas scientias de eis sic materiatis (cum, materiatae, diversificantur: et ex hoc est causa diversitatis harum scientiarum), necesse est praeterea scire et habere scientiam de rebus quantum ad earum causam formalem, quia tantum ad hoc est earum ens et esse quantum ex altera. Et haec videtur esse summa scientiarum de ente, etiam si omnes scientiae sunt de ente. Et palam est autem quod haec erit una scientia et simplex; dum scientia de rebus secundum causam materialem erit multiplex, immo erunt multae scientiae tales. Nunc melius possumus explicare omnes singulas dubitationes suprapositas, et rationes, quae confligere videntur, solvere. Semper sic et non. Nunc quoque videbimus rationem modi procedendi Aristotelis in hoc opere, et quomodo talis scientia summa fundatur super dubitationes circa auctoritates priorum, et hac logica paradoxi "sic et non" aedificatur super omnes praecedentes. Hoc tamen possibile solum quando homo sic logica utitur, non ad vincendum opponentem, sed ad includendum eum et ad differentiam apparentem solvendum. Sicut iam supra factum est. Cogita: semper quando differentia aut oppositio est opinionis, si nos rationem eius comprehendere conamus, habebimus majorem comprehensionem rerum quae sunt in universo. Quia saepe aut semper est ratio bona huius oppositionis, etiamsi restat in experientia differente aut nova opponentis. Etiam tunc homini opus datur has novas experientias in eius vita includere. Sic procedat et maturat homo. A word about Aquinas, and about these notes above. First about Aquinas: his reading of Aristotle's Metaphysics must be understood to be squarely in the context of the medieval tradition, commencing with Abelard in the twelfth century, and coming to perhaps its finest example in the Summa theologia. In this tradition was established the dialectic of sic ET non, as opposed for example to the earlier (as in Proclus) tradition of sic AN non. Abelard, of course, in his epoch-making work, Sic et Non, just put the questions, the contradictions. Aquinas gave the answers in his Summa Theol. You know the form: "Videtur quod . . . Sed contra est . . . Respondeo. Dicendum . . . and then the individual responses, Ad primum ergo, etc. . . . This was the consummation of medieval dialectic, as applied to theological topics, which Abelard had inaugurated. In the course of ages it was a new and original tradition. Now about the above synopsis: I am not sure how faithfully it reflects Thomas, and how much it reflects my own understanding of his commentary. It is fifty five years since I scratched the above notes in the margin of my copy. I had not looked at them since, until yesterday. I can read and understand them now, but I am not sure that I am at this point up to restudying the base text to determine whom it represents, Aquinas or yours truly, i.e. how much I have read into the text. Does it make a great difference, however, at the moment? It is Aristotle we are trying to understand, not Thomas Aquinas, and if the above is any help to you, just take it as it is, without worrying whether I have abused Thomas or not. I am sure that the above approach is squarely in the medieval tradition, at least. When I wrote it I was being steeped in that tradition, not just by study but by living in it, in the Dominican convent in Ottawa (they were most hospitable to me while I was absorbing the presence of perhaps the one and only live institution we inherit from that far off time). My point in this "confession" is not to burden you with the particulars of my life's story, but to explain the provenance and the rationale of the above synopsis. It is right out of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It comes at the Metaphysics from a somewhat different angle, and if this is at all helpful, it is worth the effort. Thomas' explanation of the Metaphysics, at least as it came through to me, was in the context of his time, and answered the needs of his time. That does not mean that we should stop with it, any more than we should stop with any other of our predecessors, whether Alexandrian, Arabic, medieval or modern. Their times and their needs are not ours. But that is not to say that they may not be helpful - only that they are not limiting. It hardly needs pointing out, my Latin is not "golden." It reflects modern English syntax, especially in its indirect discourse (avoiding the accusative and the infinitive, in favor of "that" and the indicative). But don't "knock" it. Latin is a flexible language that has adapted itself to many changes. That is why it has lasted so long. If it sounds childish, it will also be easier for you. And I am not Cicero. EFL, 3/1/96 COMMENTARIES, a Perspective >From time to time it is good to distance ourselves from our day to day or week to week close inspection of Aristotle's text, and take a larger view. It saves our perspective, and our sanity. This time let us look at how our venture fits into a larger tradition that has been going on for more than two thousand years. If you take the time to look at Luciano Canfora's The Vanished Library, Univ. of California Press, 1990, or Paul Moraux, Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote, Louvain, 1951, you will see how fortunate we are to have any texts of Aristotle at all. Once they survived and were collated by Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century B.C., they were read and commented upon again and again down through the ages. A good survey of the ancient commentators is a fairly new book, "Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence," ed. Richard Sorabji, Cornell U.P., 1990. Efforts to understand and explain Aristotle's Metaphysics and other works continue to this day. I mention only a few of the most prominent names. Ancient commentators in the Greek tradition: Alexander of Aphrodisias, ca. 200 A.D. Porphyry, late 3rd century Themistius, fourth century Asclepius (Ammonius), fifth-sixth century Michael of Ephesus (Ps.-Alexander), twelfth century These are of course available in the great series, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Berlin, 1882- , translations in progress, Duckworth/Cornell, 1987- . An eleventh century Persian commentary ad sententiam is in Ibn- Sina's Danish Nama-i ala'i (Ilahyyat) (Metaphysics), fortunately translated for us by Parviz Morewedge as "The Metaphysica of Avicenna (ibn Sina)", London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973. "To Avicenna Thomism owes its fundamental distinction between essence and existence." Of Arabic commentators I am not well informed, but given their interest in Aristotle there must have been others beside Al-Farabi, whom you recall by Ibn Sina's reference, in the quotation I dropped on you at Christmas time. Other titles by Al-Farabi are cited in Morewedge, op. cit., xxi, mostly, so far as I can see, in Arabic. Thomas Aquinas, In Metaphysicam Aristotelis commentaria, thirteenth century, of which there are no doubt many editions. This is far from a complete list. These are the great names. To get an idea of some of the modern commentators, look at the list on pages ix-xii in Ross. Included are Bonitz, Bullinger, Christ, Jackson, Jaeger, Maier, Natorp, and Schwegler (none of which I have read except Jaeger years ago, so cannot tell you much about them). We are not alone! It is indeed very interesting to see what some of these other readers have made of this text. My own hunch is that it is also a good idea to approach this text directly, without much intermediation. Otherwise how would the leaven of a new time and a new place get to work, as it has many times in the past. So we should feel free to consult any of these worthies as we may wish, without feeling compelled to do so. A recent commentary ad sententiam is Joseph Owens' The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, Toronto, 1978 (rev.). The scholarship is impressive, but I found it myself rather heavy. Who am I to say that! Is not our venture ponderous enough? Well, I hope not. It is laborious. That cannot be helped. But one's own (viz. your) labour is or should be sweeter than trying to follow someone else's. And I have been trying to limit my effort to outlining the text and some seminal hints, hoping to ease your pain, while leaving you a burden. I do not wish to build complicated theories about what Aristotle is saying. Oppositely my aim is to find the simplest possible explanations. If from time to time we do seem to get involved in complicated explanations, it is to convince you that none of this is being made up, that we are sticking close to his words and, as best we can make it out, his meaning. I beg to say that the Metaphysics, like Plato's Parmenides, has a reputation that is worse than it deserves. It is not a as difficult a text as we sometimes tend to make it. Occasional details are puzzling, but they can be treated as a challenge like the daily cross-word in your newspaper. They are tractable. And the whole will prove to be not insurmountably difficult. I promise you. It does leave us with a problem at the end, but that will be seen to be a problem built in to our own nature, which we are going to have to accept cheerfully. The greatest difficulty of texts of this sort is that they take time. Time for careful reading. Time for meditation. That is something that we seem to deny ourselves these days. The world is too much with us late and soon Getting and spending we lay waste our powers Little we see in nature [or the Metaphysics] that is ours Wordsworth was right. Coraggio! - EFL, 1/9/96